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JUROR DELINQUENCY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 
IN AMERICA, 1796-1996 
Nancy J. King* 
This article examines two aspects of the jury system that have at-
tracted far less attention from scholars than from the popular press: 
avoidance of jury duty by some citizens, and misconduct while serving 
by others. Contemporary reports of juror shortages and jury dodging 
portray a system in crisis.1 Coverage of recent high-profile cases sug-
gests that misconduct by jurors who do serve is common. In the trial of 
Damian Williams and Henry Watson for the beating of Reginald Denny, 
a juror was kicked off for failing to deliberate;2 Exxon, Charles Keat-
ing, and the man accused of murdering Michael Jordan's father all com-
plained of juror misconduct;3 and, of course, several jurors in the trial 
of O.J. Simpson were replaced after allegations that ·they had lied, con-
cealed intentions to profit from the case, or otherwise misbehaved.4 In 
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A. 1983, Oberlin College; J.D. 1987, 
University of Michigan. - Ed. Special thanks to the hundreds of judges that responded 
to the survey, and the dozens that took the time to volunteer comments and other mater-
ials. Thanks also to Dean John Costonis for providing funding, and to Albert W. Al-
schuler, Deborah Denno, James W. Ely, Jean Ledwith King, Stanton D. Krauss, Robert 
P. Mosteller, G. Thomas Munsterman, Nancy C. Staudt, Neil Vidmar, and Nicholas 
Zeppos, for helpful comments. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance 
of Lisa Jepson, Chad Breunig, Michael Dell, Christian Petersen, Stephanie Millet, and 
especially Shayne Bland. 
1. See, e.g., Andrea Gerlin, Jury-Duty Scofflaws Try Patience of Courts, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1995, at Bl, BS; Arleen Jacobius, California Three-Strikes Law Gob-
bling Up Jurors, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 29 (noting that "the juror shortage is almost a 
crisis in Los Angeles County"). Other news stories consider efforts to avoid jury ser-
vice amusing - good top-ten list material. See Gary Taylor, Want to Duck Jury Duty? 
They've Heard Them All, NATL. L.J., Nov. 27, 1995, at A24 (reporting the Harris 
County, Texas, District Court Clerk's top ten excuses offered by folks eager to avoid 
serving as jurors, including an astronaut who said he'd be in space that day, someone 
who said "I shot holes in my daughter's boyfriend's car," and another who insisted that 
she "had to feed [the] bird during the day"). 
2. See Henry Weinstein, ACLU Asks Ito to Release Juror Hearing Transcripts, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1995, at A16. 
3. See Request for New Trial for Exxon ls Denied, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996, at 
B2; James S. Granelli, Spotlight Shifts to Keating's Federal Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
1996, at Dl; Teen: Jordan Suspect Said to Stay Quiet, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc. 
(N.C.), Jan. 23, 1996, at B2. 
4. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Noble, District Attorney Looks into Accusations of Jury 
Tampering in Simpson Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al2; Barry Tarlow, Perspec-
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the past year, newspaper reports have described less well-known cases 
in which jurors refused to answer personal questions, stole jewels intro-
duced as evidence, had sex with courthouse deputies, visited the crime 
scene, bit another juror's arm to examine tooth marks, read forbidden 
newspaper articles, got drunk, made racist comments, used drugs, and 
discussed the case before the end of the trial. 5 
The research reported here is an effort to place these defects in the 
jury system into perspective, to learn how widespread these problems 
are, whether they are new (or, if not, how ·they differ from similar 
problems in earlier years), and what courts have done and should do 
now about them. The article incorporates a historical overview of jury 
dodging and misconduct since 17966 and the results of an original sur-
vey completed in December, 1995, by 562 trial judges across the coun-
try. The survey is the first to collect empirical information about jury 
avoidance and misconduct nationwide. 
The story of jury delinquency that unfolds holds useful insights for 
those who struggle to improve a jury system that today faces criticism 
from all sides. First, the rules that govern juror enlistment and oversight 
tive on the Simpson Trial; Juror Misconduct Isn't a License to Fish; What Jeanette Har-
ris Claims Isn't Highly Unusual; Investigating Jurors During a Trial Is- or Should Be, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at B7 (claiming "serious jury misconduct is often a part of 
high-profile cases"). 
5. See Appeal Filed in Jewel Heist - Evidence Still Missing, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 
19, 1996, at A15; Paul Elias, Alleged Misconduct Delays Rape-Murder Case, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept 7, 1995, at B4; Ken Ellingwood, Henley Says He Didn't Know of Jury-
Bribing Plan,· Paul Gustafson, -Jurors take law into own hands; Sometimes, they test the 
trial evidence themselves, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 19, 1995, at Al; Michael 
Perlstein, Ex-Exec: I Killed My Wife in 1986; Bathtub Murder Mystery Solved, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 28, 1995, at Al; John Steenson, Attorney: Jury Erred 
on Murder, Defense Lawyer Seeks to Toss Out Conviction in '94 Fatal Shooting, HER-
ALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 6, 1995, at Cl; Nita Thurman, Woman Wins Battle 
Over Juror's Right to Privacy, She Was Ordered Jailed Last Year For Refusing to An-
swer Questions, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, June 18, 1995, at A37; Misconduct by Jurors 
Hurts Justice, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Apr. 4, 1996, at A24; Hearing: 
The Ex-Ram Player, in a Bid To Win a New Trial, Also Testified that Panelists Dis-
cussed the Case While Under Order Not To, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, at Bl2 (report-
ing allegations of premature deliberations, racist comments, drug use, and bribery in a 
single trial). Jury misconduct is even featured in movies and television exposes. See, 
e.g., THE JUROR (Columbia-TriStar 1996); Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast, 
Jan. 10, 1996). 
6. As is true of many aspects of the American jury, little information has been 
compiled concerning the history of jury misconduct or truancy. This article draws heav-
ily upon general histories of courts in the nineteenth century, histories of other aspects 
of the jury, and nineteenth-century treatises and cases. For an excellent overview of the 
history of the criminal jury and a description of the need for more research into jury 
history, see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal 
Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994). 
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have been influenced over the decades by changing conceptions of the 
jury's function. Jurors have assumed many roles - group representa-
tives to a lawmaking body, democracy's students, symbols of fairness, 
accurate fact finders. Future attempts to regulate the behavior of those 
who are called for jury service must respond to the continuing shifts in 
sentiment regarding the jury's proper function. Second, both the avoid-
ance of jury duty and the existence of juror misconduct are old 
problems that in earlier times seem to have caused even more trouble 
for courts than they do today. According to a ·majority. of the judges in 
most of the cities surveyed, few cases today are plagued by misconduct 
and most people answer the call to jury duty. Over the years efforts to 
prevent culpable behavior rather than punish it have proved their value, 
a useful lesson for those hoping to improve further juror compliance in 
jurisdictions where jury avoidance or juror misconduct affect a signifi-
cant portion of trials. 
The first half of this article is devoted to a study of the avoidance 
of jury service and the law's response. After introducing theoretical and 
practical constraints on the administration of compulsory jury service in 
section I.A, I review in section I.B the experience of courts in recruiting 
jurors for the past two centuries. Section l.C describes the situation to-
day using the responses of trial judges surveyed. The discussion of jury 
avoidance concludes in section l.D with a brief analysis of several pro-
posed reforms. The second half of the article addresses misconduct by 
jurors once they have appeared for jury duty. Following an exposition 
of historical trends concerning misconduct in section II.A, section II.B 
reports the responses of judges surveyed about jury misconduct in their 
courts over the past three years. Section II.C concludes with some ob-
servations about the future regulation of juror misconduct. 
I. PERFECTING JURY COMPLIANCE IN AMERICA: 
A CONSTANT STRUGGLE 
A. Why (Not) Force Jurors To Serve? 
Competing views of the role of the criminal jury have influenced 
the enforcement of compulsory jury service in America. Some consider 
the jury an educational institution that teaches jurors and trial observers 
lessons about democratic self-governance. For them, citizens who avoid 
service deprive themselves of important knowledge and undermine the 
political order.7 For those who believe that jury service is a civic duty 
7. Empirical support for the claim that forced jury service enhances jury legiti-
macy is mixed. Some studies show that even unwilling jurors come away with a good 
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that every American owes to his community and his country, exemp-
tions from service and other manifestations of lax enforcement appear 
pernicious.8 For others, the jury is a special kind of law-making body, 
one that must fairly represent racial, ethnic, religious, gender, and other 
demographic groups in the community which it serves so that it may ar-
rive at acceptable standards of reasonableness and accountability. Vigor-
ous enforcement efforts would appeal to those holding this view of the 
jury especially if those efforts would help to alleviate the under-
representation of minority groups on juries.9 Finally, others may con-
attitude about the jury system, while others seem to suggest that reluctant jurors may in-
stead spread ill will about the system long after they have completed service they feel 
was extorted from them. For a helpful discussion of several studies, see Shari Seidman 
Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as Ju-
rors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVn.. JURY SYSTEM 282, 284-88 (Robert E. Litan 
ed., 1993); see also JANICE T. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR 
FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO JURY SYSTEM PERFORMA!'!CE § 4.3, at 34 [here-
inafter J. MUNSTERMAN ET AL.] (National Ctr. for St. Cts. ed., 1991) (finding that ju-
rors who had unsuccessfully sought an excuse tended to be less satisfied with jury ser-
vice than those who had not, and that a person's willingness to serve had a stronger 
effect on satisfaction than fees, term length, and court facilities, but less of an effect 
than the method by which the jurors were processed, and how long they waited); Leigh 
B. Bienen et al., Conference Survey: Attitudes Toward Jury Service and Reactions to the 
Experience in the State of New Jersey, in THE FINAL REPORT OF THE POLICY CON-
FERENCE ON THE AMERICAN JURY: PROTECTOR OF FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS OR ANACHRONISM? app. C, at 9 (Woodrow Wilson Sch. Poly. Conf. 
ed., 1994) (reporting recent study finding that of those citizens who reported that they 
were "displeased" to receive their jury summons, 43% rated their jury service experi-
ence negatively, compared to the overwhelmingly positive reactions to jury service by 
those who were pleased to receive a jury summons). 
8. The debate about whether and how to recruit the unwilling juror resembles to 
some extent the debate between those who support the draft and those who prefer vol-
unteer armed forces. On one side are the arguments of civic duty, shared burden, equal-
ity, and learned patriotism, ideals that draft supporters claim are undermined by a vol-
untary system because it allows those who are in the most need of such education, and 
those who already wield the most influence, to decline to serve. Opponents of the draft 
have responded by claiming that love of country is destroyed, not enhanced, by forced 
service, and that volunteers make better soldiers. See generally THE Mn..ITARY DRAFT: 
SELECTED READINGS ON CONSCRIPTION (Martin Anderson & Barbara Honegger 
eds., 1982). 
9. Courts have considered oversampling particular areas with the highest rates of 
nonresponding jurors in jurisdictions i~ which areas containing higher proportions of 
minority residents also have higher nonresponse rates to jury summonses. Because this 
means that a person may be summoned for jury service more frequently depending on 
his or her neighbor's behavior, this type of structured sampling puts the goal of repre-
sentation before the goal of equalizing the burden of jury service. See Nancy J. King & 
G. Thomas Munsterman, Stratified Juror Selection: Cross-Section By Design, 19 JUDI-
CATURE 273, 275-76 (1996); see also United States v. Gometz, 730 F.2d 475, 483-85 
(7th Cir.) (Cuhady, J., dissenting) (arguing that failing to take follow-up action to im-
prove response rate to questionnaires of only 30% denies defendant his statutory right 
to a jury drawn from a cross-section of the community), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845 
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sider these various roles unimportant compared to the mission of the 
criminal jury to determine, accurately, the facts of a case. This idea of 
jurors as fact finders, not lawmakers, has prompted adherents to look 
favorably upon measures that promise to increase compliance rates of 
prospective jurors with the most education and less favorably upon 
measures that would increase the compliance rates of those with less 
education. The concern for accuracy also may prompt some judges to 
routinely excuse reluctant veniremembers who grudgingly appear on the 
theory that an unwilling decisionmaker may choose an early exit over 
reasoned deliberation, may take out his resentments on one of the liti-
gants, or may simply lack that sense of responsibility that accurate 
judgment requires. 10 
In addition to recruitment philosophy, political and financial con-
cerns have influenced judicial responses to jury avoiders. Courts that 
may prefer to accept whoever shows up have sometimes been forced 
into action when sinking juror yields drive the cost of procuring each 
juror to troubling levels or delay court business. On the other hand, 
courts that may prefer to coerce each and every eligible person into ser-
vice have encountered their own set of barriers. One problem courts 
have yet to surmount is futility. Even if judges could drag every re-
sisting citizen into a venire, peremptory challenges have left judges 
powerless to prevent litigants from excluding unwilling jurors during 
voir dire. Judges also lack the means to deter or prevent veniremembers 
from misrepresenting their beliefs on voir dire in order to escape ser-
vice. Moreover, even if judges agree that simply getting reluctant jurors 
to come to the courthouse is worth the effort, the cost of processing 
contempt citations has steadily increased as dockets have mushroomed~ 
The following brief exposition of the history of jury duty avoidance il-
(1984); Matthew Kauffman, Race Mix of Jury at Issue: Pool of Jurors is Unbalanced, 
HARTFORD CoURANT, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al (reporting defense counsel concerns that 
failure to follow up on or enforce jury summonses results in a less representative jury, 
and citing a 1993 study from Washington, D.C. which revealed that 70% of jury sum-
monses sent to predominately minority areas were returned as undeliverable, compared 
to 30% of those sent to areas with more whites). 
IO. See, e.g., Gometz, 730 F.2d at 480 ("[A]nyone with experience as a trial judge 
knows that a person forced against his will to serve on a jury is apt to be an angry juror 
and that an angry juror is a bad juror."); G. Thomas Munsterman, Jury News: What 
Should a Modern Juror Assembly Room Look Like?, CT. MANAGER, Summer 1995, at 
6, 44 [hereinafter G.T. Munsterman, Jury News] (stating that courts justify their failure 
to do anything about jury avoidance with claims that "these people wouldn't make 
good jurors"); Richard A. Posner, Juries on Trial, 99 COMMENTARY, Mar. 1995, at 49, 
50-51 (praising those jurors who "make it through [the] gauntlet" of registering to vote, 
completing and returning the questionnaire, responding to summonses, and voir dire as 
"above average in competence, civic-mindedness, and sense of responsibility"). 
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lustrates how concerns like these have influenced compulsory jury ser-
vice during the past two centuries. 
B. Compelling Service on Juries: The Past 200 Years 
1. Filling the Box -1796-1870 
Early in the nineteenth century, jury avoidance was a continual 
nuisance for courts. Many of the reasons for avoiding jury service 
before the Civil War seem quaint or surprising to us now, made obso-
lete by the evolution of social and economic conditions and by specific 
improvements in the conditions of jury service. For example, finding a 
place to sleep while serving one's term as a juror typically poses no 
problem today - one simply sleeps at home and travels daily to the 
courthouse. But in the early nineteenth century, when travel to the 
county seat often entailed a significant journey by horse, wagon, or 
even on foot, jury service meant finding and paying for lodgings for 
weeks while on duty. Other disincentives facing prospective jurors 
before the Civil War continue to deter prospective jurors today, such as 
the inconvenience of being kept from one's daily affairs and one's fam-
ily for the duration of service. 
Just as some of the disincentives to serve in the early nineteenth 
century have disappeared today, so too has a popular method of coping 
with juror delinquency during the first half of the nineteenth century -
the use of bystanders or talesmen. The other response to jury dodging 
employed by courts of the period - the fine - survives, but may have 
been imposed more regularly in earlier years. Judges who served devel-
oping communities during the first half of the nineteenth century fo-
cused on the simple, yet at times extraordinarily difficult, task of secur-
ing enough jurors to complete the court's docket. They had yet to face 
the complexity of balancing this task with concerns about widespread 
corruption, racially discriminatory selection procedures, or 
overburdened criminal justice agencies. 
Working conditions for jurors were miserable in many places, even 
by standards of the time. Courtrooms were often crude, particularly in 
less populated communities.11 If there was a separate room available for 
11. Some communities lacked courthouses, so trials were held in log houses or 
barrooms. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 237 (1993) (noting this practice in Illinois). Others made do with courthouses 
with leaky roofs and no heat. See John A. Hall, That Onerous Task: Jury Service in 
South Carolina During the Early 1790s, 87 S.C. HIST. MAG. l, 8 (1986). Some of the 
earliest tribunals even met under trees. RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S 
PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941, at 73 (1963). In more 
populated centers, crowded courtrooms were so intolerable in the summer heat that 
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deliberation, 12 it was sometimes sparsely furnished or lacking heat or 
ventilation, yet jurors were locked in together, even overnight, until 
they reached a verdict. Some judges deprived jurors of food during de-
liberations; for their jurors, holding out meant staying hungry.13 By mid-
century, however, most courts had abandoned the "ancient barbarity" 
of starving jurors into agreement.14 
During the court's term, overnight accommodations for jurors in 
the evenings when they were not actively hearing cases were often 
crowded or difficult to obtain, at least in rural areas.,15 When several 
judges and attorneys, eighteen or so grand jurors, two dozen petit ju-
rors, as well as parties and witnesses descended upon a county seat, ac-
commodations at the local taverns filled up fast. Some jurors had to 
sleep in haymows or on dirt floors, others found themselves rooming 
with attorneys, with the parties in the cases they would hear, or even 
with the sheriff.16 The term could keep jurors away from· home, family, 
farm or business, for weeks.17 
spectators and jurors became ill, requiring the court to adjourn until temperatures 
cooled. New Hampshire's own chief justice considered "confinement in the bad atmos-
phere" of the courtroom to be a "severe trial" to jurors' health. HON. IRA PERLEY, 
TRIAL BY JURY: A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY 17-18 (1867). As late as 1848 in 
Philadelphia, ventilation was so poor that people became ill even in winter. See ALLEN 
R. STEINBERG, THE 'TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 
1800-1880, at 23 (1989). 
12. Sometimes jurors had to deliberate at the other end of the same room in which 
witnesses and parties had presented evidence. See YOUNGER, supra note 11, at 73. 
13. For example, one South Carolina jury, locked up on a very cold and disagreea-
ble night without food or heat, was supplied through a back window with supper from 
some sympathetic· citizens. See JACK KENNY WILLIAMS, VOGUES IN VILLAINY: 
CRIME AND RETRIBUTION IN ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA 82 (1959). 
14. See Ohio v. Engles, 13 Ohio 490 (1844). 
15. See Hall, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that at the end of the eighteenth century, 
jurors in South Carolina had to sleep outside, unable to find lodging, and could not ob-
tain provender for their horses). 
16. See Martin v. Mitchell, 28 Ga. 382 (1859) (upholding civil judgment when ju-
ror slept in same bed with the sheriff and in the same room with counsel for the prevail-
ing party); Hardy v. Spoule, 32 Me. 594, 596 (1851) (upholding verdict after jury and 
defendant lodged in same room, noting "[s]ituated as we are, during the trials of causes, 
boarding promiscuously, as juror and parties inevitably do, it is impossible to interdict 
all intercourse whatever, however much we may regret it"); Donald 0. Dewey, Hoosier 
Justice: The Journal of David McDonald, 1864-68, 62 IND. MAG. OF HIST. 175, 175 
(1966) (noting that lawyers and clients lodged four to a room in Indiana in the late 
1860s). 
17. The situation in 1796 in South Carolina was vividly described by one judge: 
Some of those poor men come to Court and return on foot from ten to fifty miles 
often without a shilling in their pockets .... The hardships that those poor jurors 
suffer are such that men who enjoy plentiful meals and warm beds can form no 
idea of, in frosty weather they sit in Court from morning until night thinly clad 
and shivering with cold, and discharged at night, their patience is put to new tri-
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Even though caseloads were very low compared to modern stan-
dards, 18 all pending matters had to be resolved before the end of each 
session so that the judges and trial attorneys would be free to travel to 
the next jurisdiction. Terms were held only once or twice a year in 
many communities.19 This inflexible schedule created pressure on juries 
to decide cases quickly.20 In some jurisdictions judges and juries com-
pleted several trials every day, each lasting no more than a few hours. 
For example, in one twelve-day session in the early 1800s, an Illinois 
als. The town where the Court sits denies them its comforts and hospitality, they 
are obliged to quit it, and retiring into the woods to the brink of some spring or 
water course, draw forth out of their wallet a bit of cold victuals if they have it, 
and whether the weather freezes or pours down rain or not they pass the night 
under the open sky on the cold earth. Coming into court in the morning, their sal-
low sickly and dejected countenances, their apparel wet or frozen or soiled, speak 
of what sort of night they had of it. It happens sometimes in Court that they sink 
under the double pressure of cold and hunger. This was the c.ase in two instances 
at Camden Court on my present circuit, growing too faint to sit longer, they gave 
intimattion [sic] of it, and they were discharged, one of them declared that he had 
not tasted food for two days, the Gentlemen of the bar were so kind as to raise a 
few dollars for him. Reduced and feeble as he was he had then to go home fifty 
miles on foot. 
Hall, supra note 11, at 5, 8 (quoting letter from Judge Aedanus Burke to Governor A. 
Vander Horst, Columbia, South Carolina (Dec. 8, 1796) (General Assembly Papers: 
006-674, S.C. Archives)). 
18. For example, there were only 15 criminal jury trials in seven years in one dis-
trict in Minnesota. See Jane Lamm Carroll, Criminal Justice on the Minnesota Frontier, 
1820-1857, at 135 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota); see 
also Kathryn Preyer, Crime, the Criminal Law and Reform in Post-Revolutionary Vir-
ginia, 1 LAW & HIST. REv. 53, 71-72 (1983) (reporting that in the most populated judi-
cial district in Virginia for which court records exist for the period between 1789 and 
1800, the court heard only 63 felonies over ten years). 
19. See, e.g., David J. Bodenhamer, The Efficiency of Criminal Justice in the Ante-
bellum South, 3 CRIM. J. HIST. 81, 89 (1983) [hereinafter Bodenhamer, Antebellum] 
(reporting that courts in antebellum Georgia met only twice each year with terms lim-
ited to two weeks or less). 
20. For example, during the 1790s in Davidson County, Tennessee, where the 
courts had significant legislative and administrative functions, jury trials took up only a 
part of the court's six-day term. See Note, The Tennessee County Courts Under the 
North Carolina and Te"itorial Governments: The Davidson County Court of Pleas and 
Quarter Sessions, 1783-1796, as a Case Study, 32 VAND. L. REv. 349, 373 (1979) 
[hereinafter Note, Tennessee County CC?urts]. In antebellum Indiana, prosecutors spent 
the first few days of each term with the grand jury, securing indictments while the 
judge and petit jury tried civil cases. Then the judge, the petit jury, and the prosecutor 
would try those indicted with crimes for the remainder of the session. See DAVID J. 
BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 63 
(1992) [hereinafter BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL]; see also EDWARD L. AYERS, VEN-
GEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY AMERI· 
CAN SOUTH 112-13 (1984) ("as many cases as possible had to be tried in the one or 
two weeks allotted[; t]he haste and confusion that necessarily grew out of such a system 
did not foster careful construction of the state's cases"). 
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court, sitting in the front room of a large house with judges lined up 
against one wall, disposed of twenty-eight civil cases, two murders, five 
assaults, a charge of unlawful assembly, and a burglary.21 In Frederick 
County, Maryland, in 1817 and 1818, the court attacked the criminal 
docket the first week of its two-week session, devoting an average of 
forty to forty-five minutes to each trial.22 Barely half of those Maryland 
juries left the box to deliberate before returning a verdict.23 This pattern 
of many short trials daily has been documented in several other states 
as well, including Tennessee, Indiana, and Pertnsylvani;i.24 One can ap-
preciate why a judge from this period might joke after one of these ses-
sions, "I have just come from Union[, South Carolina] where I held 
court for twelve days and ten nights and only four of the jurors died 
from fatigue. " 25 
The compensation that jurors received for all of this trouble was 
meager. Juror fees were about a dollar or two per day, with a few cents 
a mile for travel. This did not begin to compensate jurors for the ex-
penses they incurred, much less for the inconvenience they often suf-
fered by being away from home for the entire term. For example, in 
Montana, where jurors earned two dollars per day, a juror had to spend 
three times that amount each day for lodging and meals and feed for his 
horse.26 It is possible that some looked forward to jury service out of a 
21. See William F. Zacharias, Illinois Courts Prior to Statehood, 56 ILL. B.J. 556, 
563-64 & n.29 (1968). 
22. See James D. Rice, Crime and Punishment in Frederick County and Maryland, 
1748-1837: A Study in Culture, Society, and Law 225-30, 270 (1994) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Md.). 
23. See id. at'270-73 & n.20. 
24. See BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL, supra note 20, at 64; Note, Tennessee 
County Courts, supra note 20, at 373. In antebellum Philadelphia, in a typical larceny 
trial "[e]ach side presented a few witnesses, attorneys made brief remarks, and the jury 
often rendered a verdict without leaving their box." STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 72. 
25. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 81-82 (quoting Judge Thomas J. Mackey and 
describing one term in which two juries were impaneled to keep up with the caseload, 
each working twelve hours a day for over a week). 
Jury duty was also dangerous in some communities. After the leader of one west-
ern gang was indicted for embezzlement in Boise in 1865, its members swore revenge 
on the grand jury panel that dared to indict him. Men who served on frontier juries were 
prepared, it appears, for this type of thing. They frequently were members of "vigilant 
committees" themselves and came to court armed. YOUNGER, supra note 11, at 164. 
One judge of the period described jurors of early Indiana as "a hardy, heavy-bearded 
set of men, with side-knives in their belts, and not a pair of shoes among the whole of 
them; all wore moccasins." HON. O.H. SMITH, EARLY INDIANA TRIALS AND 
SKETCHES 177 (1857). 
26. See JOHN D.W. GUICE, THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN BENCH: THE TERRITORIAL 
SUPREME COURTS OF COLORADO, MONTANA, AND WYOMING, 1861-1890, at 45 
(1972). In the mid 1820s federal jurors in the District of Massachusetts logged over 
10,000 miles per year traveling to and from court. Those in the Western District of Vrr-
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sense of civic duty or perhaps as an adventure but one can understand 
why so many dreaded jury service during these times. One account of a 
South Carolina session in 1807 illustrates the problem: 
[O]n the first day jurors John Cave and John Hall failed to answer roll 
call and were indicted for non-attendance. Three additional jurymen ab-
sented themselves the following morning. On the third day another pair 
of jurors managed to obtain permission to return to their homes. On the 
fifth day jurors William Weathersbe and Shadrack Stalling failed to ap-
pear. During the afternoon of the sixth day John Nelson was discovered 
to be too drunk to sit. His relief, Henry Ford, had apparently slipped out 
of court. Another drunk juror was removed from the box on the seventh 
day, and two more were missing the following morning. Juror Robert 
Bradly blandly refused to serve on the ninth day; and by the close of 
court the next afternoon six others had followed his lead. To sum up, in 
ten days twenty-one jurors had either failed to appear, left with or with-
out permission, refused to serve, or incapacitated themselves.27 
Just how many potential jurors defied the court's summons is also 
revealed by the extent to which courts used bystanders rather than sum-
moned jurors. When too few veniremen showed up, judges, sheriffs, or 
bailiffs relied upon bystanders to fill the jury box.28 Bystanders were 
heavily used in several different regions of the country. In antebellum 
Kentucky, sheriffs apparently "rounded up as many candidates as [they] 
could find. " 29 In Georgia and Minnesota, no-shows delayed court busi-
ness and judges had to turn to bystanders in order to proceed with dock-
ets.30 In most places plenty of bystanders were available - jury trials 
attracted the whole town. Trials were one of the few sources of public 
entertainment in many communities.31 
ginia traveled over 17,000 miles per year in 1824 and 1825. In the densely populated 
Southern District of New York, jurors traveled only about 200 miles annually. See H.R. 
Doc. No. 164, 20th Cong., 1st Sess. (1828). 
27. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 84-85. 
28. See, e.g., PETER OXENBRIDGE THACHER, OBSERVATIONS ON SOME OF 
THE METHODS KNOWN IN THE LAW OF MASSACHUSETIS TO SECURE THE SELEC· 
TION AND APPOINTMENT OF AN IMPARTIAL JURY, IN CASES CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
9 (1834) (noting Act of 1807 authorizing up to five bystanders on Massachusetts' ju-
ries); David J. Bodenhamer, The Democratic Impulse and Legal Change in the Age of 
Jackson: The Example of Criminal Jur!es in Antebellum Indiana, 45 HISTORIAN 206, 
214-17 (1983). 
29. See Robert M. Ireland, Law and Disorder in Nineteenth-Century Kentucky, 32 
V AND. L. REv. 281, 291 (1979) (also characterizing some of these bystander jurors as 
"courthouse bums who served on juries in order to collect a little wine money"). 
30. See Bodenhamer, Antebellum, supra note 19, at 89 (noting that this was a 
practice decried by Georgia grand juries); Carroll, supra note 18, at 142. 
31. See J.P. CALLISON, COURTS OF INJUSTICE 401 (1956) (noting that during the 
pioneer period the jury trial was one of few sources of entertainment). Trials in the 
1820s in South Carolina resembled county fairs. For the four to ten days each spring 
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Where volunteers or bystanders were scarce or ineligible, shortages 
of qualified jurors sometimes threatened the very functioning of the 
courts.32 Without jurors, the show could not go on. The options of 
charging criminals through information rather than indictment, and dis-
posing of charges through bench trials or plea bargains were not author-
ized until much later in the nineteenth century. 33 Until then, a grand jury 
was required to bring felony charges, and petit jurors were required to 
resolve them. This practical necessity may account for the frequent 
fines for non-compliance in some courts of the period. 
Fining those who failed to obey summonses appeared to be a uni-
versal response to jury dodging throughout the colonial period,34 and in 
the early 1800s statutes in most states authorized fines ranging from 
one dollar to $250.35 Enforcement efforts were quite vigorous in some 
jurisdictions. For example, court records from the Michigan Territory 
reveal that contempt proceedings against delinquent jurors occupied 
much of the circuit court's caseload - the court considered twenty-nine 
indictments for assault and battery, forty-three indictments for theft-
related crimes, and fifty-eight contempt proceedings against men who 
and fall that court was held, much of the county's population gathered and there was 
rarely enough room for everyone to watch. See SMITH, supra note 25, at 7 (noting that 
in early Indiana, before 1857, trials were public events filling the courtroom "to suffo-
cation") WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 13, 76-77. 
32. See William Davis, Jr., Western Justice: The Court at Fort Bridger, Utah Ter-
ritory, 23 UTAH HIST. Q. 99, 111 (1955) (noting that the judge at Fort Bridger "found 
the impaneling of a [even a six-man] jury an extremely difficult matter at times [and 
had] to call in some of his farm hands at Fort Supply a dozen miles to the south"); see 
also Preyer, supra note 18, ar-71 n.69 (reporting that in Accomac District in Virginia, 
no grand jury was impanelled in three terms between 1789 and 1801, maybe "because 
the required 24 members had not turned up in obedience to process; repeatedly individ-
uals were summoned to answer and pay fines for this offense"). 
33. See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (upholding charge by in-
formation rather than grand jury); Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 
79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5 (1979) [hereinafter Alschuler, Plea Bargaining]. In 1852 Ma-
ryland became the first state to allow for jury waiver for all criminal cases; New York 
was the last, changing its constitution over a century later in 1957. See HARRY 
KAI.VEN, JR. & HANs ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 22 & n.18 (1966); Susan C. 
Towne, The Historical Origins of Bench Trial for Serious Crime, 26 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 123, 145-59 (1982). 
34. For example, one scholar studying the courts of North Carolina of the 1700s 
concluded based upon the steady increa8e in the statutory fine and complaints of absen-
teeism that "no more galling problem presented itself to the Carolina court than that of 
insufficient juries." DONNA J. SPINDEL, CRIME AND SOCIETY IN NORTH CAROLINA, 
1663-1776, at 24, 95 (1989). 
35. See, e.g., CHARLES EDWARDS, THE JURYMAN'S GUIDE 65-66 (1831) (in 
New York jurors were subject to fine of $25 for each day they neglected to attend); 
WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 84 (in South Carolina fines ranged from 50¢ to $20); 
YOUNGER, supra note 11, at 75 (listing 10 states and noting that fines for failure to ap-
pear ranged from $3 to $50). 
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had failed to attend as grand or petit jurors.36 In Williamson County, 
Tennessee, "the fining or excusing of jurors was an initial docket mat-
ter at each term of court between 1810-1820."37 
Many less wealthy veniremen complied in order to avoid the 
fine.38 For those with ~eans, however, contempt citations appeared to 
have operated not as a burden, but as a privilege. Exemption from jury 
duty was a perquisite that money could buy.39 A careful investigation of 
fines for nonattendance of jurors in South Carolina during the 1790s re-
vealed that fines were sufficient only to asslire the attendance of the 
less wealthy. Most of those fined for failing to report for jury duty were 
the community's most prominent citizens.40 It is ironic, to say the least, 
that many of the men who fought for independence and its resulting 
charter, the Constitution with its Bill of Rights, may have undermined 
the spirit of that document by avoiding jury service.41 
36. All but 13 of the 42 contempt prosecutions in the Michigan Supreme Court, 
and all of the 58 contempt proceedings in circuit court between 1805 and 1824 were 
against jurors. See William Wirt Blume, Criminal Procedure on the American Frontier: 
A Study of the Statutes and Court Records of Michigan Territory 1805-1825, 57 MICH. 
L. REv. 195, 250-56 (1958). In one district in South Carolina in 1803, 13 citizens were 
fined for failure to answer jury roll call. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 84. Another way 
that some early courts may have been able to function despite the profound reluctance 
of citizens to serve was by impaneling juries of less than twelve, but this was an option 
in only a few jurisdictions for felony cases. 
37. See Note, Justice on the Tennessee Frontier: The Williamson County Circuit 
Court 1810-1820, 32 VAND. L. REv. 413, 418 n.38 (1979) [hereinafter Note, William-
son County Court]. 
38. See Hall, supra note 11, at 1-3. One citizen complained in a diary entry, "This 
evening the Sheriff called with a notice to me to serve as juror .... This is a disagreea-
ble duty and if it were possible for me to avoid its performance without being fined I 
certainly should do so." WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 83-84. Not surprisingly, once at 
the courthouse, many unwilling veniremen tried to get out of serving by lying about 
their capacity to serve, just as they do today. "The most popular excuse [in Philadelphia 
in the 1850s and 60s],'' Steinberg notes, "was deafness, which led to curious scenes of 
people explaining to the judge why they could converse with him but could not serve as 
a juror." Allen R. Steinberg, The Criminal Courts and the Transformation of Criminal 
Justice in Philadelphia, 1815-1874, at 447 (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Co-
lumbia University). 
39. See 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 205 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 
1896) (writing around 1800 that the only people serving as jurors were those who 
lacked either the influence not to be cailed in the first place or the means to pay the 
fine). 
40. See Hall, supra note 11, at 9 (reporting that in one term, all but one of the 35 
men paying fines owned slaves, half were Revolutionary War veterans, and nine had 
been or were later elected to public office). 
41. During roughly the same period in Marion County, Indiana, "[i]t may have 
been cheaper to pay the small fine for contempt than to lose more money because of 
court attendance." DAVID J. BODENHAMER. THE PuR.surr OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND 
LAW IN ANTEBELLUM INDIANA 54 (1986) [hereinafter BODENHAMER, PURSUIT OF 
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Lawmakers of the time manifested little interest in ensuring that 
different demographic groups in the community served on juries. Jury 
service, like the vote, was reserved for white men of property. And al-
though some critics complained about the competency of jurors,42 early 
nineteenth century lawmakers did not seem concerned that their wealth-
ier and more educated citizens avoided jury duty. Not until mid-century 
did concerns about the caliber of jurors begin to translate into procedu-
ral reform, with the adoption of measures to combat corruption in the 
selection and recruitment of jurors.43 
2. The Quest for "Better" Jurors: From "Corruption" to 
"Competence" -1870-1940 
As populations grew during the nineteenth century and into the 
twentieth, securing jurors remained troublesome. More populous com-
munities brought higher crime rates, more efficient policing, and an 
ever-growing number of criminal cases requiring an. increasing number 
of jurors. The crush of cases continued despite the advent of plea bar-
gaining and bench trials.44 In the decades between the Civil War and 
World War II, inconvenience and financial loss still topped the list of 
reasons for avoiding jury service, and courts and legislatures took their 
JUSTICE]; cf. Wn..LIAMS, supra note 13, at 84 (despite rigid enforcement, fines "failed 
to halt non-attendance" in South Carolina). 
Another explanation for the frequency of these fines may be that in many courts of 
the time the prosecutor's pay depended upon the amount of fines collected - delin-
quent jurors were a handy source of income. See, e.g., Ayers, supra note 20, at 112 
(noting that fines generated revenue to feed pretrial detainees); Ireland, supra note 29, 
at 283 (noting that in Kentucky "for most of the century, prosecutors were paid princi-
pally by fees, receiving a percentage of fines recovered"). But see MAss. GEN. Cr. 
SENATE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE SUBJECT OF JURIES, 18 (1808), 
microformed on Early American Imprints, Second Series No. 15541 (noting Act that 
provided that juror nonattendance fees of $20 to $40 were "to be divided equally 
among the jurors who shall attend and serve"). 
42. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 880-81 (reporting discontent with ju-
rors as early as 1800). 
43. In antebellum Kentucky, for example, the provision of peremptory challenges 
to the prosecution and the use of out-of-county jurors in particularly divisive cases were 
designed to counter the opportunity for jury packing provided by dependence upon vol-
unteer or bystander jurors. In some counties it was almost routine for defendants with 
means to hire jurors to hang the jury. See Ireland, supra note 29, at 291-92. In the late 
1850s the Pennsylvania legislature passed a statute requiring the sheriff to choose the 
names of supplemental jurors, when needed, from the jury wheel. Wn..us REED 
BIERLY, JURIES AND JURY TRIALs, STATE AND FEDERAL, COMMON LAW AND 
STATUTORY 77 (1908); see also JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY 
§ 131 n.2 (1877). 
44. See supra note 33 (collecting sources tracing the development of plea bargain-
ing and bench trials). 
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first steps to ease these burdens. The most defining feature of juror re-
cruitment during this era was the widespread criticism that the wealthy 
and educated classes were escaping jury service, that their absence was 
harmful and unfair, and that reforms in jury selection and enforcement 
procedures were required to remedy this deficiency. 
The complaint that those who were better educated were avoiding 
service was fueled by dissatisfaction with verdicts. Influential segments 
of society were losing faith in juries to reach the right results. The pe-
riod was one in which the "values of unifornlity and certainty took on 
paramount importance, " 45 and juries seemed to many to be standing in 
the way of progress. Critics accused jurors in civil cases of undue sym-
pathy toward plaintiffs suing corporations,46 and accused jurors in crim-
inal cases of lacking the sense to deliver justice (i.e., convictions).47 
45. Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE L.J. 
170, 191 (1964). 
46. See e.g., Note, supra note 45, at 190-92 (noting influential members of the bar 
evidently objected to the jury because it would be hostile to their clients and sympa-
thetic to poor litigants); The Jury, An Address Delivered by John Dean, Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Before the Law Academy of Philadelphia, May 20, 
1987, at 15-17 ("juries began to swerve from the truth since the multiplication of cor-
porations, and their growth in power and capital ... the root of the evil lies in laxity of 
enforcement of the law regulating the selection of jurymen"). 
47. See, e.g., MAxlMUS A. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
JURY SYSTEM 207 (1894) (noting that the abolition of unanimity would be a "heroic[] 
remedy" to the "main complaint" about the jury, which is its failure to convict); Carl 
A. Ross, The Jury System of Cook County, Illinois, 5 ILL. L. REv. 283 (1910) (noting 
criticism of juries intensified after 1907 with repeated acquittals of saloon keepers for 
violating Sunday closing laws; and acquittal in 1909 of jury commissioner tried for cor-
ruption); Report on Criminal Procedure, in 2 NATIONAL COMMN. ON LAW OBSER-
VANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REPORTS 28 (1931) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM RE-
PORT] ("Repeated failure of juries to agree in recent conspicuous criminal trials has 
brought about agitation for majority verdicts in prosecutions. Many are now urging abo-
lition of the criminal jury."); cf. Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, EsQUIRE 
MAG., May 1936, reprinted in CAL. TRIAL LAW. J., Winter 1974-75, at 17 (noting "the 
tendency of the wealthy man to want to convict, in order to preserve the institution of 
Capitalism and Civilization"). One historian has documented that this dissatisfaction 
with the caliber of jurors and their failure to convict in criminal cases began just prior 
to the Civil War. See AYERS, supra note 20, at 113. 
By the turn of the century the lowered esteem in which juries were held had ena-
bled two important shifts in the relationship between judge and jury: judges had re-
moved questions of law from criminal· as well as civil juries and began ordering new 
trials when they believed a jury verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. See, 
e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 
at 28-29 (1977); PRoFFATT, supra note 43, at 440-45 (assessing, in 1877, the jury's 
power to decide the law in criminal cases in various states); Alschuler & Deiss, supra 
note 6, at 910-11 (reporting that between 1850 and 1931 the courts of at least 11 states 
and the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the jury's right to judge law as well as fact); 
Mark De Wolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939) 
(tracing shift in nineteenth century). Professor Stanton D. Krauss's careful study reveals 
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Disagreement with verdicts was not the only catalyst for charges of ju-
ror incompetence. The persistent complaint also coincided with the in-
flux of immigrants and African-Americans into the pool of citizens eli-
gible for jury service. 48 
Whatever their motive, critics after the Civil War frequently com-
plained that the "better" classes were opting out of jury service. These 
protests swelled to a chorus in the first few decades of the twentieth 
century.49 By 1930, the Frankfurter-Pound Commission concluded that 
in Cleveland "most citizens of means or intelligence avpid service. This 
avoidance has become traditional, so that it is a kind of mild disgrace 
for a so-called 'respectable citizen' to allow himself to be caught for 
jury service - like being swindled, for instance. " 50 
that the jury's lawmaking power may have been removed much earlier in some jurisdic-
tions. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine 
the Law in Colonial America (manuscript on file with author). . 
48. See LESSER, supra note 47, at 182 (protesting that in more than a dozen states 
where "unnaturalized foreigners are after a brief period of residence permitted to exer-
cise the elective franchise • . . aliens may often be in a position to decide the right to 
property, and even to personal liberty, of citizens."); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, 
at 916 (reporting dissatisfaction among Congressional Democrats in the late 1870s that 
integrated federal juries were corrupt, biased, or incompetent and noting that the decline 
in trust in jurors as legal advisers coincided with the increased diversity of the jury and 
increased complexity of legal issues); Hon. R.C. Pitman, Juries and Jurymen, 139 No. 
AM. REv. 1 (1884), quoted in LESSER, supra note 47, at 182 ("[I]f [the juror qualifica-
tion criterion of] 'good moral character' is as laxly interpreted as the same phrase prac-
tically is in the naturalization proceedings, it affords but little guaranty."); see also 
Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Politics of 
the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL I:.. REv. 325 (1995) (arguing that the decline in jury pres-
tige coincided with the influx of women jurors). 
49. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 395-96 (complaints focused on profes-
sionals who were routinely excused or bought their way out); MINIMUM STANDARDS 
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: A SURVEY OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE STAN-
DARDS OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION FOR IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE HA VE BEEN ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY 553 (Arthur 
T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949) [hereinafter MINIMUM STANDARDS] (in California, reformers 
complained that the juries were made up of "housewives, who had no experience in 
business or ordinary affairs of life outside of the home, and elderly men whose minds 
had become inactive"); Dean, supra note 46, at 20-21 ("The professional man, the boss 
mechanic, the city councilman, the thriving farmer, all want to be excused from jury 
service because of the pressing nature of their business affairs ... with them there, un-
just verdicts would be rare, and the growing dissatisfaction with the jury system would 
in a few years disappear."); Eric Fishman, New York City's Criminal Justice System 
1895-1932, at 336-37 (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) 
(noting that in New York, many believed jurors were uneducated and too sentimental, 
and that the best citizens were exempted). 
50. RAYMOND FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS 
OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMI-
NAL Jl!STICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 344 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 
1922) [hereinafter CLEVELAND REPORT]. 
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There is some basis for this perception that the middle and upper 
classes were fleeing from jury service during the decades between 1870 
and 1940. Because the administration of jury summonses remained a 
one-man operation in most jurisdictions, it was not difficult to use 
money or other influence to gain an exemption from jury service, and 
some of the well-to-do took advantage of the opportunity to avoid being 
summoned.s1 Many others simply ignored their summonses52 or relied 
on the liberal granting of excuses, sometimes making illegal payments 
or lying for the privilege.s3 If one believed the· assertions of jurors wish-
ing to be excused from jury service in Cleveland in the mid-1920s, for 
example, illness affected the "better" residential districts more seri-
ously than the more modest neighborhoods.s4 Those with means in 
Cleveland also purchased membership in military orders to avoid ser-
vice.ss In one county in Illinois in 1927 at least half of the jurors who 
51. See, e.g., STANLEY F. BREWSTER, TWELVE MEN IN A Box 19 (1934) (not-
ing citizens who dodge jury duty by sending substitutes, or lying, but that the most 
common means of avoiding service is political - "getting men excused from jury duty 
has become one of the most valuable perquisites of the small politician"); ROBERT M. 
IRELAND, LITTLE KINGDOMS: THE COUNTIES OF KENTUCKY, 1850-1891, at 82 
(1977) (reporting that in Kentucky many on the commissioners' lists were not sum-
moned and sheriffs instead relied upon "'professional jurymen,' noted for their menial 
status and leniency"); Upton Close, Twelve Good Men - and "Untrue," CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR WKLY. MAG., July 20, 1938, at 1 (in several Pennsylvania cities it was 
common for a man or woman summoned for jury service to call on a "friend with in-
fluence," who in turn secured the services of a "henchman" of the "boss" to answer to 
the name of the summoned citizen and serve out the term). The same circumstance fa-
cilitated jury stacking as well, whenever a litigant sought a particularly receptive jury. 
See MlNIMuM STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 553 (noting that jury stacking had scan-
dalized a number of metropolitan centers). 
52. In Cleveland, 37% of those residing in the "better sections" of town simply 
ignored the summons to appear for examination before the commissioners compared to 
28% overall and 26% for two other sections. CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 50, at 
346. Other communities had higher compliance rates. In Illinois in 1927, only about 8% 
did not appear when summoned. ILLINOIS ASSN. FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE ILLI-
NOIS CRIME SURVEY 232 (John H. Wigmore ed., 1929) [hereinafter ILLINOIS CRIME 
SURVEY). 
53. The Desire to Avoid Jury Duty, 11 WASH. L. REP., Feb. 17, 1883, at 91 (re-
porting that "persons eligible for jury service ... have been enabled to escape form the 
performance of it, by illegally paying certain sums to those entrusted by law with the 
duty of preparing jury lists"). On the "~orrupt atmosphere of urban criminal justice" at 
the time, see Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note 33, at 26 & n.139. 
54. CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 50, at 346 (residents from exclusive suburbs 
claimed to be less healthy than those from poor districts, 12% claiming illness, com-
pared to 9% in the poorer areas). 
55. See id. at 347. The resentment against those who managed to escape jury ser-
vice was reminiscent of anger about the ease with which those with means avoided the 
draft during the Civil War by purchasing exemptions or substitutes. See generally 
DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LIBERTY AND UNION 141-43 (1978) (describing draft 
avoidance in 1862-63). 
) 
August 1996] Juror Delinquency 2689 
showed up were excused, and 770 of the over 5000 jurors excused had 
been excused before - thirty-seven had been excused at least five 
times.56 Other commentators of the time described how easy it was to 
get out of jury service by lying, noting the surprise of attorneys to 
"hear a juror whom they hardly knew speak of his friendship and ac-
quaintance with them for no other reason obviously than to be excused 
from serving. " 57 
If the well-educated and well-to-do were trying to avoid jury ser-
vice,58 it is easy to see why. Although most trials reqiained relatively 
short around the turn of the century, more were stretching on for days 
and weeks. Frustrating delays during trials were not uncommon.59 Se-
questered jurors found themselves parted from their families and liveli-
hood for extended periods of time, confined in their uncomfortable 
juryrooms until they completed each case. 60 The practice of shuttling 
56. See ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 52, at 234. 
57. IRVIN STALMASTER, WHAT PRICE JURY TRIALS 74 (1931). Still other criti-
cism centered on the exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse those who had heard 
of the case, leaving only "fools, rogues, or hermits." NOBEL BUTLER, BUTLER'S MIS-
CELLANIES: TRIAL BY JURY, THE PHil..OSOPHY OF CoMPosmoN, AND OTHER 
PIECES 21 (1880). 
58. The rhetoric about juror incompetence probably overstated the problem. Con-
trary to the chorus of claims that the intelligence of the average juror was lower than 
that of the average citizen, two studies of petit jurors during this period found that juries 
in several cities reflected an economic status higher than that of the general population. 
Juries in many cities were not made up of the illiterate or feebleminded at all. Instead 
they were heavily middle class, with the very highest and lowest classes only lightly 
represented. See CLARENCE N. CALLENDER, THE SELECTION OF JURORS: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF THE METHODS OF SELECTION AND THE PERSONNEL OF Ju. 
RIES IN PHILADELPHIA AND OTHER CmES 49, 56 (1924) (the occupational and eco-
nomic profile of jurors in several cities was high, 25% or more occupying positions of 
responsibility or demanding a degree of education or intelligence higher than average, 
while Chicago's juries were "of a somewhat lower occupational grade"). Callender's 
work also revealed that the effect of excuses on the economic composition of the jury 
panel was not significant. Id. at 36-37; see also Eleanor S. Brussel, A Study of the 
Composition of Juries of the District Court 39 (1930) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Minnesota) (concluding from statistical study in Hennepin County, Min-
nesota that venires in 1929 were drawn from the three highest categories of occupation 
and intelligence, and that challenges had no effect on the occupational composition of 
the jury). 
59. For example, an observer describing one case in New York reported that the 
judges and attorneys dining together in· one case lingered over their midday meal until 
the evening hours, two days in a row, although the jurors, eating separately, had re-
turned by two o'clock p.m. as ordered. See HENRY LAUREN CLINTON, EXTRAORDI-
NARY CASES 64-65 (1896). 
60. Small, ill-ventilated jury rooms were "almost unendurable," resulting fre-
quently in sickness, especially for older jurors. See Willis B. Perkins, Some Needed Re-
forms in the Methods of Selecting Juries, 13 MICH. L. REv. 391, 399 (1915). Others 
contained only 11 chairs so the foreman would be forced to stand. Albert Walker, Jury 
Room Sentiments and Diversions, 13 THE GREEN BAG 196 (1901) (describing jury 
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them off to a hotel or, even more radically, sending them home for the 
night, had not yet caught on. 6I 
Financial hardship also continued to be a deterrent for all but the 
poorest jurors.62 Pay for jurors remained static while income rose,63 and 
the more money one lost during jury duty, the greater was the financial 
incentive to avoid it. What's more, fines for failing to appear did not in-
crease with the income of prospective jurors either. Those who could 
afford the fine preferred to risk it rather than pay an even higher price 
in lost time and income.64 
rooms in Brooklyn, New York). One juror explained how a judge was finally persuaded 
to give jurors cots: 
Once, the only comfortable spot I could find was the judge's high backed chair, 
tilted back seductively on springs, with my feet propped up on a pile of law 
books on his desk; we were not confmed to one room during the night, but had 
the range of the courthouse, under guard. In the morning, after the jury was dis-
charged, I told him he possessed the only berth in court suitable to a nap. He 
placidly replied ... "I have several times told the county·commissioners that 
they ought to provide cot-beds for jurors; I wish you would go to them and make 
complaint, and I will support it" Since that time they have been provided ...• 
Joseph Hornor Coates, Some Difficulties of a Juryman, SCRIBNERS, Jan. 1910, at 89, 
90-91. Another juror summed up his opinion of the situation on the juror room wall: 
The jury system 
Is the guard 
Of human liberty. 
But when you lock one up all night 
The truth one fails to see. 
Walker, supra, at 196; see also State v. White, 26 So. 849 (La. 1899) (capital defendant 
appealed on the grounds that "the jur[ors] had reached their conclusion with undue 
haste, and without proper deliberation . • . due to the disagreeable and uncomfortable 
condition of the room which had been assigned to the jur[ors] for their deliberations"). 
61. See Perkins, supra note 60, at 399. In one case, jurors who had not brought 
clean clothes had to buy them on a supervised excursion. People v. Fisher, 172 N.E. 
743, 754 (Ill. 1930). In another case, jurors slept in a vacant courtroom and bathed once 
a week at the YMCA. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 395 (reporting trial from Dedham, 
Massachusetts in 1934). But see Harvey N. Shepard, The Wrongs of the Juryman, AT-
LANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1895, at 258, 261 (noting that Connecticut jurors were al-
lowed to return home each night and recommending that this practice be adopted 
elsewhere). 
62. Juror fees were better than no income at all. For the unemployed, jury service 
was an attractive opportunity to earn a few dollars and enjoy a free meal or two. For 
example, in Cleveland during the winter of 1920-21 with the greatest unemployment 
since 1914, many jurors' names remamed in venires. A total of 77 served 300 juror 
terms, 40 serving six two-week terms each. The study reporting these figures concluded 
that these jurors "were tiding over a period of unemployment by attempting to perform 
one of the most difficult tasks of democratic government at $2 per day." CLBVBLAND 
REPORT, supra note 50, at 352. 
63. As late as the mid 1950s, only four states paid jurors as much as $10 per day. 
See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., JURY COSTS (Bernard Kulik ed., 1955). 
64. See, e.g. BRBWSTER, supra note 51, at 21 (estimating the loss to tradesmen 
and skilled mechanics from jury service at about $10 per day in 1934). During this pe-
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The increasing criticism of the caliber of the jury, the growing 
number of cases, and the rise of court administration, all contributed to 
significant changes in the ways that jurors were selected and to enforce-
ment of that selection process. In the late 1800s and the early 1900s, re-
formers set upon the jury system in earnest. The first task was eliminat-
ing corruption in the selection and enforcement system. After the Civil 
War, New York State enacted statutes punishing efforts to pay for the 
privilege of not serving, including a provision that made it a misde-
meanor for a summoned juror to fail to report any off~r to procure his 
discharge or excuse from jury duty.65 Physicians issued so many false 
certificates of illness or disability to prospective jurors that the New 
York legislature made it a crime for them to do so.66 In order to cease 
dependence upon bystanders whom many considered to be inferior 
specimens for the jury or tools of corrupt litigants, courts tried harder to 
predict the correct number of veniremembers who would be needed,67 
outlawed the use of bystanders entirely, or punished anyone seeking a 
place for himself or another in the jury box.68 By the· early 1900s, many 
riod, the prosecution of those involved in organized crime raised juror fears of retalia-
tion. See HARRY ELMER BARNES, 'TRIAL BY JURY: THE GREAT BURLESQUE OF 
MODERN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-15 (1929) ("The jury may even be covertly 
threatened with mob reprisal if it does not render a certain type of verdict."); FluED-
MAN, supra note 11, at 395 (noting two cases in 1926-27 in which urban jurors may 
have been intimidated); ILLINOIS CRIME SURVEY, supra note 52, at 234-36 (reporting 
jurors lied to escape service in case in which a witness's house was bombed); DAVID 
RAY PAPKE, FRAMING THE CRIMINAL: CRIME, CULTURAL WORK AND THE Loss 
OF CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE (1830-1900) 13-14 (1987) (noting that organized and pro-
fessional crime emerged in the late 1800s). 
65. See HUGO HIRSH, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON JURIES, THEIR POWERS, 
DUTIES, AND USES, IN ALL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMI-
NAL, UNDER THE COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE STATE OF NEW YORK 61 (1879). 
66. See N.Y. Code Civ. Proc. § 1120 (1899) (also making it a misdemeanor to 
make a misstatement to evade service); STALMASTER, supra note 57, at 81 (noting that 
"the practice of excusing jurors from service upon doctors' certificates grew so flagrant 
in New York that a special statute was enacted making it a misdemeanor for a physician 
to give a false affidavit or certificate 'for the purpose of enabling a person to be dis-
charged, or excused, or exempted as a trial juror' "). This statute actually first was 
passed in the 1870s, as the complaints a~out the caliber of jurors were beginning to heat 
up. 
67. See, e.g., The Trouble With the Jury System, 1 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
959, 961 (1911) ("As a rule, the most dangerous juror is the talesman - the idle 
hanger-on in the Court House, hungry for the pitiful per diem of a juror, sometimes ob-
truding himself to be called by the sheriff in order to serve a friend, sometimes present 
by invitation for that purpose."). 
68. See, e.g., SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & EDWIN G. MERRIAM, A TREATISE 
ON THE ORGANIZATION, CUSTODY AND CONDUCT OF JURIES, INCLUDING GRAND 
JURIES 81-93 (1882). 
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jurisdictions had substituted professional jury commissioners for politi-
cally beholden officers.69 
Selection systems in several jurisdictions were overhauled in order 
to boost the education levels of jurors.70 The prevailing view among the 
judges and attorneys who staffed reform commissions was aptly stated 
in a 1933 essay called "The Unfit Juror. " 71 The author argued that 
"America has long suffered from the false teaching that every citizen is 
the equal of every other citizen, and by right is entitled to perform any 
service or hold any office of the state." Better· care had, to be taken, the 
author said, to "screen out unfit jurors in order to improve the caliber 
of juries. " 72 As a result, stricter selection criteria were adopted73 and re-
formers began to tackle those conditions of service that deterred busi-
nessmen from serving, shortening terms of service, and relaxing rules 
69. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 547; Aifred C. Coxe, The Tri-
als of Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 286, 296 (1901) (complaining that the supervi-
sors, town clerks, and assessors were too influenced by favoritism and politics in their 
decisions to leave off or add some persons to the jury list, and that the work should be 
done by a jury commissioner). The Wickersham Commission's report of 1931 accused 
judges of playing political favorites, too, in their exercise of excuses. WICKERSHAM 
REPORT, supra note 47, at 24 ("[T]here is constant heavy pressure to be excused on the 
part of those best fitted for jury service. When elected judges, frequently holding for 
relatively short terms, are subjected to this pressure, often reinforced by political influ-
ence, it can not be expected that a high standard of competent juries may be 
maintained."). 
70. See, e.g., CALLENDER, supra note 58, at 9. 
71. The essay was published in the most influential publication in the new field of 
judicial administration, the Journal of the American Judicature Society. See Albert S. 
Osborn, The Unfit Juror, 17 J. AM. JUDICATURE SocY. 113 (1933). For an excellent 
overview of the growth of judicial administration, see SHELDEN D. ELLIOTT, IMPROV-
ING OUR COURTS: COLLECTED STUDIES ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1-30 
(1959). 
72. Osborn, supra note 71, at 115. 
73. Jury commissioners in Los Angeles, for example, required two written tests 
and a personal interview of every prospective juror. On the first test, "twenty five 
words ordinarily used during the trial of cases are set down next to three other words, 
one a synonym, which the juror is asked to circle. The second test asked the citizen to 
read several common jury instructions and mark statements appearing afterward as right 
or wrong." Admirers of the system noted, "No attempt has been made to raise the 
mental standard too high. The personal· interview ... permits the weeding out of per-
sons who, though high in intelligence rating, appear to lack reason, or who have a 
wrong conception of government or law enforcement" MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra 
note 49, at 554. Of course, we know now that this sort of selection system also made it 
easier for officials to "weed out" minority racial and ethnic groups as well. See, e.g., 
S.W. Tucker, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection in Virginia, 52 VA. L. REv. 736, 
738-39 (1966) (describing Act of 1919 that placed the selection of jurors in the hands of 
nonjudicial officers who presumed that "Negroes were utterly unqualified to sit on 
juries"). 
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against separation.74 Exemptions that permitted entire professions to opt 
out of jury service were targeted for elimination, with mixed success.75 
One commentator promised that upon the repeal of the long list of pro-
fessional exemptions in New York, "the average intelligence of juries 
will automatically rise 50%. " 76 
Finally, there was considerable support for more vigorous enforce-
ment of summonses through the use of fines for contempt.TI Some 
judges throughout the period used their contempt powers, but not 
strictly enough to satisfy all critics. Said one, "A few fines for con-
tempt of court for failing to respond to mailed summonses . . . would 
quickly put an end to the present wholesale ignoring of the court's 
74. See HIRSH, supra note 65, at 190; Coxe, supra note 69, at 297. By the 1940s, 
11 jurisdictions limited jury service to three weeks or less, six others required a month. 
Others continued to have very long terms. In California jurors were on call for three 
months, in Arizona service lasted as long as four months, and several states required ju-
rors to be on call for an entire year. Twenty-nine states permitted separation before de-
liberations, but 13 states still required sequestration in capital cases. See MINIMUM 
STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 195-96, 203-04; see also WILLIAM M. WHERRY, A 
STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF LmGATION AND OF THE JURY TRIAL IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK COUNTY 53 (1931) (reporting that in New York, 
starting in 1929, jurors began to be called in pools for several courts, instead of calling 
separate panels for each court, reducing waiting time and resulting in savings of over 
$63,000 in juror fees). 
75. The elimination of exemptions from jury service started quite early in Massa-
chusetts, in 1808. See Dierdre A. Harris, Note, Jury Nullification in Historical Perspec-
tive: Massachusetts as a Case Study, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 968, 993 (1978). In 
1938, the American Bar Association issued its recommendations, which recognized that: 
[I]f the qualifications and exemptions set by statute are so fanciful and numerous 
as to exclude the majority of otherwise available citizens, it will be almost im-
possible for the jury commissioners to select jurors who are honest, and bring to 
their task intelligence, sound judgment and courage that will enable them rightly 
to decide questions of fact, and to do so without fear or favor. 
MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 162 (internal quotation marks omitted). It 
wasn't until 1995 that the New York legislature scrapped its list of exempt occupations. 
76. BREWSTER, supra note 51, at 15. 
77. Fines for nonappearance ranged in 1882 from five dollars in Connecticut to 
$500 in Nevada. See THOl'vfi'SON & MERRIAM, supra note 68, at 83. An elaborate pro-
cedure for fining delinquent jurors and the review of those fines was in place in New 
York at the end of the 1870s, including a board for the enforcement of jury fines, made 
up of several judges, the recorder, and ihe mayor, that met at least twice a year to de-
cide whether to remit jury fines. See HIRSH, supra note 65, at 55-60. During 1904-05 in 
New York County, 33,500 jurors were summoned to serve, 60% tried to dodge service, 
and 1500 of these were ordered to pay fines. See Samuel R. Stern, Men Not so Good 
and Not so True, 13 UNPARTIZAN REv. 287, 288-89 (1920). In the 1920s in New York, 
court business was halted by the lack of jurors, and one judge reportedly imposed fines 
for the 70% of those summoned who did not show up, subject to remission if they 
proved to have valid excuses. See JULIA MARGARET HICKS, WOMEN JURORS 14 
(1928). 
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call. " 78 The next era in jury enforcement would see an expansion of ef-
forts to remove disincentives, but also a shift in the groups targeted by 
those efforts from wealthy and conventional-thinking businessmen79 to 
groups historically underrepresented on juries: racial and ethnic minori-
ties and women. 
3. Compulsory Jury Service Encounters the Rights Revolution -
1940-1995 
Beginning around the middle of this century, criminal prosecutions 
were transformed by judicial application of the Bill of Rights to all 
stages of the adjudicative process. Jury selection and its enforcement 
were recast as well. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
court reformers had been concerned that verdicts in criminal cases be 
"truthful" and "accurate" and uninfluenced by sympathy or politics 
that might undermine business interests. This led them to remove disin-
centives that discouraged educated citizens from serving as jurors and 
to delegate considerable discretion to jury commissioners to qualify and 
summon only those jurors whom the commissioners considered "fit" to 
serve. In a few short decades, this approach was replaced by one based 
on distrust of those same commissioners. Discretion once considered vi-
tal to maintain the "caliber" of jurors became despised as a tool for 
discrimination that threatened the rights of criminal defendants. 
The Court began its renovation of jury selection by prohibiting the 
exclusion of women and of wage earners in the federal courts in the 
1940s. In the decades that followed, the Court continued by interpreting 
the Equal Prot~tion Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Sixth 
Amendment to prohibit state as well as federal officials from discrimi-
nating on the basis of race or gender in jury selection, and by requiring 
states to defend selection procedures when jury venires did not fairly 
represent the racial and ethnic diversity of the communities from which 
they were drawn.80 In contrast to the late 1930s and 1940s, when courts 
carefully screened potential jurors for "character" or "intelligence," by 
78. CLEVELAND REPORT, supra note 50, at 353; see also ILLINOIS CRIME SUR-
VEY, supra note 52, at 1929 (urging that judges cite those who ignore summons with 
contempt to improve turnout). · 
79. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. CHOATE, .AMERICAN ADDRESSES 235-36 (1911) (argu-
ing "competent men, having been selected, must be compelled to serve. Too great ex-
emptions are allowed, too paltry excuses accepted, and the very men who by their 
weight and character would leaven the whole lump escape altogether."). 
80. See generally WAYNER. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE §§ 22.2(c)-(d), 22.3(d) (2d ed. 1992). Earlier regulation of racial discrimination 
in state jury selection under the Equal Protection Clause had not been effective. See Al-
schuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 891-95. 
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1980 such screening had been replaced in most jurisdictions by random 
and race-blind procedures drawing jurors indiscriminately from voters 
lists.81 
In addition to removing much of the discretion that judges and 
commissioners earlier had enjoyed, the modem approach to juror com-
pliance has focused more aggressively on eliminating disincentives to 
serve. Conditions for jurors had improved considerably by the second 
half of the twentieth century, but working people still found it difficult 
to remove themselves from jobs and family for jury ~ervice. Average 
lost earnings for each juror from one term of service in 1975 in some 
counties was more than $1000.82 Since 1950 several states have raised 
the amount that jurors receive as fees and adopted criminal or civil lia-
bility for employers that retaliate against employees called as jurors, 
and six have required employers to pay the salary of employees while 
on jury duty.83 In 1978, the American Bar Association issued its Stan-
dards Relating to Juror Use and Management, in which it advocated 
several revisions in jury administration, such as the one day/one trial 
system designed to reduce burdens on all jurors who serve. States that 
adopted them84 reported improved compliance.85 · 
81. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1994) (setting separate qualifications for 
federal jurors); see generally Carl H. Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving a Demo-
cratic Institution, 6 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 247 (1973); Lester B. Orfield, Trial Jurors in 
Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 108-30 (1962). Selection procedures that al-
lowed volunteers to serve as jurors were disapproved as violating the statutory rights of 
criminal defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 610-11 (5th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 865 (1977); Gattis v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 815 (Del. 1994) 
(collecting cases), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 132 (1994). 
82. See William R. Pabst, Jr. & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Economic Hardship 
of Jury Duty, 58 JUDICATURE 494, 497-98 (1975) (reporting also that for about 75% of 
jurors, losses were borne by the employer). As of 1958, less than half of the country's 
factory workers were guaranteed compensation during jury service by their collective 
bargaining agreements. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 
SUMMARY OF HEARINGS ON COMPENSATION OF JURORS 9 (1962) (statement of 
Thomas L. Pitts, Secretary-Treasurer, California Labor Federation, AFL-CIO). 
83. See G. Thomas Munsterman, A Brief History of State Jury Reform Efforts, 79 
JUDICATURE 216, 217 & n.4 (1996) [hereinafter G.T. Munsterman, A Brief History] 
(noting that mandatory pay for jurors is required of at least some employers for a lim-
ited number of days of service in Alabama, Nebraska, Tennessee, Massachusetts, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, and Louisiana). These mandatory pay statutes were upheld as consti-
tutional in Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 412 U.S. 543 (1973) (requiring 
employers to pay employees while on jury duty has "no less sturdy a footing" than re-
quiring employers to pay employees while voting). 
84. See G.T. Munsterman, A Brief History, supra note 83, at 217-18 (summarizing 
history of standards). 
85. See, e.g., J. MUNSTERMAN ET AL., supra note 7, § 4.1, at 21-24 (noting that 
many courts have reported improved yields with reduced terms of service). 
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Despite great strides in reducing disincentives to serve, the shift 
from qualification interviews to qualification by mail in most jurisdic-
tions during this period may actually have expanded opportunities to 
avoid jury service.86 Many jurisdictions, following the lead of the fed-
eral act, adopted a procedure by which each randomly selected citizen 
received a mailed questionnaire, and later, only if he chose to fill out 
the questionnaire and mail it back, was summoned for service. Some 
courts continued to enforce summonses against qualified respondents 
who failed to appear, but very few did anything about those who never 
returned their qualification questionnaires.87 Shirking jury duty became 
easier than ever, even though the duty itself had become less onerous. 
No longer did jury dodgers have to procure excuses through influence 
or deceit, pay fines, or avoid apprehension by sheriffs who knew per-
fectly well they had been summoned.88 With the advent of the mailed 
qualification questionnaire, Americans could avoid being bothered with 
jury service simply by tossing their jury questionnaires in the trash 
along with other unwanted junk mail. 
86. Studies during the late 1970s showed that citizens continued to resist jury ser-
vice. James L. Allen, Attitude Change Following Jury Duty, 2 JUST. SYS. J. 246, 251 
(1976) (concluding that most jurors who responded to their summons would still try to 
get out of jury service if summoned again, even those that had served as trial jurors); 
John P. Richert, Jurors' Attitudes Toward Jury Service, 2 JUSTICE SYS. J. 233, 236 
(1976) (noting that more than half of the persons called for jury duty in his study wrote 
to get out (1443 of 2703), only 3.6% asked for defennent, and 49.8% asked for 
exemption). 
87. See G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN ET AL •• A SUPPLEMENT TO THE METHOD· 
OLOGY MANUAL FOR JURY SYSTEMS: RELATIONSHIPS TO THE STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO JUROR USE AND MANAGEMENT 42 (1987) (stating that "some courts will 
carefully follow up all 'no shows' to the summons, yet simply drop from the system 
those who do not respond to the qualification questionnaire"). 
88. In the nineteenth century, jury selection was not nearly as anonymous as it is 
today. In some states, the same names appeared on the jury rolls again and again. See 
AYERS, supra note 20, at 224 (reporting that in Greene County, Georgia, between 1890 
and 1900, 11 families accounted for almost 20% of the grand jurors, and 25 men ap-
peared in the grand jury four times or more); MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON 
AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND 
SOUTH CAROLINA. 1767-1878, at 154-55 & n.63 (1980); WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 
83. There was no intennediate qualification stage in jury selection. See LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL. THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISH· 
MENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, 1870-1910, at 55 (1981) (describing se-
lection in Alameda County, California, in the late 1800s). In Fort Wayne in the early 
1800s, the sheriff would yell for the jurors to appear when court began. SMITH, supra 
note 25, at 168-70. 
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C. Compulsory Jury Service Today 
1. Jury Duty Avoidance-Its Extent 
2697 
Today, high rates of jury avoidance seem to be a localized phe-
nomenon, not a nationwide epidemic. Statistical studies of various juris-
dictions reveal extremely low response rates to questionnaires or to 
summonses in some jurisdictions, and near-perfect compliance in 
others.89 People who resist jury duty today are apprehensive about lost 
income, the inconvenience of being absent from work. and family, un-
pleasant working conditions, and long waits.90 In addition, some poten-
tial jurors may stay away to avoid attention from litigants or the press,91 
89. Compare G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, 
WAYNE COUNTY, MICHIGAN, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT, JURY MANAGE-
MENT 9, 12 (National Ctr. for State Courts ed., 1995) (reporting that in Wayne County, 
Michigan, an average of 26% of those sent questionnaires did i:iot return them, and of 
those who did respond and were qualified, 16% failed to appear when summoned) and 
Gerlin, supra note l, at Bl (reporting that only 22-25% of those summoned in Dallas 
County responded at the beginning of August, 1995) with G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, 
THIRTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, CALHOUN COUNTY, MICHIGAN, 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT 2 (National Ctr. for State Courts ed., 1995) (Cal-
houn County manages a very low 6% nonresponse rate) and ERROL E. GIDDINGS, 
COLORADO JURY SYSTEM FAILURE TO APPEAR NOTICES 27-31 (1993) (reporting 
4% failure to appear rate). 
The judges in Los Angeles are among the most concerned about juror yields. Of all 
the citizens summoned to jury service in 1994, 52% ignored the qualification question-
naire; in 1995, after the adoption of follow-up procedures 36% of summoned citizens 
failed to respond. The problem has become acute recently because more defendants are 
going to trial due to the "three strikes" law, CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 
1996), and because the large number of peremptory challenges allowed in that state in 
criminal cases requires nearly twice the number of veniremembers per trial as in other 
states. See Jacobius, supra note 1; see also Bienen et al., supra note 7, app. C at 1-4 
(reporting a study of 348 jurors summoned for jury service in 1994 in New Jersey that 
revealed that 31.5% of respondents had tried to avoid or postpone having to appear at 
the designated time, that 20.5% did not attend, that 27% asked to be excused once they 
got to court, and that 39% of the jurors summoned successfully avoided jury service in 
these ways). 
90. See HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY'S TASK FORCE ON RACIAL COMPOSI-
TION OF THE GRAND JURY 55 (1992) (noting that the most common reasons people 
seek excuse are economic and child care); REPORT OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMIS-
SION ON JURY SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT 26 (Judicial Council of California et al. eds., 
1996) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA REPORT] (reporting that in some California counties, 
60% of hardship excuses involve child care); Bienen et al., supra note 7, at app. C 
(78.1 % of jurors surveyed disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement "the 
money allowances I received were adequate" (54.5% reporting strong disagreement), 
63.4% of those who sought excuses reported that the statement "I did not want to dis-
please my employer" applied very much or somewhat, and 54.8% said that the state-
ment "I could not afford to lose my pay from work" applied very much). 
91. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 90, at 34 ("[M]any jurors are plainly 
worried about the threat of intimidation or retaliation."); Nancy J. King, Nameless Jus-
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or to protest a system they feel is unjust.92 
Existing studies, however, do not reveal how, if, or when judges 
enforce jury summonses. Nor do they address why judges choose to 
spare or punish jury dodgers. To obtain additional information about 
jury avoidance and jury misconduct during trial, I mailed 970 surveys 
to state and federal trial judges in late November of 1995. The survey 
solicited answers to several questions about the behavior of jurors and 
prospective jurors in the recipient's court over the past three years, as 
well as the recipient's response to that behavior.93 Well over half (562) 
of the 970 judges to whom I sent surveys completed and returned them. 
tice: The Case for Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal Cases, 49 VAND. L. 
REV. 123, 126-30, 139 {1996). 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Grisham, 841 F. Supp. 1138, 1149 n.22 (N.D. Ala. 
1994) (noting an expert's testimony that blacks may return questionnaires at lower rates 
than whites because of "sociologically induced mistrust of government"), affd., 63 F.3d 
1074 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 798 (1996). One jwy supervisor said in a 
phone conversation that an older man said he didn't want to ·participate because, "I 
don't believe in the system; all lawyers are weasels." Telephone Interview with Michael 
Devereaux, Jury Supervisor, 22d Judicial Circuit, St. Louis (Feb. 1996). 
93. The names and addresses of 717 state judges and 253 federal judges were se-
lected from BNA DIRECTORY OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGES, AND 
CLERKS (Kamla J. King & Judith A. Miller, eds., 4th ed. 1996). The judges worked in 
both large and small cities in 17 states and 30 federal districts nationwide. Within those 
cities, only courts that were listed as having jurisdiction over major felony and civil 
cases were selected, and only those with three or more judges at the same address, to 
ensure anonymity. Within those courts, each or some (using a regular interval) of the 
listed judges' names were selected. Of the state judges sent surveys, 179 were in south-
ern states, 132 in northeastern states, 179 in western states, and 227 in Midwestern 
states. Judges were requested to complete the survey and return it without identifying 
themselves. -
Approximately the same proportion of federal and state judges responded. One 
hundred thirty-three of the returned surveys were from federal judges, 375 from state 
judges, and 54 from judges that did not identify themselves as state or federal judges, 
for a total of 562 responses. A handful of additional surveys were returned as undeliver-
able; several judges indicated by phone or in writing that they had not tried jury cases 
in the last three years and a few judges wrote explaining that they did not answer 
surveys. 
The sample included judges predominately from courts in larger cities: Of the 549 
judges specifying city size, 8% (N=44) worked in courts located in cities of under 
100,000; 28.4% {N=l56) in cities of between 100,000 and 500,000; 25% {N=l37) in 
cities between 500,000 and 1,000,000; and 38.6% (N=-212) in cities over l,000,000. 
Most of the judges responding estimated that they had tried between 30 and 89 jwy 
cases in the past three years. Seven and seven-tenths percent (N=-43) reported trying less 
than 10 jury cases; 18.6% (N=l04) reported 10-29 jury trials; 29% (N=l62) reported 
30-59 jury trials; 23.8% (N=l33) reported 60-89 jwy trials; 11.1 % (Nc62) reported 90-
119 jwy trials; and 9.8% (N=55) reported 120-150 jwy trials over the past three years. 
State judges tried more cases on average than federal judges. Most judges had tried both 
civil and criminal cases: 19.0% (N=l05) reported trying no civil cases; 18.7% (Ncol03) 
reported less than 25%; 27% (N=l49) reported more than 25% but less than 50% civil 
cases; 16.7% (N=92) reported trying more than half civil cases; and 18.7% (N°103) re-
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The survey results concerning jury duty enforcement must necessa-
rily be considered as somewhat incomplete. Randomly sampled judicial 
impressions of the problem of jury dodging are less exact than statistics 
compiled by jury administrators or surveys of prospective jurors, partic-
ularly because in many urban courts, knowledge about jury administra-
tion prior to the voir dire stage is concentrated in a few judges and the 
jury staff.94 Moreover, the results reflect the responses of only those 
judges who chose to complete and return the questionnaire. Also, be-
cause the survey requested that judges recall· three years of litigation, 
some responses may be based on incomplete recollections. Finally, be-
cause the sample was limited to cities large enough to have three or 
more judges in the same court at the same address, the results do not 
necessarily represent the impressions of trial judges in the thousands of 
smaller communities across the nation. Nevertheless, the survey pro-
vides the first national snapshot of formal jury enforcement proceed-
ings, judicial attitudes concerning jury dodging, the conduct of jurors 
during voir dire, and judicial responses to that conduct. 
The survey suggests that most trial judges do not consider jury 
avoidance to be a serious problem. For example, when judges on the 
bench seven years or more were asked their opinions about whether 
compliance with jury summonses had become worse or better or had 
stayed the same compared to seven years ago, most judges answered 
that compliance was about the same. Of the judges that thought condi-
tions had changed, however, more thought compliance had worsened 
than thought that it had improved. This was the case when considering 
the responses of all judges95 and also after excluding the responses of 
those judges who suggested directly or indirectly that they had no re-
ported trying entirely civil cases. Judges were almost evenly divided three ways be-
tween those on the bench six years or less, those on the bench seven to fourteen years 
and those on the bench fifteen years or more (1-6 years: 30.2% (N=170); 7-14 years: 
30.4% (N=171); 15+ years 27% (N=152); 12.3% of the respondents did not answer this 
question). A complete report of survey data is available from the author. 
94. In addition, because the survey asked only about those aspects of juror recruit-
ment likely to be known by trial judges (noncompliance with jury summonses and un-
truthfulness during voir dire) it provides no additional information about nonresponse to 
qualification questionnaires in those jurisdictions that continue to use a two-step system 
rather than a combined questionnaire/summons. 
95. Eleven percent of those judges who responded to this question believed that a 
smaller percentage of those summoned for service were ignoring their summonses today 
as compared to seven years ago, 34% responded that a greater proportion of those sum-
moned are ignoring their summonses today, and 55% thought that the proportion of re-
calcitrant jurors is about the same today as it was seven years ago. Notably, state judges 
were more likely than federal judges to respond that nonappearance was worse today 
than seven years ago. Of state judges answering this question, 50% thought compliance 
was the same, 38% thought it was worse, and 12% thought it was better. Of federal 
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sponsibility for enforcing jury summonses.96 Of the nearly 200 judges 
who volunteered comments about the use of contempt to enforce jury 
summonses, only a dozen suggested that the rate of noncompliance was 
high or was a problem in their courts.97 Nearly four dozen volunteered 
that enforcement was not necessary because all (or almost all) of those 
summoned complied.98 Less than one-sixth of the responding judges in-
dicated that they had issued a show cause order to a person who had 
failed to comply with a jury summons within the past three years.99 
2. Jury Duty Avoidance - Enforcement 
a. Existing Information about Enforcement. Anecdotal information 
from judges and jury administrators suggests that courts that have ad-
dressed the problem of juror truancy have preferred to remove disincen-
tives to serve rather than punish those who resist. 100 According to G. 
judges, 70% thought it was the same, 23% though it was worse: and 7% thought it was 
better. These differences were statistically significant. (p<.01). 
96. The responsibility for enforcing jury summonses in most cities is not shared 
equally among trial judges, but is delegated to particular judges or to a jury administra-
tor. To create a sample of judges who were most likely to have responsibility for enforc-
ing jury summonses, I removed the response of any judge who volunteered that some-
one else took responsibility for enforcing jury summonses, marked as a reason for not 
using contempt powers that the court had an alternative enforcement program, or indi-
cated lack of knowledge of who was or was not complying. The remaining 206 judges 
were more likely to be actively involved in enforcement. Of the judges in this smaller 
sample who had expressed an opinion about the problem today as compared to seven 
years ago (N=l 15), 29% (N=33) thought that a greater proportion of people ignore jury 
summonses today than did seven years ago compared to 16.5% (N=19) who thought the 
situation had improved. 
97. Those comments included the following: "In our 40-county district, transpor-
tation problems are severe," "This is an extremely serious problem for us. We are try-
ing to formulate a plan, short of contempt proceedings, to address this issue." "I think 
more jurors should be held in contempt for not complying. I think about 1'3 do not show 
up in Harris County," "Over 'h of all summoned jurors fail to respond in our jurisdic-
tion." "We don't have time to do this, FTA [failure to appear] rate is 40-50%," "we 
have many no-shows." "Fewer than 25% of Detroit residents respond to question-
naires." Two judges, one from New York City, and another from San Francisco, ex-
plained that the rate of response to summonses was 20% or less, one characterized the 
jury system as "in serious trouble." Another comment echoed a familiar theme: "Our 
largest problem with juror misconduct i~ that well educated and involved persons avoid 
jury service like the plague." 
98. Forty-seven judges noted adequate or complete compliance in their volun-
teered comments. 
99. See infra text accompanying note 108. 
100. The story of one honest but conflicted citizen from Houston is an apt illustra-
tion. Reading on his questionnaire that by failing to respond he risked a $100 fine, he 
slipped a check for $100 in with his questionnaire along with an explanation that he 
simply couldn't serve. The judge called him in and learned that his employer wouldn't 
pay him while he was on jury duty and that this had prompted the juror to decide that it 
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Thomas Munsterman, Director of the Center for Jury Studies of the Na-
tional Center for State Courts, very few courts follow up on those citi-
zens who do not return their qualification questionnaires, and most do 
nothing even when summoned jurors do not respond.101 Some jurisdic-
tions that have strengthened enforcement or follow-up procedures may 
have done so in part as a response to challenges that lax enforcement 
fails to secure jury panels that represent a fair cross section of the sur-
rounding community.102 
This is not to say that contemporary courts are s~tisfied with vol-
unteers and have abandoned enforcement efforts entirely. Rather, they 
seem to be using penalties such as contempt as a last resort when re-
forms such as employer-mandated pay and one-day/one-trial fail to at-
tract sufficient numbers of qualified jurors. 103 More courts are replacing 
hardship excuses with a single chance to defer service to a more conve-
nient time. Automated follow-up notices and well-coordinated systems 
for scheduling deferral dates have proven to be cost-effective ways to 
boost compliance in some jurisdictions. 104 Because· many people who 
fail to respond to their jury questionnaires do not receive them, are dis-
was better to pay a fine than to miss work. The judge then called the employer, per-
suaded the employer to pay the employee while on jury duty, and sent the $100 back to 
the employee. Telephone Interview with G. Thomas Munsterman, Apr., 1996. 
101. See G.T. Munsterman, Jury News, supra note 10, at 6, 44-45 (noting the lack 
of enforcement efforts against summoned jurors); see also G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, 
TWENTY-SECOND JumcIAL·Cmcurr COURT, WASHTENAW COUNTY, MICIIlGAN, 
TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE REPORT 2 (National Ctr. for State Courts ed., 1996) (noting 
that Washtenaw County "is one of the few counties in Michigan and probably in the 
U.S. that follows up on persons who do not return their qualification questionnaire") 
(emphasis added). 
102. See supra note 9. 
103. See, e.g., THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE 
USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12, at 49 (Sept. 1994) [hereinafter ARIZONA 
REPORT] (recommending automated follow-up mailings, but declining to recommend 
further enforcement action, noting "public education efforts ... coupled with consider-
ate and efficient treatment and utilization of jurors called to service, will, in the long 
term, produce a higher level of compliance with the summons"); Jan Hoffman, Jury-
Duty Dodgers Tell It to the Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1996, at Bl (reporting that in 
Manhattan, reducing term of service from two weeks to three days in 1996 has doubled 
the percentage of those who appeared). 
104. See Joanna Sobol, Hardship Excuses and Occupational Exemptions: The Im-
pairment of the "Fair Cross-Section of the Community," 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 155, 170 
(1995) (noting success of deferrals in Central District of California); G.T. Munsterman, 
Jury News, supra note 10, at 45 (noting that follow-up notices produced 29% of the 
nonresponding jurors in some counties of Colorado, reduced to less than 1 % of those 
originally contacted the number of unexplained nonresponders in San Diego, reduced 
the nonresponse rate by 32% in Detroit and by half in Atlanta). 
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qualified, or have a legitimate excuse for not serving, 105 most courts 
tend to use contempt selectively, only after a prospective juror has not 
responded many times or has been found to have had no valid reason to 
avoid service.106 In many jurisdictions those who are fined must still 
serve. In St. Louis, for example, the offer of one self-employed pro-
spective juror to pay the fine instead of serving was refused by a some-
what annoyed judge. Instead, the juror was forced to sit in the court-
house for several hours until he agreed to serve at a later date. 
According to the jury supervisor, all steps are taken to assure the public 
that a person who can afford the fine cannot buy his way off.107 
b. Survey Results Concerning Enforcement. The survey responses 
reflect this preference for carrots over sticks. Although a small but sig-
nificant percentage of judges use their contempt powers, many judges 
are reluctant to use contempt as a remedy for juror truancy. Of those 
judges who had issued an order to show cause in the past three years 
(only 17.5% of all judges responding), 43% used such orders sparingly, 
issuing only one or two. Fourteen percent reported that they had issued 
eleven or more such orders.108 The percentage of judges issuing such or-
105. See G.T. Munsterman, Jury News, supra note 10, at 45 (noting that it is not 
accurate to presume that all those who fail to respond to their questionnaires are recalci-
trant - many either never received them, or are unqualified or exempted). 
106. See id. at 45-46 (noting this approach was adopted recently by some judges 
in Houston and Baltimore); Interview with Ms. Norma J. Wagoner, Jury Administrator, 
W.D. Tex. (Jan. 1996) Oury supervisor could recall only two hearings to show cause 
why prospective juror should not be held in contempt in the past 19 years in the West-
ern District of Texas, both where the person refused service or failed to respond to ear-
lier orders to appear. One was excused, the other deferred for service on a later date). 
Other courts continue to try regular punishment to send a message. In Washington, 
D.C., judges randomly select the unlucky "juror of the month" to punish, says G. 
Thomas Munsterman. See Munsterman, supra note 100. One judge from another city 
told me in a telephone conversation on Dec. 14, 1995, that "every six months or so we 
haul 10 people in here and try to get a lot of publicity." See also Federal Judges Warn 
Jurors to Show Up, ANN ARBOR NEWS, May 2, 1996, at C6 (announcing "crack-
down" in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan). 
107. Conversation with Michael D. Devereaux, Jury Supervisor, 22d Judicial Cir-
cuit, St. Louis, Mo. (Feb. 1996); see also Hoffman, supra note 103, at Bl (reporting 
that jury shirkers in New York are scheduled for service as well as fined). 
108. Over 82% of judges surveyed had not issued an order to show cause to a per-
son failing to appear for jury service iri the past three years. Of the smaller sample of 
judges referred to in note 96, about 40% had used their contempt powers in the past 
three years to issue orders to show cause to those who had failed to appear. 
Forty-three percent (N=41) of the judges who had indicated that they had issued an 
order to show cause in the past three years had used an order only one or two times, 
42% (N=40) had used an order 3-10 times, and 14% (N=14) had ordered 11 or more ju-
rors to appear and explain why they hadn't obeyed their summonses. Most of these 
judges were from cities with a population over 500,000. The relationship between city 
size and frequency of show cause orders was statistically significant (p<.01). 
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ders is low, probably because most of the judges surveyed lacked re-
sponsibility for doing so, 109 but several judges offered other explana-
tions as well: ninety judges noted that using contempt to enforce jury 
summons was too costly or inefficient, 110 eighty-five judges responded 
that coerced jurors make bad jurors, 111 nearly fifty explained that com-
pliance was adequate, and sixteen responded that most of those who fail 
to appear have a good reason for not appearing.112 Particularly interest-
ing were the candid responses of three judges that they have declined to 
hold delinquent jurors in contempt because they face election. 113 
Of those judges who have ordered recalcitrant jurors to come to 
court to explain their noncompliance, less than half had held a 
noncomplier in contempt, and, of these, less than a third held four or 
more jurors in contempt during the past three years. 114 Over half of the 
judges who had held nonresponders in contempt noted that they had im-
posed a sentence for this offense, but most judges had done so only 
109. Of the approximately 450 judges who in the past three years had not issued 
any order to show cause to a nonresponder, 182 stated they did not know which pro-
spective jurors did not comply, 161 indicated that their court had an alternative enforce-
ment mechanism, and 80 noted that the responsibility for enforcing jury summons be-
longed to another judge or jury commissioner. One judge reported that he or she used 
letters to jurors to appear in chambers to discuss their failure to appeal rather than for-
mal summonses, three others issued bench warrants or had sheriffs round up noncom-
pliers, several simply scheduled no-shows for later service. 
110. Typical of the volunteered comments on this point were, "the expense of a 
contempt is greater than the return benefit," "those who fail to show are such an insig-
nificant number it is not worth my time or taxpayer dollars to pursue them," and 
"[t]here are far better methods to get a response short of contempt - which is like a 
significant sanction, we get a good response to our summonses - have one day one 
trial." See also Kauffman, supra note 9 (recounting that judges asked the states' attor-
neys to withdraw 400 cases filed in 1992 to collect fines from jury dodgers because of 
the strain it put on the courts). 
111. One volunteered, "If they do not want to serve, the litigants should not be 
forced to take them." 
112. Of the smaller sample of judges who were more likely to have had responsi-
bility for enforcing jury summonses, see supra note 96, 33 responded that one of the 
reasons that they had not issued orders to show cause was that those who comply make 
better jurors than those who must be coerced into compliance, 42 responded that using 
contempt in this situation uses too much of the court's resources, and 8 indicated that 
they assume nonresponders have good reasons for not complying. 
113. "We are elected!" "Judges are elected - reluctance to arrest people who 
vote; would expect publicity because so rarely enforced" "Not good p.r. for elected 
judges." 1\vo additional responses contained references to public relations or the mes-
sage contempt would send to prospective jurors. These responses project a certain para-
dox: by striving to increase the accountability of judges through judicial elections we 
may be indirectly undermining the ability of the jury to fulfill its democratic role. 
114. Of the 95 judges, 42 indicated that they had cited at least one potential juror 
with contempt. Of these, 32 had held only one to three potential jurors in contempt. The 
remaining judges held 4, 5, 6, 10, 23, 24, 35, or 80 jurors in contempt. 
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once in the past three years. 115 Like sentences, fines were unusual -
twenty-five of the twenty-nine judges imposing fines during the past 
three years had fined three persons or less.116 Only two judges com-
mented that they thought that more recalcitrant jurors should be held in 
contempt. The responses indicate that even those judges who perceive 
compliance with jury summons to be a problem would prefer not to se-
cure attendance through contempt procedures, and that many judges 
who do issue orders to show cause often do not follow with a penalty. 
The survey also produced information about veniremembers who 
avoid service as trial jurors by misrepresenting the truth during voir 
dire. The questionnaire asked judges about the proportion of cases in 
which they became convinced that a veniremember was untruthful. Al-
though they were not asked to, several judges elaborated on the reasons 
that they thought veniremembers had lied. The most common reason for 
dishonesty, according to the comments, is to avoid service. Fifteen 
judges indicated concern about the number of veniremembers who lie to 
avoid serving. As one judge concluded, "intelligent ·panel members re-
alize and use the obvious responses to avoid jury service." Another re-
ported that veniremembers falsely represent "that they do not believe in 
the presumption of innocence, cannot apply 'beyond a reasonable 
doubt' standard, will not follow the judge's instructions, cannot be fair 
because they believe the Defendant is guilty ... or don't like lawyers 
or people who ask for damages." 117 
Most of the judges who were convinced that a veniremember had 
been dishonest dismissed the untruthful veniremember. Doing nothing 
and allowing the attorneys to handle it was another popular response to 
veniremember deceit.118 Sixteen judges reported that they had 
threatened contempt and four reported imposing contempt for untruth-
115. 1\venty-three of the 42 judges had imposed a sentence on an offending juror. 
Sixteen of those 23 reported imposing a sentence for nonappearance only once. 
Sentences ranged between one and 100 days. Three judges specifically noted that they 
had imposed sentences suspended upon service in another pool. 
116. The remaining four judges reported fining 5, 24, 35, and 75 potential jurors. 
Fines ranged up to $1500 (one judge), with the most popular amounts being $100 or 
$250 (eight and five judges each). 
117. The second most common type of untruthfulness, according to the judges' 
comments, is the failure to reveal prior criminal history or other relevant information. 
This kind of misconduct will be examined in Part II. 
118. 1\vo hundred thirty-eight judges responded that they had dismissed the 
veniremember from that trial in this situation, 184 said they had allowed attorneys to act 
if they chose, and 46 had dismissed the veniremember from service in any trial. One 
judge explained, "I have never interfered with the responses given by prospective ju-
rors, assuming that a juror that didn't want to be a juror could find a pretext for avoid-
ing service." 
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fulness during voir dire. Some judges, however, expressed frustration 
about how to control this behavior. One stated, "I have never come up 
with a good remedy for a well-coached veniremember who lied about 
his/her feelings or attitudes (as opposed to lying about verifiable 
facts)." Just as nonappearance has generated creative responses from 
courts that are concerned that an who are summoned appear, judges 
have employed a variety of punishments other than contempt for the 
veniremember who lies to stay off the jury. Four judges apparently re-
fused to let deceitful veniremembers avoid service by demanding in-
stead that they sit through the entire trial as observers. Others denied 
them their juror fee, ordered them resubpoenaed for service, or embar-
rassed them. Future responses to this behavior may depend in part upon 
what judges learn about who is fibbing to get off, and whether letting 
them go biases the outcome of criminal cases. 
In sum, these responses suggest that jury dodging does not trouble 
most judges, but does pose a serious problem for some courts. Most 
judges do not use contempt to enforce appearance; and those that do 
generally do so infrequently and are often able to coerce compliance 
without requiring payment of a fine or incarceration. Finally, however, 
the survey suggests that veniremembers who are able to claim bias and 
other subjective disqualifying characteristics often can, and do, evade 
further service after appearing. 
D. Future Directions 
The foregoing discussion of jury avoidance past and present 
reveals a distinct trend: the remedies of fines and bystanders have given 
way to a very different, and for many courts more successful, prescrip-
tion for recruiting jurors - targeting the causes of juror resistance. This 
shift has taken place for several reasons. Foremost has been the desire 
to increase jury participation by particular groups - frrst, businessmen, 
and more recently, all "cognizable" groups that the Court has pro-
claimed must not be systematically excluded from jury pools. Also 
prompting the change in emphasis has been the high cost of punitive as 
compared to preventive solutions, and the continuing futility of attempts 
to impanel veniremembers who have strong incentives not to serve. 
Contempt may deter overt defiance of a jury summons; it is practically 
useless against the person who shows up and then lies to avoid serving 
as a trial juror. Shorter terms of service, employer liability for juror 
wages, the use of deferred service instead of hardship excuses, together 
with the adoption of the combined summons and qualification question-
naire and automated tracking of those summoned for jury service, have 
provided most courts with an adequate supply of jurors. 
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In communities in which jury avoidance is high, lawmakers con-
sidering changing procedures for recruiting jurors are well advised to 
keep these past successes in mind. For example, calls for the routine 
imposition of criminal contempt penalties against jury shirkers may 
meet with skepticism from cost-conscious judges and resistance from 
overburdened police, prosecutors, and corrections officials who must ar-
rest, prosecute, and house these offenders. More novel punishments are 
worth considering. 
In a provocative recent article exploring· ways tq ensure that the 
jury remains a viable and effective institution of self-governance, Pro-
fessor Akhil Amar suggested that courts withdraw the franchise from 
those who fail to report for jury service.119 The proposal, however, 
seems likely to promote less participation in democracy, not more, an 
objection Amar acknowledges. 120 Perhaps jury avoiders should forfeit a 
government privilege, not unlike the current federal law that conditions 
eligibility for student loans upon registration for the draft, but it is diffi-
cult to settle on which privilege woqld be appropriate, efficient, or ef-
fective to withhold. The California legislature is presently considering 
whether to bar jury dodgers from renewing their driver's licenses until 
after they can prove they have complied with their jury summonses. 121 
For an even sharper bite, a state might suspend driver's licenses or 
other government benefits when scofflaws fail to appear. At any rate, 
some citizens may feel that they cannot spare a day or two for jury ser-
vice, even on dates convenient to them and with full pay. For them, 
conditional sentences, community service, 122 or stiff monetary sane-
119. See Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. 
DAVJS L. REV. 1169, 1179 (1995). 
120. See id. at 1180. Rather than increasing the proportion of citizens involved in 
governance, the proposal restricts that number to only those who care so much about 
their right to vote that they will serve on juries against their will, and to those who al-
ready willingly serve on juries. 
121. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 90, at 105-06. The shorter the renewal 
period, the more effective this proposal will be. 
122. For example, one Manhattan stockbroker sent an impostor to court during 
voir dire instead of responding to the summons himself. After confessing that he was 
merely a substitute, the impostor bolted. Authorities easily located and promptly prose-
cuted the true venireman, who ended up performing 500 hours of particularly fitting 
community service: helping the Jury Supervisor with paperwork. The Jury Supervisor 
reported that he was "a very, very bright, likeable guy,'' one of the best workers he's 
ever had. This spring, months after completing his stint in the jury office, the stockbro-
ker completed his service as a sworn juror. Telephone Interview with Vincent 
Hominick, Jury Supervisor, New York County, N.Y., June 19, 1996; Busy Executive 
Finds Even Best Mechanic Can't Fix Jury Duty, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 1995, at A3. 
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tions123 may always be necessary deterrents of last resort. 
Because courts appear to prefer to make jury service more conve-
nient for jurors rather than trying to police those who stay away, we can 
anticipate more experiments with new incentives to serve. Using jurors' 
social security numbers a state could offer jurors a tax credit or an in-
come tax exemption for compensation while on jury duty.124 An insur-
ance plan to compensate self-employed jurors for lost wages and em-
ployers for the cost of supporting employees on jury duty may provide 
additional incentives to comply.125 With creative scheduling, busy courts 
could offer potential jurors their choice of morning, afternoon, or full-
day service. 
Child care problems of potential jurors demand attention as well. 
A century ago, when responsibility for child care and jury service rarely 
overlapped, one judge in Seattle allowed a three-year-old boy to sit near 
the jury box, in a small rocker furnished by the sheriff, sucking his 
thumb and looking at a picture book, while his mother served as a ju-
ror.126 One might expect that several decades of experience with jurors 
who are also parents would produce more systematic accommodations 
for child care, but the best that most courts off er is deferred service at a 
later date. Child care vouchers or facilities have yet to be seriously con-
sidered by most courts.127 
It is also possible that courts in which jury shirking persists as a 
serious problem may consider tackling some of the more intractable 
causes of reluctance to serve, including even those trial features that lit-
igants have come to regard as constitutional entitlements. For example, 
judges could limit the length of time a litigant has to present evi-
123. Professor Amar also proposed a fine equal to two weeks of salary in order to 
address the avoidance-by-the-rich problem that lesser fines have posed for years. Amar, 
supra note 119, at 1179. If fine caps are high enough - some jurisdictions have re-
cently raised the possible fine for jury dodging to $1500 - judges may have the discre-
tion to follow Amar's suggestion. 
124. Precedent for such an exemption exists in the combat-pay exemption for 
those who serve in armed services. See I.R.C. § 112(a)(l) (1994) (excluding from 
wages and gross income certain compensation that members of the armed forced earn 
while in active service in combat zone); see also CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 90, 
at 45 (recommending tax credit for e~ployers who compensate employees while on 
jury duty for more than three days). 
125. See CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 90, at 45-47 (proposing that state un-
employment benefits be extended to employees unable to work due to jury service); So-
bol, supra note 104, at 222 (proposing insurance plan). 
126. See Lelia J. Robinson, Women Jurors, 1 CHI. LEGAL TIMES 22, 28-29 
(1887). 
127. A variety of other "soft" rewards are possible as well, such as the "juror ap· 
preciation week" recently proposed by judges in Arizona. See ARlzONA REPORT, 
supra note 103, at 34. 
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dence, 128 identify jurors by number rather than name to alleviate appre-
hensions about serving,129 or consider cutting back on peremptory chal-
lenges to prevent veniremembers from talcing advantage of the voir dire 
process to avoid being selected to serve.13° Certainly, courts and legisla-
tures are well advised to be cautious whenever targeting well-
established aspects of the trial process, just as they must be careful not 
to overreact to a perceived problem in criminal justice before verifying 
its existence on a local level or before comparing its severity to other 
problems in the criminal justice system that demand attention as well. 
Still, it is about time that lawmakers at least consider the effects on ju-
rors, and on the jury system, of procedures originally designed with 
only litigants in mind. 
II. JUROR MISCONDUCT DURING TRIAL 
A. Jury Misconduct in America - How It Has Evolved 
Just as changes in trial procedure and social attitudes over the past 
two centuries have affected the way that citizens regard and courts en-
force compulsory jury service, they have left their mark on the rules 
governing the behavior of those jurors who do serve. First, the opportu-
nities for juror misconduct have expanded due to longer trials and in-
creasing demands on juror behavior. In addition, some forms of jury 
misconduct have become easier to discover or prove, although the law 
still severely limits access to and proof of the jury's work after it is 
complete. Finally, as jury misconduct has posed a greater threat to the 
finality and efficiency qf the trial process, courts have adopted two 
strategies in response: (1) managed tolerance, in the form of trial proce-
dures and review standards that obviate the need for new trials when-
ever misconduct is revealed and (2) prevention, in the form of efforts to 
assist jurors to behave properly. The discussion of jury misconduct that 
follows traces each of these developments. 
128. See infra note 278. 
129. See King, supra note 91 (recommending that states consider using anony-
mous juries in all criminal cases). 
130. Cf Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About 
Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 485, 488 (1996) 
(reporting survey of published decisions addressing Batson challenges revealed that 
14% of the "race-neutral" reasons offered by litigants for their challenges involve be-
havior during voir dire, and that in 14% of those cases, the litigant challenged the juror 
because the juror "wished to avoid jury service"). 
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1. Increasing Demands upon Juror Behavior, 1796-1996 
Much of the jury behavior that we consider misconduct today was 
also misconduct two hundred years ago, but jurors back then had fewer 
opportunities to engage in it. 131 Trials of the nineteenth century were too 
short to provide much of a chance for shenanigans. Whenever a jury 
was not in the jury box or actively deliberating, a bailiff closely super-
vised its members, watching over the group to make sure it behaved. 
Today that picture has changed. Felony trials with one or two witnesses 
lasting a few hours or less, once commonplace, are now rare. Also unu-
sual today, primarily because of the increased length of trials, is the 
routine sequestration of the jury. Changes in press coverage of criminal 
proceedings have also enlarged opportunities for inappropriate behavior 
by jurors· during trials. Moreover, contemporary judges and litigants 
have different expectations for jurors, expectations that have shifted, 
and will continue to shift, as the boundary separating acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior by jurors changes with societal views of the 
jury's function.132 
a. The Lengthening of the Criminal Jury Trial. Today, most felony 
jury trials take three days or longer to complete; in some jurisdictions, 
jurors spend a week trying the average felony case.133 A criminal case 
that lasts for several weeks is no longer the sensation it used to be -
one in every twenty felony jury trials in three counties in California 
takes nearly a month to complete.134 Jury deliberations across the coun-
131. Some forms of misconduct were probably more prevalent in years past than 
they are today. For example, there is less contact today between jurors and the parties or 
the public through open windows or in crowded accommodations in which in the past 
jurors, parties, and witnesses lodged during the court's term. See, e.g., Louisville & 
Nashville Ry. Co. v. Tumey, 62 So. 885, 888-89 (Ala. 1913) Gurors shared bed, then 
room, at boarding house with plaintiff throughout the trial); Farrer v. Ohio, 2 Ohio St. 
54 (1853) (new trial granted in part because of conversations held between jurors and 
various persons on the sidewalk below through the windows of the jury room). 
132. Another potential catalyst for one type of juror misconduct -
veniremembers' efforts to conceal criminal histories - is the expansion of the jury pool 
in many communities during the 1950s and 60s beyond hand-picked men whose reputa-
tions were well-known. 
133. See DALE ANNE SIPES ET Ar.., ON TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL 1'RIALs 17-18, 79 (1988) (computing hours per day that were devoted to tri-
als in nine jurisdictions, revealing that median criminal trial length ranged from just 
over two to over seven days); see also Sobol, supra note 104, at 173 Gury trials average 
one week in two California jurisdictions). 
134. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN 
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 12 (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN] (reporting 
that the number of criminal jury trials lasting between 6 and 20 days have increased 
118% since 1973); SIPES ET AL., supra note 133, at 17-18. 
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try have grown from short conferences that took only minutes to discus-
sions averaging well over two hours.135 
i. Causes. Longer trials have crept up on us gradually and for 
many reasons.136 Some attribute the lengthening of trials to attorneys. 
Expanded provision of counsel for the defense during the nineteenth 
century meant longer voir dires, more objections, more arguments about 
evidentiary and procedural matters, and, of course, more orations to the 
jury, all of which increased even further the time required to try even 
simple felonies. 137 Others have blamed "the system of elective judges 
with short tenure which swept over the country after 1850" for trial de-
lays, complaining that "elected judges can not afford to antagonize 
[counsel] and so take refuge in a passive attitude and tend to become 
mere umpires." 138 
Another change during the nineteenth century which may have 
lengthened trials in some jurisdictions was the withdrawal of questions 
of law from the jury. When juries were no longer allowed to decide the 
law for themselves the trial judge was obligated to 'instruct them care-
fully. Former practice in some jurisdictions had been to submit cases 
without instructions.139 
135. SIPES ET AL., supra note 133, at 19. 
136. See FRIEDMAN & PERCNAL, supra note 88, at 185 (in Alameda County, 
California, felony trials lengthened from a median of 1.2 days in 1880, to 1.7 days in 
the 1890s, to two days during 1900-1910); KAI.VEN & ZEISEL, supra note 33, at 156 
(most felony trials took less than two days in the 1950s); Gordon Van Kessel, Adver-
sary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 403, 470 
(1992) (noting that in 1922 Cleveland prosecutors were trying two to four cases per day 
and that felony trials in Los Angeles took about three days in 1954); John H. Langbein, 
Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 3, 10 & n.18 (1978) (half of felony 
trials in 1976 in New Jersey lasted one to three days and five percent over five days; 
Los Angeles felony trials averaged over a week of trial time); supra text accompanying 
notes 20-24. 
137. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 136, at 10-11 (attributing the lengthening of 
trials to the provision of counsel during the nineteenth century and to evidentiary rules). 
By 1887, felony defendants in Chicago were provided counsel if they were unable to af-
ford their own, and at least one writer lamented the "unseemly wrangles and displays of 
wit and wisdom" that regularly extended for days the time required to select a jury. EL-
LIOTT ANTHONY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SELF DEFENSE, TRIAL BY JURY IN 
CRIMINAL CASES, AND NEW TRIALS IN CRIMINAL CASES 207 (1887); see also Van 
Kessel, supra note 136. In some jurisdictions, defendants had counsel much earlier. See, 
e.g., Rice, supra note 22, at 256 (only eight percent of felony defendants lacked trial 
counsel in Frederick County, Maryland, between 1818 and 1825). 
138. WICKERSHAM REPORT, supra note 47, at 41 ("Rather than imperil their po-
sitions, they tolerate continuances and postponements, evasions of jury service and long 
drawn out selections of juries, and the wranglings of counsel and ill treatment of wit-
nesses, so unhappily characteristic of American criminal trials."). 
139. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 47, at 143 (noting that "until 1807 the prac-
tice of Connecticut judges was simply to submit both law and facts to the jury, without 
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The law of evidence also changed in ways that lengthened trials. In 
the late nineteenth century, shifting and increasingly formal evidence 
doctrine provided ammunition for argument during trial. And although 
some recent reforms, such as the exclusionary rule barring illegally ob-
tained evidence, have narrowed the scope of admissible evidence, many 
more evidentiary modifications since 1800 have increased the volume 
of evidence available to both the prosecution and the defense in crimi-
nal trials. For example, many witnesses commonly heard in criminal tri-
als today, including defendants, their spouses; and convicted criminals, 
were barred from testifying during at least part of the nineteenth cen-
tury.140 Hearsay rules were relaxed in the early decades of the twentieth 
century.141 Preliminary hearings and the testimonial evidence that such 
hearings produce did not begin to replace less-accessible grand jury tes-
timony until late in the nineteenth century.142 
Other developments may help to explain lengthening trials. Proof 
of guilt has become more complex. Early nineteenth century prosecu-
tors relied heavily upon eyewitnesses. By 1900, prosecutors were de-
pendent upon evidence collected and presented by professional investi-
gative agencies. By the late 1950s, one quarter of all felony trials 
included expert witness testimony.143 In the 1980s, felony trials in some 
counties typically included the testimony of at least one expert and 
expressing any opinion or giving them any direction on how to find their verdict," but 
after 1807 they were required to give instructions on every point of law involved); Ire-
land, supra note 29, at 286 (stating that until instructions were required by statute in 
1854, most judges in Kentucky did not instruct the jury unless one or both parties re-
quested instructions). 
140. Until the mid-nineteenth century, criminal defendants (and parties to a civil 
case) were not competent to testify, nor were their spouses. Until 1917, and much later 
for some states, those convicted of a felony, or of a crime of deceit, could not testify as 
witnesses. See generally 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 92-94 (John W. Strong ed., 4th 
ed. 1992). Defendants may have answered questions at trial, but not as witnesses. See 
Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Re-
main Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625, 2647-60 (1996) [hereinafter Alschuler, Peculiar 
Privilege]. 
141. See 2 EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 293, 302, 
306-07 (1961). Liberalization of the hearsay rules has continued. For example, state-
ments against penal interest, now a routine part of many criminal prosecutions, were 
inadmissible in many jurisdictions until the 1970s. See McCORMICK, supra note 140, 
at 340-43. · 
142. See supra note 33. Also contributing to longer trials in some courts is the rule 
requiring the government's disclosure of the prior statements of prosecution witnesses, 
after the trial has begun. In New York, trials frequently have been delayed or recessed 
for up to a day after the jury is sworn while the defense digests this material. See THE 
JURY PROJECT, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 85 
(1994) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT] (recommending that New York instead re-
quire disclosure before jury selection begins). 
143. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 33, at 136-40. 
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three officials, as well as fourteen or fifteen exhibits, in addition to lay 
witnesses.144 In addition, as the percentage of criminal cases disposed of 
by guilty plea increased between 1850 and 1930, more of the simple 
cases may have been "pled out," increasing the complexity of the aver-
age criminal jury trial. 1~5 With increasingly complex criminal conspira-
cies, the number of criminal jury trials with multiple defendants may 
have increased as well. Between 1990 and 1994, for example, the num-
ber of federal jury trials with four or more defendants went up thirty-
five percent.146 For all of these reasons, the contrast between the felony 
jury trial of 1996 and the felony jury trial of 1796 is stark - the frame-
work is the same, but what rests upon it is a much more bloated and 
complicated version of the previous crude, but slim, form. 
ii. Effects on Jury Misconduct. Certain forms of jury misconduct 
have been aggravated by lengthening trials. When trials were snappy af-
fairs jurors had little or no opportunity to misbehave before a verdict 
was returned. They rarely left the jury box during the trial and reached 
verdicts in minutes. Longer trials, with their recesses and breaks, al-
lowed jurors many more opportunities to expose themselves to outside 
influence, conduct experiments, visit the scene of the event, share li-
quor, or otherwise act improperly before the verdict was returned. 
144. See SIPES ET AL., supra note 133, at 19, 34. 
145. I am grateful to Professor Robert P. Mosteller of Duke University School of 
Law for suggesting these latter two points to me. The relationship between longer trials 
and plea bargaining has been noted before. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining, supra note 
33, at 34. Mosteller's insight is that bargaining may have been a cause as well as a con-
sequence of increasingly complex trials. 
146. LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 134, at 12. In recent decades defense attor-
neys have received even more leeway to question veniremembers during voir dire, and 
appellate courts have insisted that some questions be permitted in order to preserve a 
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. Compare Hill v. State, 661 A.2d 1164 
(Md. 1995) (holding that a judge's refusal to ask veniremembers about racial or ethnic 
bias in the trial of an African-American defendant charged with cocaine possession vio-
lated the Maryland Constitution) and LAPA VE & ISRAEL, supra note 80, § 26.2(d) with 
THACHER, supra note 28, at 12-15, 18 (describing the use of "triers" in Massachusetts 
as of 1834 and noting that in the early 1800s jurors were not even questioned except 
upon motion of one of the parties). A comparative examination of cross-examination 
practices from 1796 to 1996 may very .well confirm Professor Albert Alschuler's sug-
gestion to me that cross-examination, too, has expanded to the point at which attorneys 
"consider it their professional duty to force witnesses to repeat their stories at least two 
or three times." Letter from Albert W. Alschuler, Wilson-Dickinson Professor & Arnold 
& Frieda Shure Scholar, University of Chicago Law School 2 (July 3, 1996) (on file 
with author). The Court has held that other aspects of trial strategy are constitutionally 
protected as well. See Peter Westen, Order of Proof: An Accused's Right to Control the 
Timing and Sequence of Evidence in His Defense, 66 CAL. L. REV. 935 (1978) (describ-
ing the Court's holding that the defendant's right to control the timing and sequence of 
the presentation of evidence is constitutionally protected). 
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Eventually, the sluggish pace of trials prompted courts to abandon 
their first line of defense against jury misconduct: sequestration. By the 
second half of the nineteenth century many courts treated the failure to 
keep jurors sequestered ("juror separation") as harmless,147 and by the 
1940s most states had abandoned the rule barring separation prior to de-
liberations in noncapital cases.148 Judges concerned about jury compe-
tence recognized that sequestration deterred many potential "reliable" 
jurors from serving as jurors. 149 
The introduction of women as jurors in many jurisdictions during 
the 1920s also increased the sentiment against sequestration. Male ju-
rors locked together in a small room overnight to sleep or argue were 
expected to bear up under whatever inconvenience and embarrassment 
such close quarters might cause. But women jurors were an entirely dif-
ferent matter. Few desired that women jurors endure the close company 
of male strangers under such circumstances.150 Pending the amendment 
of statutory prohibitions against separation, judges and bailiffs took 
whatever means they could to assure female jurors some privacy while 
keeping the jury together, including using sheets to divide off separate 
147. See Owens v. Commonwealth, 167 S.E. 377, 378-79 (Va. Ct. App. 1933) 
(discussing shift in law in Virginia between 1812 and 1868); 2 SEYMOUR D. THOMP-
SON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRIALS IN ACI"IONS CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
1827-28 (Marion C. Early ed., 1912). 
148. See MINIMUM ·STANDARDS, supra note 49, at 203-05 (by the 1940s, 29 ju-
risdictions pennitted judges to allow separation during trial until deliberations, but thir-
teen states mandated jury sequestration throughout the trial during capital cases). As 
they relaxed their separation rules, some states adopted statutes requiring judges to ad-
monish jurors not to talk among themselves or with others about the case during separa-
tions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 1122 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996) (enacted 1872). 
149. See Stephens v. People, 19 N.Y. 549, 554 (1859) ("if the ancient rule forbid-
ding the separation of jurors, during a trial, should be enforced, at the present day, the 
public would lose the services of the most reliable jurors, and a weary burden would 
fall exclusively upon those who are unable to pay their fines, and to whom and their 
families the entire loss of time is a serious evil"), overruled, People v. Epps, 334 N.E. 
2d 566, 570 (N.Y. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 999 (1975). 
150. See How a "Mixed Jury" Passed an All-Night Session, LITERARY DIG., Mar. 
17, 1923, at 50 (relating how jury of men and women endured a night locked in a jury 
room equipped with a bathroom door that revealed the occupant's silhouette and during 
which the young female juror slept on the marble window-sill "wrapt ... tenderly" in 
the other jurors' over-coats while "her iover from across the courtyard ... kept v~gil"); 
Imogen B. Oakley, The Crime Wave and the Jury, 132 OUTLOOK 376, 378 (1922) 
("[T]he chief reason why cleanly and intelligent citizens evade jury duty in the criminal 
court is that a murder trial will consign them to the jury donnitory and compel them to 
bunk next to men of doubtful cleanliness and of any 'race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude.' .•. Modem sanitary science demands separate cubicles, and until they are 
provided women jurors will be justified in refusing to go into a donnitory and prefer-
ring a jail sentence for contempt of court, for in a jail one may at least have a cell to 
herself."). 
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areas for women jurors.151 Statutes were quickly passed providing for 
separate bailiffs for women and men and permitting the separation of 
male and female jurors.152 Eventually, even jurors in the midst of their 
deliberations were permitted to separate.153 
Lifting sequestration rules made misconduct more difficult to pre-
vent and gave jurors the opportunity to misbehave individually and 
away from the watchful eyes and ears of the court officers. Consider, 
for example, the use of alcoholic beverages by jurors. In the early 
1800s intoxicated jurors posed problems for judges of a different sort 
than they pose today. Alcohol consumption in many areas of the coun-
try was high, peaking in 1830 when, on average, every adult male drank 
a half pint of liquor daily.154 Liquor was often sold near the courthouse, 
straining a court's ability to complete its term as veniremen showed up 
drunk for the day's trials.155 Once jurors were screened for drunkenness 
and the trial was underway, the rules against separation and the dispatch 
with which trials were conducted meant that jurors could not easily ob-
tain liquor before delivering their verdict. When liquor was discovered 
in the jury room, the judge's first concern was whether a party to the 
case had provided it, wary of the sympathy that a bit of refreshment 
could stimulate for a generous litigant.156 After courts began to provide 
jurors with food and drink, and as intolerance of liquor consumption in-
creased after 1830, apprehension about the effects of liquor on a juror's 
ability to fairly judge a case took the place of concerns about its 
151. See R. Justin Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REV. 30, 42 (1922) (noting 
that a room partition between the sexes complies with statute barring separation); Eliza-
beth M. Sheridan, Women and Jury Service, 11 A.B.A. J. 792 (1925); Women on Wash-
ington Juries, THE INDEPENDENT, July 3, 1913, at 50-51 (noting bailiff coped with 
women jurors by installing cots in a small rented hall and hanging a curtain across the 
center of the room). 
152. See, e.g., MATILDA FENBERG, WOMEN JURORS AND JURY SERVICE IN IL-
LINOIS 17 (1940); ROBERT VON MOSCHZISKER, TRIAL BY JURY§ 413 (1922). 
153. New York, however, clung to rules requiring sequestration during delibera-
tions until 1995. See NEW YORK REPORT. supra note 142, at 112-13 (noting that as of 
1994 New York was the only state to mandate sequestration of juries in felony cases). 
Many states still forbid separation in capital cases. 
154. See w J. RORABAUGH, THE ALCOHOLIC REPUBLIC: AN AMERICAN TRA-
DmON 8-21 (1979) (citing statistics and documenting the lifestyle of the early nine-
teenth-century male as one involving frequent visits to taverns, consumption at home, 
while traveling, and at all times of the day). 
155. See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 84; Hall, supra note 11, at 8. 
156. See THOMPSON, supra note 147, at 1846-47 (noting cases in which verdict 
was attacked because of possible connections between parties and food or drink com-
sumed by jurors). 
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source.157 Many courts forbade court officers from supplying liquor to 
jurors, but alcoholic beverages sometimes accompanied meals supplied 
by the tavern or hotel in which the jury was lodged.158 The longer the 
trial, the more opportunity - and, perhaps, incentive - to drink. By 
1915, the use of intoxicants was termed "a common form of miscon-
duct among jurors." 159 
One form of juror misconduct that surfaced only as the average 
trial stretched beyond one day's work is the discussion of evidence 
before deliberations begin. The custom of instructing ju_rors not to make 
up their minds or discuss the case before the end of the trial was an off-
shoot of the rule barring expressions of opinion by jurors to nonjurors 
regarding the verdict before the end of the trial. The theory behind both 
prohibitions was that a juror might stick with his public statement and 
close his mind to further evidence.160 Nineteenth-century courts con-
ducting short trials rarely encountered predeliberation discussions be-
tween jurors. By the 1940s, however, most states had codified a ban 
against "preliminary deliberations." In 1945, the dufy of judges to give 
jurors this instruction assumed constitutional status. A divided panel of 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a conviction, otherwise 
supported by the evidence, because the judge had not warned the jurors 
to stay mum.161 The majority felt that this situation denied the accused a 
fair trial as required by the due process guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 
The court reasoned that to allow jurors to discuss only part of the evi-
dence, before the defense presents its case, shifts "the burden of proof 
and place[s] upon the defendants the burden of changing by evidence 
the opinion thus formed.'' 162 Judge Woodrough, dissenting, argued that 
there was no proof that the jurors had discussed the case before deliber-
ations, and that in any event the instruction was not "practical" in a 
157. See RORABAUGH, supra note 154, at 8-9 (reporting precipitous drop in con-
sumption rates between 1830 and the Civil War); Use of Intoxicating Liquor By Jurors: 
Criminal Cases, 7 A.L.R.3o 1040 (1966). 
158. See, e.g., State v. Baber, 74 Mo. 292 (1881); FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 
250. But see MORRIS J. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM 28 (1968) (relat-
ing 1805 Pennsylvania trial in which the jury consumed five and one-half quarts of Ma-
deira wine, two quarts of brandy, two quarts of beer, and one quart of cider, all at 
county expense during one day's deliberation). 
159. Howard H. Lehman, A Critical Survey of Certain Phases of Trial Procedure 
in Criminal Cases, 63 U. PA. L. REv. 754, 783 (1915). 
160. See PROFFATT, supra note 43, § 389 (citing cases); James P. Thomas, Recent 
Decisions, Constitutional Law - Sixth Amendment - Juror Misconduct - Premature 
Deliberations, 32 DuQ. L. REv. 983 (1994) [hereinafter Thomas, Recent Decisions]. 
161. See Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 
U.S. 863 (1945). 
162. 147 F.2d at 328. 
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trial that was seven weeks long. "No normal honest Americans ever 
worked together in a common inquiry for any length of time with their 
mouths sealed up like automatons or oysters," he argued. 163 Although 
some states agreed with Judge Woodrough, more followed the major-
ity's reasoning - jurors who discussed the evidence before the end of 
the trial became jurors who threatened the due process rights of 
defendants.164 
b. Publicity's Perils. Longer trials and less control over jurors dur-
ing trials were not the only developments over the past two centuries 
that provided more opportunities for jurors in criminal cases to stray. 
Publicity about criminal cases increased during the period, creating new 
pitfalls for jurors. 
Beginning in the 1830s with the distribution of the "penny 
presses" in New York and other large cities, "news" of crime began 
reaching more people than it ever had before.165 Short on truth and long 
on melodrama, these daily papers thrived on reporting crime at a price 
anyone could afford. Editors in smaller cities and towns at first contin-
ued to rely on the more traditional weeklies for the bulk of their stories, 
but the newer presses grew and soon set the trends.166 In Indianapolis, 
for instance, the Indiana State Journal began its "crimes and acci-
dents" column in the 1840s, covering minor crimes and supplementing 
its usual coverage of sensational murders.167 Soon newspapers in New 
York banded together into the Associated Press to talce advantage of the 
telegraph. News became more centralized, and local papers became 
163. 147 F.2d at 330 (Woodrough, J., dissenting). 
164. See, e.g., United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 1993) (collecting 
cases). In cases in which the jurors were given instructions not to talk but did, their 
misconduct did not require a new trial unless the defendant was prejudiced. See 
Thomas, Recent Decisions, supra note 160, at 990-91 (collecting cases). 
165. Until the 1830s, crimes and those accused of committing them were the terri-
tory of the pamphleteer, whose sensational and often completely fictitious accounts 
were popular reading. See ANDIE TUCHER, FROTH & SCUM: TRUTH, BEAUTY, 
GOODNESS, AND THE Ax MURDER IN AMERICA'S FIRST MAss MEDIUM 9-11 
(1994) (reporting that crime "news" for those who did not indulge in pamphlets was 
"sporadic" due to the beliefs of most weekly editors that precious and expensive col-
umn space should not be wasted on information that readers were likely to know al-
ready and that the less readers knew about the criminal elements among them the better 
off their communities would be). · 
166. See PAPKE, supra note 64, at 34-35 (noting that new presses reached ten 
times as many people because of the low price, and that the new readers - mechanics, 
artisans, office workers, and small merchants - were different people from those who 
had read the traditional papers); id. at 44-45 (when advertising revolts led The Herald to 
cut back on crime sensationalism, the gap was quickly filled by other newspapers de-
voted extensively to crime); TucHER, supra note 165, at 90-96. 
167. See David Jackson Bodenhamer, Law and Disorder on the Early Frontier: 
Marion County, Indiana, 1823-1850, 10 W. HIST. Q. 323, 335 (1979). 
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more dependent on the urban-based wire services for crime reporting.168 
In the 1880s intense competition for subscribers in larger cities 
prompted a renewed increase in crime and scandal reporting.169 By the 
1920s, criminal cases were discussed on radio as well as on front 
pages, 170 and modem newsreels brought their images to theaters nation-
wide. By the 1960s, television again changed the way America received 
its news, and the Supreme Court observed in 1966 that "unfair and 
prejudicial news comment on pending trials has become increasingly 
prevalent." 171 This expansion of news and comment about prosecutions 
occurred at the same time that jurors were first permitted to leave the 
courtroom during trials, and at the same time that some of the most 
well-publicized information about criminal cases became off limits as 
evidence.172 As a result, it has become more difficult for jurors to fol-
low instructions - if indeed such instructions have been given to them 
- not to read, listen to, or watch news about the criminal cases before 
them. 
c. Misconduct, an Expanding Definition. Changing conceptions of 
the jury's role have also affected what behavior has been considered 
misconduct. As the jury's role shrank from law maker to fact-finder,173 
168. See TUCHER, supra note 165, at 194; Disqualification of Jurors in Criminal 
Cases, 1 ALB. LJ. 327-28 (1870). 
Id. 
There is not a murder committed in the remotest mining town of the west but 
finds its way speedily into the New York papers, and through these into every 
village. . . . A burglary committed in any little country store in New England 
finds its way in twenty-four hours into the note-book of a Chicago reporter. 
169. See JOHN LoFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PREss 80 (1966) (circulation war, 
combined with better printing technology, "broaden[ed] and quicken[ed) the impact of 
crime news on the public"); PAPKE, supra note 64, at 72-73 (noting that around the 
turn of the century, even higher class papers such as the New York Times were devoting 
up to five percent of their space to crime news). 
170. See John R. Bender, The Free Press-Fair Trial Issue and Journalistic Profes-
sionalism: Practices in News Coverage of Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 1891-1980, 
at 219-29, 340, 379-89 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri 
(Columbia)). 
171. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 53, 333, 362 (1966); see also Bender, supra 
note 170, at 52-53 (noting that a study of the American Bar Association Advisory Com-
mittee on Free Trial and Fair Press in 1966, and a follow-up study in 1979, showed that 
news reports frequently contained prejudicial information such as confessions and opin-
ion about the guilt of the accused). 
172. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 80, §§ 3.20), 6.8(a), 6.9(g) (describing 
the Court's constitutional regulation of police conduct under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments that removed several items of commonly publicized infor-
mation from jurors' review). 
173. See supra note 47; see also Dooley, supra note 48, at 353, 354 & nn.143-46 
(collecting theories about why this decline in jury power vis-a-vis judges in the late 
nineteenth century occurred, including the growing emphasis on uniform, predictable 
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some conduct appropriate to the jury's former function became prohib-
ited. For example, jurors who were at one time allowed to consult dic-
tionaries were forbidden to do so as the judge became the sole source of 
instruction for deliberating jurors.174 States that once allowed jurors to 
sentence defendants have barred them from speculating upon what a 
defendant's sentence might be.175 Early nineteenth-century juries rou-
tinely weighed a defendant's explanation, or lack of explanation, of the 
charges.176 By 1965 jurors were not allowed to consider defendant's si-
lence as evidence of his guilt. 177 The expression of racial bias by jurors 
has also been condemned by modem courts.178 Much more recently, 
some judges have concluded that the failure to participate in delibera-
tions is misconduct.179 The characterization of obstinacy as misconduct 
is a modem extension of the impatience with hung juries that became 
rules, a rise in the number of well-trained judges, and racist and sexist attitudes toward 
minority and women jurors). 
174. Compare Denison v. State, 93 S.W. 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1906) (holding that 
because the jury was authorized to examine a dictionary, it was not error for the judge 
to refer them to it) with Wilson v. State, 495 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (error 
for judge to furnish jury with dictionary). 
175. Compare, e.g., Luker v. State, 105 So. 2d 834, 841 (Ala. Ct. App. 1958) (jury 
must be charged as to the permissible punishment in rape cases and fix the sentence), 
cert. denied, 105 So. 2d 845 (Ala. 1958) and AUSTIN ABBOT, ABBOT'S CRIMINAL 
TRIAL PRACTICE §§ 726, 768 (4th ed. 1939) (collecting jury sentencing cases from 
Texas, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arkansas) with ALA. R. 
CR. P. 26.6(a) (abolishing jury sentencing for noncapital offenses committed after 1980) 
and Pruitt v. State, 457 So. 2d 454, 456 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (when judge fixes pun-
ishment, jury instructions concerning punishment are misleading), cert. denied, 457 So. 
2d 456 (Ala. 1984) and People v. Van Arsdale, 26 N.Y.S.2d 11, 14 (County Ct. N.Y. 
1941) (upon request, judge must instruct jurors that they must not consider the punish-
ment in determining guilt). 
176. See Alschuler, Peculiar Privilege, supra note 140, at 2660-63. 
177. See id. at 2663 (discussing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)). The 
effects of many of these expanding concepts of juror misconduct have been limited to 
preverdict revelations; since about 1810 most courts have not accepted after conviction 
a juror's word that he or another juror had relied upon forbidden inferences during de-
liberations. See infra text accompanying notes 186-95. 
178. See, e.g., Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (permitting 
proof of racist statements in jury room by other jurors); State v. Jackson, 879 P.2d 307 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (ordering new trial due to juror's comments about "coloreds"); 
Derrick v. State, 187 S.W. 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1916) (ordering a new trial after the 
foreman told other jurors that convicting the defendant would help to quell the frequent 
disturbances of Negroes near his home). 
179. Such findings appeared in civil cases appealed by unsuccessful plaintiffs, and, 
more recently, in criminal cases. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 179 
(Ct. App. 1994) (upholding trial judge's decision to discharge juror where the judge 
found that there was "good cause" to replace a juror who had "made up his mind 
before he went in there," did not answer the questions posed to him by other jurors, did 
not sit at the table with the other jurors during deliberations, did not look at the two vic-
tims in the courtroom, and did not cooperate with the other jurors). 
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prevalent in the late nineteenth century, impatience that led to the wide-
spread adoption of the Allen or "dynamite" instruction for deadlocked 
jurors.180 
The more skeptical judges have become of jurors' competence and 
the more certain they have become of their own, the less leeway they 
have given jurors to conduct themselves. This growing distrust of the 
jury has influenced not only the very definition of misconduct, but its 
discovery, as the following section explains. 
2. Uncovering Juror Misconduct: Lowered Trust in Jurors, Growing 
Protection for Defendants 
Along with more opportunities for jurors to commit error came 
more opportunities for attorneys to learn of it. First, longer trials have 
meant more chances for jurors and others to come forward with their 
concerns about behavior during the trial. Many judges who have al-
lowed jurors to separate have taken care to question returning jurors 
concerning exposure to outside influences before starting trial again. 
Moreover, even if some trial judges had been inclined to ignore or dis-
miss hints and allegations of jury misconduct which they received dur-
ing trial, the Supreme Court by 1954 had limited that option. In Rem-
mer v. United States, 181 the Court held that upon learning that a juror 
may have been approached by an unnamed person offering a reward for 
a particular verdict, the trial judge was obligated by the Constitution to 
hold a hearing "with all interested parties" participating in order to 
"determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and 
whether or not it was prejudicial."182 
Second, by the close of the nineteenth century, trial judges were 
less convinced that jurors were reaching their verdicts correctly. Their 
increased willingness to grant new trials probably provided a corre-
spondingly greater incentive for defense counsel to seek proof of mis-
conduct after conviction.183 For defendants whose requests for a new 
trial due to jury misconduct were denied, appellate relief became avail.a-
180. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); Note, Due Process, Judicial 
Economy and the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 
123, 123-24 (1967) (tracing history of this instruction). 
181. 347 U.S. 227 (1954). 
182. 347 U.S. at 229-30. Even prior to Remmer, some states, including California, 
strongly encouraged mid-trial questioning. See, e.g., People v. Tinnin, 28 P.2d 951 
(1934). 
183. See WICKERSHAM COMMISSION, supra note 47, at 30 ("In the heyday of 
technical procedure in the last half of the nineteenth century, a great mass of detail de-
veloped as to new trials, and for a time they were granted lavishly."). Today in some 
states trial judges are obligated to make some type of preliminary inquiry upon receiv-
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ble only in the second half of the nineteenth century.184 By the early 
1900s, appellate courts regularly reviewed such decisions and other 
claims of jury misconduct.185 
The avenues for postconviction relief, however, were considerably 
narrower in some states than in others because of rules limiting defend-
ants' use of the most accessible source of proof of jury misconduct -
affidavits by the jurors themselves. American courts by about 1810186 
had embraced a rigid rule barring testimony of jurors to impeach their 
own verdicts.187 In many of these early cases, the rule prohibiting the 
use of juror affidavits or testimony to impeach verdicts was interpreted 
to bar juror testimony about almost anything the jurors said, did, or ex-
perienced.188 However, other courts during the mid-nineteenth century 
allowed juror testimony concerning certain types of misconduct to be 
offered as proof in support of a motion for new trial, particularly in 
ing allegations of misconduct following a verdict. See, e.g., S~te v. Brown, 668 A.2d 
1288, 1303 (Conn. 1995). 
184. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. 581 (1878) (writ of error not available 
to review refusal of new trial); ANTHONY, supra note 137, at 340 (reporting that in Illi-
nois, a trial judge's decision to deny a motion for new trial was unreviewable in crimi-
nal cases until the rule was changed by statute in 1857). The government argued this 
rule in Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 145 (1892), but the Court reviewed the 
lower court's decision denying a new trial anyway, noting that the court "did not exer-
cise any discretion." 146 U.S. at 147. Appellate courts in Texas continued to decline to 
second-guess trial courts on this score well into the twentieth century. Hubert Dee John-
son, Note, New Trial - Misconduct of Jurors, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 101, 107 & n.46 
(1936) (citing cases from 1909-1916). 
185. The Texas Courts of Appeals considered many such claims - jury miscon-
duct was, along with variance·between the charge and proof at trial, the fifth most fre-
quent successful ground of appeal in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals between 
1900 and 1927, accounting for 2.2% of all cases reversed. See Keith Carter, The Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals: Section 4, Legislation, 11 TEXAS L. REv. 185 (1933). A 
similar study of 206 criminal appeals from Cook County during 1924-28 suggested that 
the figures from Texas may be high for the period; not one of the 97 cases reversed 
from Cook County was reversed because of jury misconduct. See Joseph E. Green & 
Thomas J. Connors, Causes for Reversals of Cook County Convictions 1924-28, 27 ILL. 
L. REV. 100 (1932). 
186. Before this time courts liberally received juror testimony concerning miscon-
duct in the jury room. At common law, testimony or affidavits of jurors could be re-
ceived on a motion for new trial based upon misconduct in the jury room. See 5 JOHN 
H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352 (2d ed. 1923). 
187. The rule was based on an English case that had been decided in 1785. See 
Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785). 
188. See, e.g., Henry v. Ricketts, 11 F. Cas. 1188 (C.C.D.C 1809) (No. 6385) (trial 
court refused to hear evidence from jurors regarding the intoxication of jurors, the pres-
ence of "spirituous liquors ... sent to them in their blankets," and the departure of two 
jurors from the jury room); Hulet v. Barnett, IO Ohio 459 (1841) (rejecting juror affida-
vit concerning policeman's conversation with jurors in jury room); People v. Barker, 2 
Wheel. Cr. 19 (N.Y. 1822) (rejecting jurors' testimony that defendant's conviction for 
dueling was the result of chance); see also PRoFFAIT, supra note 43, §§ 408-09. 
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criminal cases.189 In 1892 the Supreme Court held that federal courts 
deciding whether to grant a losing litigant a new trial due to jury error 
were free to consider juror affidavits as proof of the existence of an ex-
traneous influence on the jury, but the Court continued to bar the use of 
such affidavits as proof of the decisionmaking process of one or more 
of the jurors.190 
In the decades that followed, the rule barring juror testimony 
eroded in some jurisdictions, tracking the growing concern among 
courts that juror misconduct can implicate not only verc,lict accuracy but 
the constitutionality of a conviction. In some states convicted defend-
ants aired for the first time much of the jury's dirty linen that stricter 
rules in other states concealed.191 By the late 1940s and 1950s promi-
nent judges - including future Justice Warren Burger and Judge Je-
rome Frank - proposed that all juror affidavits be admissible to im-
peach criminal convictions. 192 By 1970, both state and federal courts 
recognized that some forms of jury misconduct threatened not only a 
defendant's right to an impartial jury, but also his right to confrontation, 
and allowed proof of such misconduct even from the mouths of the ju-
rors themselves.193 Presently, courts continue to accept juror affidavits 
selectively.194 Efforts by lawyers to secure evidence of misconduct from 
189. See, e.g., Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866) (allowing 
affidavit of jurors concerning quotient verdict); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 361 (1851) (considering affidavits of two jurors who had read newspaper ac-
counts); Renee B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in 
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. R.Ev. 505, 532 (1995) (noting 
willingness of judges in several states to accept juror affidavits in criminal cases). 
190. See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); see also McDonald v. 
Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915). 
191. Comment, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts, 25 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 360, 368 n.60 
(1958). In Texas, where rules regarding the receipt of juror testimony ~ere particularly 
liberal, appellate courts between 1905 and 1926 granted new trials in at least 30 crimi-
nal cases because of jurors' discussion of the failure of the accused to testify. Texas 
continued to allow such proof quite recently. See Smith v. State, 530 S.W.2d 827, 829-
30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Contrast Texas's unique position with United States v. 
Friedland, 660 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane) (upholding trial court's refusal to ex-
amine jurors concerning their alleged consideration of defendant's silence), cert. denied, 
456 U.S. 989 (1982). 
192. See Klimes v. United States, 263 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1959); JEROME FRANK, 
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 115, 144 (1949). 
193. Compare People v. Mullen, 99 N.Y.S. 227 (County Ct. 1906) (barring juror 
testimony concerning external influence) with Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) 
(bailiff's communications to juror denied defendant his right to cross-examine witnesses 
against him) and People v. DeLucia, 229 N.E.2d 211 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that defend-
ant's right to confrontation mandated consideration of juror affidavits concerning exter-
nal influence). 
194. FED. R. Evm. 606, enacted in 1975, retained the prohibition barring jurors 
from impeaching their own verdicts, except in specific situations. The Rehnquist Court 
2722 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2673 
jurors have been vigorous, prompting many conflicting statutes and 
rules of ethics encouraging or limiting attorney access to jurors after 
trial.195 
3. When Misconduct is Discovered - Salvaging the Trial 
One might expect that all of this prying into jury behavior would 
have led to a significant number of mistrials and new trials due to jury 
misconduct, but there is reason to believe that the frequency with which 
jury misconduct has led to a mistrial or a new trial has actually fallen 
over the past two centuries. Judges and legislatures have coped with the 
threat that jury misconduct has posed to the efficiency and fairness of 
the jury system in two ways: they have attempted to salvage verdicts 
once misconduct has taken place, and they have adopted additional 
measures to deter and prevent juror misbehavior from occurring in the 
first place. 
a. Postverdict Review: Avoiding New Trials . . Even though con-
victed defendants today are probably more likely than defendants in the 
nineteenth century to raise jury misconduct as a basis for a new trial, 
they are probably less likely to succeed in securing relief. Many deci-
sions from the first half of the nineteenth century reflected the attitude 
that jury misconduct destroyed the integrity of the trial and required re-
lief regardless of its effect on the verdict.196 This uncompromising 
stance, however, was never uniform, and eventually softened. By the 
first few decades of the 1900s, impatience with the fragility of verdicts 
in 1987 interpreted the Rule strictly. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 
(1987) (barring juror affidavits as proof that jurors were intoxicated and using drugs 
during the trial). Prior to Tanner, many courts had permitted juror testimony to prove 
juror intoxication. See Christopher B. Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and In-
dictments in Federal Court Under Rule 606(b), 57 NEB. L. REv. 920 (1978). Recent 
commentary continues to echo the recommendation of Judges Burger and Frank, calling 
for wider acceptance of juror testimony. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme 
Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 
56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 221-29 (1989) (criticizing the Court's "hear-no-evil" posture). 
195. See, e.g., Ronald L. Palmer, Post-Trial Interview of Jurors in the Federal 
Courts-A Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 Hous. L. REv. 290 (1968). 
196. See, e.g., Mattox v. United _States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (noting that 
some jurisdictions continued to forbid separation entirely, others allowed the govern-
ment to rebut a presumption of prejudice to the defendant, and still others conditioned 
relief upon proof indicating that tampering really took place); Johnson v. Root, 13 F. 
Cas. 798 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 7409) (" '[W]here there is an irregularity which 
may affect the impartiality of the proceedings ... inasmuch as there can be no certainty 
that the verdict has not been improperly influenced, the proper and appropriate mode of 
correction or relief is by undoing what is thus improperly and may have been corruptly 
done.'") (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Roby, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496, 
519 (1832)). 
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on appeal had ushered in harmless error review for evidentiary, instruc-
tional, and charging errors and reduced the number of courts willing to 
reverse convictions for juror misconduct without first considering 
whether that misconduct had affected the jury's decision.197 
Although several illustrations of the ascendancy of harmless error 
review for jury misconduct are available,198 the story of judicial treat-
ment of intoxicated jurors is particularly instructive. As the opportuni-
ties for jurors to drink during a trial rose with lengthening trials and 
more frequent separation, judicial reaction followed a familiar pattern of 
unyielding intolerance giving way to harmless error review. During 
much of the nineteenth century judges in many states provided a new 
trial merely upon proof that a juror had partaken.199 But the cost of au-
tomatic reversal proved too high. Judges feared that too many convic-
tions would be sabotaged if reversal could be had so easily.200 Some 
seemed to recognize that they could not prevent drinking by jurors ac-
customed to obtaining their "customary refreshment." One sympathetic 
court warned that depriving a man of all alcohol during a protracted 
trial would probably cause him to "fall into such a state of mental and 
physical depression and irritation as to seriously unfit him properly to 
discharge the duties of a juror. " 201 
Trying to be appropriately condemnatory while at the same time 
preserving the finality of the trial process, some courts tried at first to 
197. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 80, § 23.7G). 
198. Compare People v. Knapp, 42 Mich. 267 (1879) (presence of police officer 
during jury deliberations required new trial, without regard to whether any improper in-
fluence was actually exerted over jury) with United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (holding that continuation of trial in absence of sick juror was not "plain er-
ror" requiring relief when defendant failed to object to absence at trial). See also Mc-
Donough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (not every knowingly 
false answer of a veniremember is grounds for a new trial) and Lee v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 
1296 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (reversing trial court's finding that conversation be-
tween police officers and juror in deliberation room was "structural error" requiring re-
versal without a showing of prejudice and finding conversation innocuous). 
199. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 13 Tex. 168, 182 (1854) (stating that the effect of 
drink "is so very different on different men .... The only safe rule is to exclude it 
entirely."). 
200. See, e.g., Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452, 462 (1882) (arguing that a per se re-
versal rule "would hold out an obvious "temptation, and furnish an almost certain oppor-
tunity to secure a new trial in every case, by the surreptitious introduction of liquor into 
a jury room, and would tend to lessen the certainty of conviction in every criminal 
case"); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 546-47 (1874) ("[W]ith the habit of drinking so 
common as it unfortunately is, to hold that, if a juror should during a protracted trial 
take a single drink of liquor, the verdict thereafter rendered must be set aside therefor, 
would be giving to verdicts of juries a dangerous and unnecessary instability."). 
201. State v. Taylor, 35 S.W. 92 (Mo. 1896) (denying alcohol would be like deny-
ing coffee or tobacco). 
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minimize the destabilizing influence of rules requiring new trials when-
ever alcohol crossed a juror's lips by limiting automatic reversal to 
drinking committed in certain locations or at certain times during the 
trial. For instance, some courts would uphold verdicts if drinking oc-
curred only during recesses, but not if jurors used liquor in the court-
house.202 This is understandable from the point of view of maintaining 
appearances, which mattered quite a bit. It made little sense, however, 
to litigants who were not likely to be persuaded that the potency of in-
toxicants varied with the location of the imbiber. Other courts were par-
ticularly intolerant of the use of alcohol during deliberations, but would 
consider harmless its use at other times during the trial. 203 The basis for 
this dubious distinction was the belief that as long as jurors were sober 
by the time they deliberated, their decisions could not be affected by 
any fuzzy-headedness they had experienced listening to the evidence 
and instructions during the trial. 204 Such flimsy distinctions soon disap-
peared. In no state today does a juror's use of alcohol, where proven, 
raise an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice requiring a new trial. 
It is not surprising that judges were relatively quick to find jury 
misconduct harmless. Unlike other errors in the trial process, the fault 
for jury misconduct often lies with the juror alone, a visiting participant 
in the justice system, and not with judges or prosecutors, its repeat 
players. The deterrence of future misconduct by courtroom regulars has 
always been a reason to grant relief to criminal defendants when those 
regulars overstep the law, even when relief may not be required to pro-
cure accurate results.205 But granting a new trial to a defendant when 
one juror misbehaves is .unlikely to have any effect on the behavior of 
202. See THO!VfPSON, supra note 147, at 1849 (citing cases); Morton John Steven-
son, Use of Intoxicating Liquors by Jurors, 59 ALBANY L.J. 208 (1899) (discussing 
cases in which court did not object to jurors drinking during adjournments). 
203. See, e.g., Graybeal v. Gardner, 48 Ill. App. 305 (1892), ajfd., 34 N.E. 528 
(Ill. 1893); State v. Bruce, 48 Iowa 530 (1878); Lelunan, supra note 159, at 783 (noting 
the contention of some courts that the use of intoxicants "at any rate while the jury are 
deliberating on their verdict, is of itself error, without any inquiry at all into the ques-
tion whether the defendant was prejudiced thereby"). 
204. See, e.g., State v. Madigan, 59 N.W. 490 (Minn. 1894). For exposition and 
criticism of this rule, see Charles C. Moore, Use of Intoxicating Liquors by Jurors as 
Ground for New Trial, 13 LAW NOTES ·188 (1910). Of course, this idea that jurors only 
make up their minds once they shut the door to the deliberation room has been thor-
oughly discredited by jury decisionmaking research. Still, the different treatment could 
have had additional justifications. Misconduct by jurors who had retired to deliberate 
implicated the culpability of the officer guarding them, and was also more difficult for 
the parties to discover. They might otherwise be able to object before a verdict is re-
turned, securing a mistrial or other relief. 
205. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 
COLUM. L. R.Ev. 79 (1988). 
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future jurors. Indeed, courts have noted the availability of punishment 
against jurors themselves when choosing to let verdicts stand, implying 
that direct punishment of jurors for their transgressions would be more 
appropriate than allowing convicted felons a windfall.206 
Any resolution to punish jurors themselves seems to have been 
spotty, however. Of the infrequent reported cases discussing formal 
punishment (contempt proceedings or other prosecutions) of jurors or 
former jurors for their misconduct, most involve jurors who served in 
criminal trials that ended in acquittal or mistrial.207 Some courts have 
seemed pleased that prosecutors focus on such jurors, suggesting that 
the punishment of jurors who prevent convictions is a fair substitute for 
the right to procure a new trial because of misconduct, a right defend-
ants enjoy, but prosecutors are denied.208 The prosecution of jury mis-
conduct, however, is no substitute for the ability to appeal an acquittal 
tainted by jury error. Neither is prosecuting only defendant-friendly 
misconduct particularly fair. A juror whose misbehavior leads to a 
206. See, e.g., Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452 (1882) (refusing to set aside verdict 
and noting that the jurors who drank liquor were fined); cf. United States v. Olano, 62 
F.3d 1180, 1211 (9th Cir. 1995) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that the judge's de-
cision to go on with the trial absent an ill juror "is a deliberate action on the part of 
court and counsel that infringes on the defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights; it 
is not a shortcoming on the part of a juror"). 
207. See, e.g., Blake v. Rupe, 651P.2d1096 (Wyo. 1982) (holding that a prosecu-
tor is entitled to immunity from liability for the malicious prosecution of juror who had 
served in trial ending without conviction). 
208. See, e.g., United States v. Hand, 863 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir. 1988) (upholding, as 
part of fonner juror's contempt sentence, payment of nearly $47,000 to the United 
States for Department of Justice and Drug Enforcement Agency costs associated with 
lost convictions - the "victims" of the juror's offense of receiving flowers and calls 
from the defendant and refusing to vote to convict); In re Mossie, 589 F. Supp. 1397 
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (rejecting claim of vindictive prosecution by former juror who argued 
she was prosecuted only because she had held out for acquittal, but admitting that juror 
probably would not have been investigated had the jury returned a guilty verdict); In re 
Bassett, 15 N.Y.S.2d 737, 746 (S. Ct. 1939) (noting that the "misconduct of the con-
temnors is especially to be condemned. In a civil trial, or if the defendants had been 
convicted, the evil wrought could be remedied by the granting of a new trial. In the 
present situation, that remedy may not be applied [as the defendants have already been 
put in jeopardy]"); In re May, 1 F. 737 (E.D. Mich. 1880) (holding in contempt a for-
mer juror who held out for acquittal anq noting that the court would have had to grant a 
new trial if the jury had convicted). 
A few courts have been troubled by the targeting of hold-out jurors for prosecu-
tion. See, e.g., In re Cochran, 237 N.Y. 336 (1924) (contempt may not be used to punish 
juror for attitude in the jury room regarding the appropriate verdict); cf. United States v. 
Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1989) (expressing dismay at government's failure to in-
vestigate and prosecute jurors for misconduct after trial in which jurors voted to convict 
defendant); People v. Diefendorf, 119 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1953) (reversing contempt convic-
tion because trial judge took into account juror's action of holding out in the jury room 
in addition to his deliberate violation of the court's instructions during trial). 
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guilty verdict is no less culpable than a juror whose misbehavior leads 
to an acquittal or mistrial. If future jurors learn any lesson from such 
prosecutions, it is that they can misbehave freely so long as they 
convict. 209 
b. Preverdict Remedies: Avoiding Mistrials and Tainted Verdicts. 
When misconduct is revealed before trial's end, the rule barring jurors 
from impeaching their own verdicts has never provided an excuse to 
sweep misconduct under the rug. As more misconduct has surfaced dur-
ing lengthening trials, judges have had to detetmine whether it necessi-
tates a mistrial. Few alternatives to mistrial were available in the 
1800s.210 Even waiver was not always an option. Some courts were re-
luctant to allow defendants to waive their objections to jury misconduct 
because such waivers were not considered to be voluntary. For example, 
a convicted defendant who had assented to the illegal separation of the 
jury during trial could nevertheless demand a new trial on the basis that 
his assent was compelled by the need to prevent jury resentment.211 Not 
until the late nineteenth century, when harmless error was embraced to 
prevent new trials, did courts experiment with procedures that could 
prevent mistrials as well. 
One of the most effective devices that courts discovered for avoid-
ing mistrials was the alternate juror. Substituting jurors midstream was 
a very controversial concept when it first appeared around 1900. Until 
that time, if a juror had to be discharged during a trial, the accepted 
practice was to discharge the entire panel - a procedure then called 
"withdrawing a juror" - and begin a new trial with a new jury. The 
judge would discharge the juror in question, then administer the oath to 
a new juror together with the jurors who remained from the aborted 
trial, but witnesses would have to take the stand again and the trial be-
209. Even symmetry is lacking - unlike convicted defendants who seek new tri-
als, prosecutors are not hampered by the rule barring the consideration of juror testi-
mony to impeach verdicts. According to the Supreme Court, "A juror of integrity and 
reasonable firmness will not ... expect to be shielded against the disclosure of his con-
duct in the event that there is evidence reflecting upon his honor." Clark v. United 
States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933) (upholding conviction of juror who held out for acquittal 
against eleven men - literally pressing her hands over her ears in the jury room - af. 
ter concealing on voir dire that defendant employed her husband). 
210. If the juror was sick or inebriated, the court could simply adjourn and wait 
for the juror to feel better, but the jury could not separate while waiting. See, e.g., State 
v. Tatlow, 8 P. 267 (Kan. 1885). 
211. See ALBERT w. BRICKWOOD, BRICKWOOD's SACKETT ON INSTRUC-
TIONS TO JURIES 84 (3d ed. 1908); THOJ.\.fi'SON, supra note 147, at 1823; see also Peo-
ple v. Deegan, 26 P. 500, 502 (Cal. 1891) (DeHaven, J., concurring) (objecting to a rule 
that would deem a felony defendant to have waived any objection to a drunk juror if the 
defendant failed to object, and reasoning that the defendant should not be required to 
bring himself into antagonism with the juror). 
August 1996] Juror Delinquency 2727 
gin anew.212 To avoid this cumbersome process some courts would ta1ce 
actions that today seem extreme. For example, in one murder trial 
around 1845, an Illinois judge ordered a juror who had ta1cen ill to lie 
on a pallet next to the juror box.213 In 1895 California's legislature was 
the first to provide that at the very beginning of any trial that was likely 
to be protracted, a judge could impanel one or two alternate jurors to sit 
near the other twelve throughout the trial and take the place of any juror 
who became incapacitated, even without the defendant's consent.214 
Other states, then Congress, followed California's lead,215 and today al-
ternates are routinely impaneled under similar provisions. 
A second significant aid to efficient disposition of mid-trial mis-
conduct was the approval of verdicts by fewer jurors than the number 
that started the case. By the late nineteenth century, at least one state 
authorized judges to dismiss incapacitated jurors and accept verdicts 
from the jurors who remained.216 Not until 1900, however, did the 
United States Supreme Court hold that state criminal juries of fewer 
than twelve members survived the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and not until 1970 did the Court overrule an 1898 case barring 
juries of fewer than twelve under the Sixth Amendment.217 In 1983, 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 was amended to allow a court to 
212. See, e.g., Dennis v. State, 50 So. 499 (Miss. 1909); West v. State, 28 So. 430 
(Fla 1900); State v. Davis, 7 S.E. 24 (W. Va. 1888). See generally ANTHONY, supra 
note 137, at 306. 
213. There, the juror fell asleep. See Baxter v. People, 8 Ill. (3 Gilm.) 368 (1846). 
214. The California Supreme Court upheld this statute twenty-six years later, de-
spite a defendant's challenge that the use of an alternate juror deprived him of his right 
to a jury trial under the California Constitution. See People v. Peete, 202 P. 51 (Cal. 
1921). A similar statute passed in 1931 was upheld under the North Carolina Constitu-
tion. See State v. Dalton, 174 S.E. 422, 425 (N.C. 1934) (explaining that the act "was 
designed to cure [the] evil" of the prior practice which required courts to restart trials). 
Prior to such statutes, some states allowed the substitution of alternates providing all 
parties, including the defendant, first consented. See BIERLY, supra note 43, at 141, 
167-68. 
215. In 1934, one of the chief proposals of the ABA's Program on Criminal Law 
was the endorsement of the use of alternate jurors. See LESTER BERNHART ORFIELD, 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 398 (1947). In upholding the fed-
eral statute, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals termed it a "forward looking statute and 
a needed reform in procedure." Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 397 (1944) 
(considering 28 U.S.C. § 417a (1932)).' 
216. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 4 Tex. App. 450 (1878) (upholding verdict of 11 ju-
rors (citing TEX. CONST., art. 5, § 13)). 
217. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605 (1900); Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970) (overruling Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898)). It wasn't until af-
ter jury waivers (bench trials) were allowed in felony cases that some courts upheld ver-
dicts of juries with less than 12 members even when the defendant had consented. See 
Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (trial in any manner other 
than before a jury of twelve men is forbidden, even if the defendant consents); 
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continue with eleven jurors in felony cases, even without the defend-
ant's consent.218 Authorized juror attrition, like the provision of alternate 
jurors, was originally intended to provide an alternative to mistrial 
when jurors become ill or otherwise unavailable during protracted trials. 
Each has proved to be a useful device to assist courts to complete trials 
when jurors misbehave.219 
c. Prevention. All of this judicial maneuvering to minimize the 
consequences of juror misconduct may have been necessary because 
judges were not trying hard enough to prevent.it. Calls for more explicit 
instructions to jurors to keep out of mischief appeared as early as 
1893,220 and they have continued for a century.221 Juror handbooks, 
Cruncemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128 (1858) (reversing conviction returned by 11 jurors rea-
soning that defendant could no more waive one juror than he could waive them all). 
218. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b). The runendment was preferred to an runendment 
to Rule 24 that would have allowed for the substitution of alternate jurors after delibera-
tions had begun. See Amendments to Rules, 91 F.R.D. 245, 297-:98 (1983). In 1991, the 
federal courts opted to abandon alternates in civil cases and instead authorized judges to 
proceed with whatever jurors remained should it become necessary to discharge jurors 
during the trial, on the condition that at least six jurors remained. 
The laws of some states may still prohibit this practice. See, e.g., S. 3820, 218th 
Assembly, Cal., 1st Sess. (1995) (proposing constitutional runendment that would allow 
for verdicts by eleven jurors if a juror is discharged after deliberations begin). Other 
states continue to require the consent of both parties. See State v. Gorwell, 661 A.2d 
718 (Md. 1995) (reversing judge's decision to continue trial with 11 jurors over state's 
objection). 
219. A third change in trial procedure in some states during the late nineteenth 
century may have tempered the effects of jury misconduct on jury verdicts - abolition 
of the requirement that jury verdicts be unanimous. Support for abolishing rules of una-
nimity gained ground the srune time as harmless error rules. Critics blruned erroneous 
verdicts on incompetent or inexperienced jurors that made their way onto juries. See 
LESSER, supra note 47, at 188-201; Francis Lieber, The Unanimity of Juries, 6 AM. L. 
REG. 727 (1867) (criticizing the unanimity rule); Reform Our Jury System, 12 REV. RE-
VIEWS 77 (1895) (reporting the introduction of a bill in California to eliminate unanim-
ity in criminal cases and allow for the waiver of juries). Although several states have 
authorized majority verdicts in civil cases and misdemeanor cases, only two states ulti-
mately adopted majority verdicts in felony cases. See LA. CONST. art. 7, § 41 (1921); 
OR. CONST. art. VI, § 5 {1929); OR. REV. STAT. § 17.355(1). 
220. See LESSER, supra note 47, at 118 n.39 ("[O]ccasional lectures by courts to 
panels of jurymen upon the general proprieties of their position would not be thrown 
away." (quoting N.Y.L.J .• June 20, 1893)). Some states enacted statutes requiring such 
instructions towards the end of the nineteenth century. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CRIM. 
PRoc. § 415 (1811) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.40 (McKinney 
1993)). Some states' statutes required judges to instruct jurors not to talk to others, or 
each other, at each adjournment. See, e.g., KY. CRIM. CODE § 246, quoted in J.P. HOB· 
SON ET AL., INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES § 679, at 807 (1914). 
221. See, e.g., Suggestions For The Improvement of the Jury System, 1 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 630, 631 (1910) (calling for clearer admonitions to jurors); Edward 
T. Swaine, Pre-Deliberation Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and Juror Re-
sponsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187, 202 (1988) (asserting that the bulk of juror instruction 
occurs only after trial and that little attention is paid to instructing jurors about miscon-
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some of which contained admonitions against exposure to publicity and 
warnings concerning other common forms of misconduct, did not be-
come accepted until the rise of court administrative organizations in the 
1920s and 1930s,222 although many judges issued warnings to jurors 
about the conduct expected of them before then.223 Today some jurors 
are given elaborate and detailed instructions explaining what they can 
and cannot do or say.224 Simple innovations such as the identification 
buttons jurors sometimes wear have probably helped to reduce prohib-
ited contacts and limit the opportunities for jurors to overhear prejudi-
cial comments. 
Despite these isolated improvements in preventing jury miscon-
duct, the overwhelming response of courts seems to have been to con-
tain its costs, not to diagnose and cure its causes. This may be because 
those causes are too difficult to identify, much less eliminate. Or per-
haps this band-aid approach has persisted because judges have not con-
sidered jury misconduct to be a significant problem demanding addi-
tional preventive measures. The next section· reveals judicial 
impressions of jury misconduct today that support this latter 
explanation. 
duct and how to avoid it). Following the Supreme Court's reversal of a conviction 
tainted by prejudicial publicity in the 1960s, commentators called for more measures to 
prevent juror tainting, some of them urging that judges take more care in ordering jurors 
not to expose themselves to publicity during trials, and arguing that clearer instructions 
would probably have prevented mistrials or reversals in several cases. See, e.g., ~ 
FRED FRIENDLY & RONALD' L. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY: THE IMPACT 
OF NEWS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 109 (1967). 
222. See, e.g., Comment, History and Criticism of Juror Handbooks as a Method 
of Orientation, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 394 (1959) (noting that "jury primers" were 
first used in New York courts in 1925, a response to the variation in preliminary in-
structions); D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Indoctrination by Court of Persons Summoned 
for Jury Service, 89 A.L.R.2D 197, 201 n.5 (1963) (stating that 15 states used hand-
books by 1958 (citing Recent Case, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 115, 115 (1958))). 
223. See, e.g., DEWITT c. BLASHFIELD, A TREATISE ON INSTRUCTIONS TO JU-
RIES IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES§ 360 (1902) (recommending an instruction list-
ing prohibited actions, which ended with the threat, "a violation of this injunction will 
be punished severely by the court"). 
224. In the Western District of Texas, for example, fe~eral jurors are told, in great 
detail, who they can and cannot talk to, ·what they can and cannot say, and what to do if 
someone approaches them or they hear something they should not have heard. They are 
told that they cannot talk to each other about the case until deliberations, cannot use 
nonevidence of which they are aware in deliberations, cannot investigate or experiment 
with places or things, cannot relate any special expert knowledge to other jurors or seek 
out infonnation in books, and more. See Orientation for Prospective Jurors 5-7 (on file 
with author). Some pattern instructions are considerably less detailed. See, e.g., FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 4-5 (1988) (less 
than one page of instructions concerning misconduct). 
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B. The Present: Jury Misconduct in Courts Today 
The survey results that follow provide a refreshing supplement to 
the typically anecdotal treatment of juror delinquency. Judges' answers 
to survey questions about the frequency and consequences of juror mis-
conduct are useful not only to those interested in jury misconduct itself, 
but also to reformers considering several related issues. For example, 
the decision to expand or contract voir dire may take into account how 
often jurors conceal information or how successful judges are at deter-
ring deceit during voir dire. Proposals to limit trial length, to abandon 
unanimity rules, to abolish sequestration, to allow for more juror testi-
mony impeaching verdicts, or to allow more access to jurors by attor-
neys after trial may all be affected by perceptions about the prevalence 
of misconduct. 
The judges who received surveys were asked to indicate whether 
or not they had in the past three years become convinced before the 
verdict that misconduct of various kinds had occurred, and, if so, in 
how many criminal and how many civil cases. Thirteen different types 
of misconduct were listed, with an additional question asking judges to 
specify any misconduct they had learned of during trial that was not on 
the list. Judges were also asked if they had questioned jurors about mis-
conduct after the verdict, and if they had ordered a new trial because of 
misconduct during the last three years. Judges who had ordered a new 
trial in the past three years were asked to specify the type of case -
civil or criminal - and the type of misconduct that had occurred. 
At the outset it is important to note some additional limitations of 
the survey results concerning juror misconduct. First, since there are no 
means to observe jurors during their deliberations, only jurors them-
selves can really tell us what they do. Judges, however, have a pretty 
good idea of what trial jurors are up to.225 They are responsible for su-
pervising the jury and for curing any misconduct that occurs, and many 
of them talk with jurors after trials are over about the jurors' exper-
iences. Second, the total number of cases in which judges reported ei-
225. An up-to-date survey of juroi:s themselves would be an excellent supplement 
to this judicial survey. Few published juror surveys concern misconduct. One found that 
slightly over one in ten jurors talked about the case during trial. See Elizabeth F. Loftus 
& Douglas Leber, Do Jurors Talk?, TRIAL. Jan. 1986, at 59-60 (reporting survey of ju-
rors about discussing evidence before deliberations with another juror, a family mem-
ber, or a friend, and finding that 11 % reported they had talked to someone). A 1991 
survey of 190 jurors found that 39% failed to answer correctly voir dire questions about 
crime victimization and friends or relatives in law enforcement. See Richard Seltzer et 
al., Juror Honesty During the Voir Dire, 19 J. Crim. Just. 451, 456 (1991). An earlier 
study of about 250 New Mexico criminal jurors produced the following responses: 
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ther granting new trials or learning of misconduct before the verdict is 
probably lower than the total number of cases in which misconduct ac-
tually occurred in their courtrooms.226 Despite these limitations,227 the 
survey provides important information, previously unavailable, about 
the frequency with which judges nationwide have learned of miscon-
duct during trials, the frequency of their responses to that misconduct, 
and the frequency of successful new trial motions due to jury 
misconduct. 
Always Usually Sometimes Never 
Do you feel that jurors are perfectly honest 
in answering questions during the voir dire? 17.8 70.3 11.9 0 
At any time during the trial or deliberations, 
did you feel ~t any of the jurors considered 
evidence which was not presented or was 
withheld during the trial? 5.2 7.9. 51.8 35.1 
At any time during the trial itself did you 
feel that any of the jurors discussed the case 
among themselves or with others? 3.8 3.8 36.6 55.9 
Thomas L. Grisham & Stephen F. Lawless, Jurors Judge Justice: A Survey of Criminal 
Jurors, 3 N. MEX. L. REv. 352, 354-58 (1973). Compared to the responses of these 
New Mexico jurors twenty-five years ago, the judges who responded to my survey were 
more likely to report dishonesty during voir dire (73% of judges reporting at least some 
dishonesty by veniremembers in the past three years, compared to 12% of the New 
Mexico jurors) and less likely to report consideration of nonevidence (20% of judges 
compared to 65% of New Mexico jurors). Of judges surveyed, 20% thought that jurors 
had talked to nonjurors in the past three years, 13% thought jurors had contact with par-
ties, press, or witnesses, and 22% thought jurors had talked about the case with each 
other, 44% of New Mexico jurors who responded that at least one of these things had 
happened. An ongoing study of jurors in capital cases so far shows that a significant 
percentage of jurors in these unique cases do not follow their instructions. See William 
J. Bowers, The Capital Jury: ls It Tilted Toward Death?, 19 JUDICATURE 220, 221 
(1996) (reporting that 40% of capital-case jurors interviewed considered the defendant's 
sentence when determining guilt). An empirical analysis of case reports would also be a 
useful addition to the research reported here, although only a small portion of the mis-
conduct that occurs in trials is reported in published opinions. 
226. The survey did not ask about cases in which misconduct was revealed only 
after the verdict but which was never the subject of a new trial motion, or cases in 
which allegations of misconduct were rrused after the verdict but in which no new trial 
was ordered. 
227. There is another reason to regard the findings from the survey as an underes-
timate of actual jury misconduct in courts today. Trial judges may be likely to underre-
port, rather than overreport, how often misconduct occurs in their courtrooms, even in 
an anonymous survey such as this one, because the existence of at least some forms of 
jury misconduct could be attributed to deficiencies in supervision or instruction. Also, 
many judges have a great deal of affection and respect for their jurors, and may not rec-
ognize misconduct at the same rate that the jurors themselves or attorneys might. 
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1. Overall Incidence of Misconduct 
a. Misconduct Discovered Before the Verdict. According to judges 
surveyed, most types of jury misconduct are not routine features of jury 
trials. Only a small proportion of judges reported that they had become 
convinced in the course of a trial during the past three years that any of 
ten forms of jury misconduct surveyed had occurred.228 In addition, 
most of the judges who did report learning of misconduct said that it 
occurred infrequently. By their own estimates, the 562 judges who re-
turned surveys had together tried a total of between 26,060 and 40,426 
jury trials during the past three years. Judges reported encountering 
most forms of misconduct during trial in only a small percentage of 
these cases. 
There were three exceptions to this predominantly positive picture, 
each involving the kinds of misconduct that are easiest for judges to ob-
serve themselves without information from the jurors. First, seventy-
three percent of all of the judges responding reported that 
veniremembers had not told the truth during voir dire in at least one of 
the cases they had tried during the last three years - eight percent of 
all judges responded that veniremembers were untruthful in many, 
most, or all cases. Second, sixty-nine percent of the judges reported 
cases in which jurors had fallen asleep; by judges' estimates, this had 
happened in more than 2300 cases. Finally, eighty percent of the judges 
responded that jurors, after being sworn in, had not reported to court or 
reported late, with the total trials in which this occurred exceeding 
3000.229 In addition to the thirteen specific categories, judges were 
asked if they had learned of "other" misconduct before the verdict. 
These responses are compiled in Table 1. 
b. Misconduct and New Trials. The judges responding to the sur-
vey also reported that misconduct is not often the basis for a new trial. 
Only seven percent reported that they had ordered even one new trial 
228. For example, a tiny fraction of judges reported that they had presided over a 
case in the past three years in which a veniremember had refused to answer a question 
during voir dire, or in which they had l~arned that a juror had accepted a bribe. Twenty 
percent of responding judges (N=l 10) reported becoming convinced that jurors had 
considered material not admitted as evidence during at least one trial. Comments of-
fered by judges noted that these incidents included dictionaries, unadmitted depositions, 
and a Bible. Twenty-two percent of responding judges (N=120) reported learning that 
jurors had discussed the case before deliberations, and at least 28 judges commented 
that they believe this happens quite frequently but cannot be sure. 
229. Fifteen judges volunteered that this was either a minor problem or that jurors 
usually had a good excuse for being late. Other judges cited traffic or car trouble as a 
cause of lateness, or noted that they did not consider lateness misconduct. 
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because of misconduct during the past three years.230 Less than one 
quarter of the judges said that they had questioned a juror during the 
past three years about misconduct subsequent to the return of a verdict. 
The number of new trials granted due to misconduct was very low; only 
fifty-one cases out of over 26,000 cases tried. 
c. General Comments and Trends. The survey also asked judges 
who had been on the bench seven years or more whether in their opin-
ion jurors were more or less likely today to engage in various forms of 
misconduct than they were seven years ago: Most of the judges re-
sponding thought jury behavior had remained about the same. Of those 
judges who believed that the rate of jury misconduct had changed dur-
ing the past seven years, most said juror behavior had improved, except 
for two categories - untruthfulness during voir dire and talking about 
the case before deliberations.231 
230. A few judges volunteered that they had learned, after a verdict, of miscon-
duct that did not lead (or had not yet led) to a new trial. One reported that "two jurors 
during sequestered deliberation allegedly engaged in sexual (consensual) behavior with 
each other with the connivance of a deputy sheriff who supposedly was watching them. 
This occurred in the hotel after deliberations for the day .... " 
231. The percentages of judges who responded that the proportion of jurors engag-
ing in misconduct was the same, less, or greater now as it was seven years ago for each 
question were: 
'fype of misconduct Same Less Greater 
Refuse to answer questions 
during voir dire 85.7 11.4 2.9 
Consider material not 
admitted as evidence 86.2 9.2 4.6 
Initiate or fail to report 
contact with parties, press, 
counsel, or witnesses 88.9 9.1 2.0 
Use drugs or alcohol during 
jury service 84.8 11.9 3.3 
Conduct experiments or view 
sites contrary to instructions 89.5 8.1 2.4 
Talk about the evidence 
before trial's end 84.6 7.1 8.3 
Do not answer voir dire 
questions truthfully 80.3 8.0 11.7 
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TABLE! 
JUDICIAL REPORTS OF MISCONDUCT DISCOVERED BEFORE TIIE VERDICT 
T:z:Ee of Misconduct ReEorted 
Survey Categories: 
Late or absent 
Not truthful during voir dire 
Sleeping 
Talked to other jurors about the evidence before trial's end 
Talked with non-jurors 
Considered material not admitted as evidence 
Feigned illness 
Initiated or failed to report contact with press parties, witnesses 
Juror under the influence of drugs or alcohol 
Visited scene of dispute/crime contraiy to instructions 
Refused to answer questions in voir dire despite chance to answer in 
camera 
Conducted experiments 
Accepted bribe from party 
Other misconduct:' 
Failed or refused to deliberate 
Confrontations or coercion' 
























































• Percentage of judges reporting that in at least one lrial during the past thrtc years they had become cominoed before a ttrdict had been returned that thJs 
conduct hadoc:currcd. 
•The pcrccntage or judges reponing conduct under '\un'C)' categories" n:nccts the number or judges noting !lat they had become comini:at beron: 1 verdict 
was returned that the spccilied conduct had occurnd. dnidcd by the number or judges ll!SMring that specific qucstln• (Le., .SY.judges nponing bribed jurors 
means that 3 out of the SlO judges responding to the question about bnbed jurors marlced yes). The pen:cntage of judges n:portlng conduct under 'bther 
misconduct" n:Occts the number or judges indicating the specific conduct dMdcd by the total number or judges responding to the SWVC)' (I.e., .4% jud&tS 
reporting that "'black jurors rcf'usc 10 comic:t black dd'cndants" means that 2 out of 562 Judges rcponed this as mlst0nduct). 
•Total includes responses that did not specify case lypc. 
• 65% of rcspondingjud~ indicated \-enircmcmbers were untruthful in some cases, bul less than 11.C: $J% indicated \'Cniremembers were untluthfUI In many 
cases. but less than 112; 1.1% indicated \'Cnircmembcts were untruthful in most cases: 1.3% indicated \'Cnirtmcmbers were untnrthful ln all cases. 
' Includes only misconduct reported by two or moo: judges. Single repollS or other misconduct ditccn'Clcd befon: the \'Crdicl Included: juior MS dlmlptJve In 
cowt;juror amstcd;juror frightened other jurors with report he had been threatened; juror replied 10 defcndanl's altnmey during closing by sayfnJ 'bb )U )'OU 
did"""hcn attorney denied bchttling a witness; allcmatejuror went into dcbbcrations after the juror had been excused; juror formed opinion on suih bet ore trW 
"'"· One judge reported that jurors nfien "\'Ole by lot.• 1 Judges' explanations include: 'fh~ Black ju10rs gouged ci~ on a bold-out white juror and accused him or racism during delibcratlons, •'loud, pani.ally 
racially motio;ated argument bordering on physical during dchbcraitons. .. 'juror threatened another juror."" 'Juror threatened phys!cal \'lolcnce.'" and 'Juror 
expressed racial bias lo other juror in ra;e disCrimination trial."' 
TABL~2a 
JUDICIAL REPORTS OF NEW TRIALS GRANTED DUE TO MISCONDUCT 
Type of Misconduct Causing New Trial 
Considered non- or prejudicial evidence 
Failure to disclose infonnation on voir dire 
Unauthorized visit to scene 
Contact with non jurors 
Recreating scene/experiment 
Failed to follow damage instruction or arrived at verdict by lot or average 
Juror would not vote because prayers had not been answered 
Coercion 
Type of misconduct causing new trial not specified 
TABLE2b 
Number of Judges Who Reported 
Granting at Least One New Trial in the 
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Judges were invited to add their own general comments to the sur-
vey and eighty-eight did. The most frequent comment was that miscon-
duct never or rarely happened (forty-four judges), or that misconduct is 
easily controlled by judicial supervision and attention to instructions 
(ten judges).232 Several wrote that lying during voir dire was a signifi-
cant problem. Most of these judges mentioned that veniremembers lied 
to avoid service.233 Two noted that veniremembers often concealed prior 
criminal histories, one complained of jurors who hide religious limita-
tions on their decisionmaking, and one judge stated that a juror often 
comes forward shortly after trial starts with information the juror should 
have revealed during voir dire but did not.234 Eight judges observed that 
jurors have been more disrespectful, confrontational, or cynical in re-
cent years, and two of them linked this attitude to the trial of O.J. 
Simpson.235 
Nine judges volunteered concerns about jury nullification. Five of 
these judges expressed concern about race-based nullification or racially 
split deliberations.236 Two were concerned about juries failing to convict 
232. One judge stated that "Jury misconduct is so rare it is close to the point of 
being unheard of in this country." 
233. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. 
234. This judge gave as an example a juror who was embarrassed to admit that the 
psychiatrist witness was treating him for an anxiety/disorder. There may be many other 
reasons veniremembers do not tell the truth during voir dire. A federal judge from 
Texas explained that veniremembers in his court are most likely to misrepresent that 
they have the ability to speak and understand English; bench conferences with prospec-
tive jurors sometimes reveal that they really do not. 
235. Comments included "Angry confrontational attitude," "Jurors are not better 
or worse, just more cynical," "driver's license pool has brought in more prospective ju-
rors with no interest in supporting the jury system[; panels include those who] I call 
'rock throwers' who delay and lengthen the voir dire examination, and if one ends up 
on a jury, the other jurors usually pay the price having to deal with these people. This 
confrontational attitude by a very small minority can make jury service more difficult 
for other jurors." "We have noticed a change in jurors since the O.J. case - more de-
manding, assertive, and even aggressive. Complain that we offer only coffee daily and 
pizza during deliberations .... Don't seem embarrassed [to tell people they discussed 
case before deliberations] or even realize that they violated court's instructions and or-
ders." "Jurors are more anxious to ask questions of witnesses that they feel the attor-
neys have ignored." "Jurors since the O.J. Simpson trial appear bolder less respectful 
and more inclined to present juror problems." "Jurors recently seem more vocal re: 
what 'rights' they have as jurors. They are more vocal and articulate about what they 
perceived to be the failures of both criminal and civil law ... they are evidencing a 
greater desire actively to participate in the trial process in an inappropriate manner. 
They are demonstrating greater awareness of the trial process itself, but are often mis-
taken in what they believe the law is. They also seem to be less intimidated and far less 
respectful of the process and judges and lawyers." 
236. The comments were: "black jurors refuse to convict black defendants," 
"Blacks acquit black defendants," "consider Race, national origin, etc." "You have 
stayed away from juror misconduct due to racial attitudes - certainly there are circum-
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in reaction to stiff mandatory sentences,237 one about jurors who use 
verdicts to protest police conduct,238 and one expressed concern about 
nullification in general, stating that "jury nullification may be the 'wave 
of the future' of jury misconduct."239 
d. Variation Between Courts. A comparison of the responses of dif-
ferent groups of responding judges reveals significant variations. Some 
judges may be eager to seek solutions to what they perceive as a prob-
lem, while others would oppose expending further resources to alter a 
situation they consider to be satisfactory.240 The differences in responses 
also suggest that there is much more to learn about why misconduct 
troubles some judges but not others. 
State judges, for example, were much more likely than federal 
judges to report that they had encountered jury misconduct before the 
end of a trial. A higher proportion of state judges than federal judges 
reported misconduct for almost every category of misconduct, and the 
difference was statistically significant for jurors not telling the truth, 
feigning illness, and talking to nonjurors about the case during the 
trial.241 
stances that 'we have to stick together' - re: a defendant - re: 'he is one of us' -
that would be more interesting." "Juries are frequently dividing along racial lines and 
of course very little confidence in law enforcement. The only recourse I see is a limita-
tion on jury trials in certain criminal cases, or very strictly controlled judicial voir 
dire." 
237. "Jurors have learned of mandatory minimum sentence required for some 
drug cases and for that reason have refused to convict." "Only recent difficulty has 
been with some juror nullification over 'three strike' or other 'strike' cases." 
238. "In my general voir dire in criminal cases jurors are asked whether they had 
feelings one way or another concerning 'police officers.' Very few raise their hands. 
(Those that do have poignant stories about police mistreatment.) We know that a great 
many jurors have feelings but prefer to sit on a jury and vent their feelings in a verdict 
" 
239. One judge from Montana sent along a copy of a recent decision in which he 
refused to dismiss jury tampering charges against a person who had sent veniremembers 
letters advising them of the right to nullify. 
240. For example, 27.3% of all judges responded that none of their recent trials in-
volved jurors who failed to tell the truth, but one percent of all judges believed that 
most trials involved less than truthful veniremembers, and another one percent believed 
that at least one veniremember had been untruthful in every case they had tried. 
241. Ten percent of state judges reported that veniremembers had been untruthful 
in many, most, or all cases, compared to only three percent of federal judges. (p<.05). 
All of the judges who responded that jurors were untruthful in most or all cases were 
state judges. Twenty-nine percent of state judges, compared to 13% of federal judges, 
reported jurors feigning illness. (p<.01). Twenty-nine percent of state judges, compared 
to 18% of federal judges, reported misconduct by jurors who talked to nonjurors. 
(p<.05). There was, however, no statistically significant difference in the frequency with 
which state and federal judges reported grants of new trials due to misconduct. 
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There was a statistically significant relationship between the num-
ber of jury trials over which a judge estimated that he or she had pre-
sided during the past three years and the likelihood that the judge re-
ported certain types of misconduct - sleeping, lateness, talking to 
nonjurors, and jury experiments. As one might expect, judges who tried 
more jury cases were more likely to encounter this misconduct. But this 
relationship existed only up to a point. Judges who estimated that they 
had presided over 120 to 150 jury trials or more in the past three years 
were actually less likely to report misconduct than judges who esti-
mated that they had presided over 90 to 119 jury trials. Judges who try 
very large numbers of cases (primarily state judges) might try shorter 
cases in which this misconduct does not occur as frequently, they might 
take greater precautions that prevent misconduct from occurring, or they 
might simply be less alert to misconduct when it does occur.242 
Judges who have served longer on the bench appear to have more 
confidence in the honesty of jurors than newer judges. There was a sta-
tistically significant relationship between the number of years a judge 
had been on the bench and that judge's assessment of the honesty of ju-
rors during voir dire, with the newer judges responding more skepti-
cally than judges with at least fifteen years on the bench.243 
Judges in large cities seem to encounter some forms of misconduct 
more frequently than judges in smaller cities. The bigger the city, the 
more likely it was that a judge reported that jurors lied during voir dire, 
were late or absent for trial, or feigned illness.244 Lateness may be sim-
ply a reflection of how difficult it is to get around in a larger city or 
find parking, but all three behaviors may also reflect a greater reluc-
tance on the part of residents of larger cities to serve as jurors.245 
242. It is also possible that jurors in these busiest courts are better behaved than 
jurors who serve on juries in courts that are not as busy, but this seems unlikely. There 
was also no statistically significant correlation between a judge's estimated caseload and 
that judge's report of new trials due to misconduct. 
243. (p<.05). For example, 14% of judges on the bench 15 years or more re-
sponded that veniremembers were untruthful in many trials, compared to about 40% of 
newer judges. For other types of misconduct, there was no statistically significant dif-
ference between the responses of senior judges and newer judges. 
244. For untruthfulness during voir dire: (p<.01), for reporting late or not at all: 
(p<.01), for feigning illness: (p<.05). There was no statistically significant relationship 
between city size and reports of other forms of misconduct, or between city size and re-
ports of new trials. 
245. One judge suggested that lateness is a special problem in courts that rely on 
citizens from Indian reservations, both because many of these jurors lack transportation 
and because "of the cultural difference regarding the need to arrive at an appointed 
time." 
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A comparison of responses from California, New York, and Ten-
nessee showed interesting differences in the frequency with which 
judges reported discovering misconduct before the verdict, but no dif-
ferences in the proportion of judges reporting new trials for misconduct. 
For all but two of the categories surveyed, a greater proportion of the 
trial judges in California than in either New York or Tennessee re-
sponded that they had encountered misconduct during the trial, a find-
ing that would be expected given California's longer trials.246 See Table 
3. 
Finally, the survey suggests that some forms of misconduct may be 
more of a problem in criminal cases than in civil cases. The 103 re-
sponding judges who tried only civil cases in the past three years were 
significantly less likely than the 105 judges who tried only criminal 
cases to report that jurors were dishonest during voir dire, were under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol, or viewed the scene of the dispute or 
event without permission.247 
2. Judicial Response to Jury Misconduct 
The survey results suggest that a large number of mistrials and 
new trials are obviated by a court's ability to accept verdicts from juries 
reduced in size by attrition or from juries that include alternates who 
have replaced original jurors. Also, judges do not often choose to pun-
ish jurors when misconduct is discovered before the verdict. Instead, 
they focus on providing a fair trial for the litigants. 
a. Avoiding Mistrials and New Trials. According to the judges, 
jury misconduct discovered before the verdict seldom requires starting 
the trial over again. Only a small proportion of the judges who reported 
that they had encountered misconduct also reported that they had or-
dered a mistrial as a result. Dismissal, or replacement, or both, of the 
246. Alternatively, California jurors may be less controlled by judges, or less well-
behaved than jurors in the other two states, but these explanations are not reflected in 
the new trial rates, which are just as low as in the other two states. Nine percent (N=4) 
of judges in California reported granting new trials, for a total of five trials; 12% (N=6) 
of New York judges granted new trials, and 7% (N=2) of judges in Tennessee reported 
granting new trials. 
247. Of the criminal judges, 14% reported that many, most, or all of their cases in-
volved at least one veniremember who was untruthful, compared to only 5% of the civil 
trial judges. (p<.05). Nineteen percent of the criminal judges reported jurors under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, compared to 8% of civil judges. (p<.05). Nine percent of 
criminal judges reported unauthorized visits to the scene, compared to 2% of civil 
judges. (p<.05). 
TABLE3 
THREE-STATE COMPARISON OF JUDICIAL REPORTS OF MISCONDUCT DISCOVERED BEFORE THE VERDICT 
California New York Tennessee 
Number of judges responding 49 so 31 
Percentage of judges• 
Type of misconduct: California New York Tennessee 
Late/absent 88% 88% 77% 
Not truthful during voir dire: 
• no cases 2i 22 32 
• some cases/less than 1/4 71 65 68 
• many cases/less than 1/2 6· 10 0 
• most cases 2 2 0 
• all cases 0 0 0 
Sleeping 81 76 65 
Talked with other jurors 32 24 23 
Feigned illness 26 24 10 
Talked to non-jurors 28 18 32 
Considered non-evidence 33 20 16 
Contact with press, parties, witnesses 23 12 3 
Under influence 13 10 3 
Visit scene II 4 10 
Experiments 9 6 0 
Bribe accepted 0 0 0 
• Pcn:cnlagc of judges from C3Ch slate reporting that they h3d become convinced before the \Wc:t that this type of misconduct h3d occurred in at le:ist one trial 
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juror with an alternate were much more popular options.248 See Table 4. 
Although the number of judges who ordered mistrials for jury mis-
conduct was small, the likelihood that misconduct resulted in mistrial 
varied greatly with the type of misconduct. Four out of the eight judges 
reporting that jurors had failed to deliberate noted that a mistrial was 
the result, as did three out of the seven judges reporting juror confronta-
tions. Juror experiments, visits to the scene, and consideration of mate-
rial not admitted as evidence also prompted significant rates of mistrials 
(4 of 22 judges reporting; 6 of 36, and 25 of 110 respectively). When 
these forms of misconduct occur, they tend to occur during delibera-
tions, so their higher mistrial rates would be consistent with the rules in 
several jurisdictions that prohibit replacement or dismissal of jurors af-
ter deliberations begin. 249 
b. Letting Jurors off the Hook. Few judges reported that they cited 
or even threatened to cite offending jurors with contempt for most 
forms of misconduct.25° For behavior linked to avoiding service, how-
ever, judges appeared more interested in coercing. compliance or setting 
an example for the other jurors. Of the eighty-seven judges reporting ju-
rors who feigned illness, thirteen reported that they had threatened the 
juror with contempt and three reported imposing contempt. Of 444 
judges reporting late or absent jurors, sixty-one (fourteen percent) 
threatened and twenty-three (five percent) imposed contempt.251 Sleep-
248. These findings are consistent with a recent study in Los Angeles. See Ca/l'or-
nia Group Shuns Lobbying Process, Defeats Verdict Proposal, IO Crim. Prac. Manual 
(BNA) 229, 230-31 (June 5, 1996) (two percent of criminal trials end in mistrial due to 
jury misconduct). The responses suggest that for many judges, alternate jurors, when 
authorized, are routine: 42% of the judges reported using one or more alternates in 
every case and another 20% had used one or more alternates in most of their jury trials. 
As one judge explained, the rule allowing the substitution of alternates meant "I had a 
situation during trial that I could fix at the time, on the spot, that could have created a 
serious problem post-trial." Alternates are not authorized in civil trials in federal court. 
249. Mistrial rates may also vary by location. In Tennessee, four out of seven 
judges reporting preliminary deliberations and five out of ten judges reporting jurors 
talking with nonjurors also reported that they had ordered a mistrial. Judges in Califor-
nia and New York reported this misconduct just as frequently, but only one judge re-
ported ordering a mistrial. 
250. See Table 4. None of the six judges reporting juror confrontations or the eight 
judges reporting refusal to deliberate indicated that they had threatened or imposed con-
tempt for this behavior. 
251. Late jurors were sometimes required to forfeit juror pay as a penalty, accord-
ing to two judges. Of the 24 judges who reported that a juror had refused to answer a 
question on voir dire, even after being offered the chance to answer in camera, 16 re-
ported that they had dismissed the obstinate juror, 4 reported threatening contempt, 1 
reported holding the juror in contempt, and 3 reported that they took no action and left 
it to the attorneys. Judicial response to deceit during voir dire was mentioned in Part I 
- most judges either dismissed the juror or left it up to attorneys to challenge the juror. 
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ing jurors were usually awakened and offered a break, or a chance to 
drink water, cola, or coffee, but not reprimanded. Many other judges 
stated that they left it up to the lawyers to take action when jurors 
dozed, some noting that after all it was the lawyers who had put them 
to sleep. The survey al~o inquired about whether jurors had been prose-
cuted for their behavior. Of the 539 judges who answered this question, 
only fourteen reported having ever, in their entire career, presided over 
a case in which a former juror was prosecuted for misconduct as a ju-
ror, and those judges who did report such cases reported twenty-nine 
separate prosecutions. Six judges reported that those prosecuted for mis-
conduct as jurors served on juries that never reached a verdict, two 
judges reported jurors prosecuted for behavior on convicting juries, and 
one judge reported that the former juror had served on a jury that had 
acquitted a defendant. No judge reported a prosecution of a former juror 
who had served on a jury that had reached a verdict in a civil case. A 
larger sample would be helpful to determine whether or not prosecutors 
are more inclined to prosecute a juror for misconduct when that mis-
conduct deprives the government of a conviction. 
C. A Look Ahead 
1. Defining Jury Misconduct 
The preceding study suggests that changing trial procedures and 
social attitudes about juries will continue to prompt disagreement about 
what jury conduct is misconduct.252 Efforts to define misconduct must 
focus on whether the behavior undermines or advances the jury's pur-
poses. Such a focus will at least sharpen those debates over misconduct 
that it cannot resolve. For example, if one assumes that behavior that 
impairs the accuracy of verdicts and serves no other jury function is im-
proper, the propriety of various types of juror behavior may tum upon 
whether they are accuracy-enhancing or accuracy-impairing. Consider 
the rule barring jurors from talking to other jurors during trial about the 
See supra note 118. Many judges indicated in their comments that they questioned the 
juror further themselves before deciding whether to dismiss the juror. 1\vo judges noted 
that when jurors had lied they had declared mistrials. Several judges noted that false-
hoods were not verifiable or that the juror's dishonesty did not "rise to the level that 
could be prosecuted." 
252. For example, the catalogue of misconduct listed in the survey was for some 
judges overinclusive (e.g., some judges stated that they did not consider talking before 
deliberations to be misconduct) and for others, underinclusive (e.g., some judges indi-
cated that behavior not listed was misconduct, such as the failure to deliberate, coercion 
in the jury room, or nullification). 
TABLE4 
JUDICIAL REsPONSE TO MISCONDUCT DISCOVERED BEFORE TIIB VERDICT° 
Nwnberof Questioned Questioned Instructed 
Judges Dismissed Replaced Declared Threatened Imposed Offending Other Other 
T~ of Misconduct R~orted R~ortingb Juro!:!s~ Juro!{s} Mistrial Contemgt Contem~t Juro~s2 Jurors . Jurors 
Late or absent 444 91 177 9 61 23 286 14 90 
Sleeping 381 85 123 5 - - 225 - 52 
Premature deliberation 120 27 42 12 13 2 77 64 60 
Considered material not admitted as 110 20 28 25 6 I 72 54 39 
evidence 
Talked with non-jurors 108 36 35 14 8 3 81 45 34 
Feigned illness 87 33 45 3 13 3 38 4 9 
Contact with press, parties, witnesses 71 20 25 6 8 I 60 30 20 
Under the influence 65 39 31 0 5 2 25 2 8 
Visited scene of dispute/crime contrary 36 9 8 6 2 0 23 12 10 
to instructions 
Conducted ex~riments 22 3 3 4 2 0 14 7 8 
.lues represent the number of judges who indicated that they had responded to the misconduct with the specified action. Judges were instructed to select all applicable responses. 
1mber of judges reporting at least one case in the past three years in which they became convinced before th!! verdict that this type of misconduct had occurred. 
~ 
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evidence. This rule is said to protect the defendant from premature deci-
sionmaking before the defense has had its chance to oppose the prose-
cutor's claims. If by discussing the evidence a juror tunes out what is to 
come, the verdict may be less accurate than it would have been had she 
kept an open mind. But the more common effect of the rule may in-
stead be to undermine. accuracy, either by causing a juror to forget 
much of the prosecutor's case, or by preventing a juror from pointing 
out flaws in another juror's thought processes early on in the case when 
opinions are forming. Without any opportunity to discuss the case dur-
ing trial jurors may not discover until after they begin deliberations that 
they have questions or are confused about certain issues in the case, 
questions that they could have raised during the trial when the judge 
and counsel could have responded more effectively. As judicial views 
about the effects of this traditional prohibition against talking during the 
trial change, the rule is eroding, directly by repeal, and indirectly 
through neglect.253 Note-taking by jurors, and even questioning of wit-
nesses by jurors, thought at one time to impair the accuracy of verdicts, 
are increasingly viewed as improving verdict accuracy.254 Similar 
changes have taken place regarding jury access during deliberations to 
the charge against the defendant and to written versions of the judge's 
instructions.255 Present debates about whether or not a juror commits 
misconduct when she anticipates telling her story for profit, will in part 
depend on whether or not such anticipation impairs verdict accuracy.256 
253. Last year Arizona abandoned the rule in civil cases. See B. Michael Dann & 
George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizana Experience, 19 JUDICATURE 280, 281-83 
(1996). Five judges commented in the survey that they or their colleagues did not con-
sider this misconduct, and others noted that they did nothing to prevent this. See also 
William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 142-43 (al-
lowing jurors to talk could clear up confusion and help ease tension). 
254. Note-taking is probably more widespread than juror questioning. By 1965, 
only one state completely forbade jurors from taking notes, and most state and federal 
jurisdictions allowed judges to decide whether or not to permit note-taking. See Dragan 
D. Petroff, The Practice of Jury Note Taking - Misconduct, Right, or Privilege?, 18 
OKLA. L. REv. 125 (1965) (tracing history of note-taking rules); R.M. Wheddle, Anno-
tation, Taking and Use of Notes by Jury, 14 A.L.R.3o 831 (1967 & 1994 Supp.). 
Many courts continue to discourage juror-originated questioning. See, e.g., United 
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 448-50 (2d Cir. 1996) (arguing that questioning tends 
to impair juror neutrality and to encourage premature deliberations). For the latest com-
prehensive empirical work on the effects of note-taking and juror questioning, see Larry 
Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through Note Taking 
and Question Asking, 19 JUDICATURE 256 (1996). 
255. See Lehman, supra note 159, at 771 (noting change). 
256. See Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POLY. REV. 389 (1994) 
(claiming that there is no evidence that juror journalism negatively affects verdicts). 
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The criminal jury, however, continues to do more than find the 
facts. It educates citizens through their service, defines the reach of le-
gal obligations, enforces community standards of reasonableness, and 
legitimates trial outcomes. If jurors are supposed to accomplish these 
goals as well as decide what happened, as I believe they must, then it is 
not enough to classify juror behavior as proper or improper by referring 
only to whether it has a tendency to impair or enhance the accuracy of 
the verdict. Allowing a juror to refuse to deliberate or allowing jurors to 
acquit defendants in the face of strong evidence of guilt may not en-
hance accuracy, but that does not settle whether either type of behavior 
should be considered misconduct. We must consider whether it is con-
sistent with the jury's educative, lawmaking, or legitimating functions. 
Race-based nullification and nullification in cases carrying 
mandatory penalties, decried by some of the judges surveyed, offer re-
cent examples of this problem.257 Neither type of jury conduct is un-
precedented.258 Although differences of opinion about whether jurors 
ought to exercise their discretion in these ways have· been with us for a 
long time, nullification is presently under renewed attack. In the aca-
demic literature and the press, its constitutional roots are assailed, its 
wisdom questioned.259 It will take a more significant and sustained shift 
in beliefs concerning the jury's political role before courts seriously at-
tempt to regulate nullification. Indeed, effective regulation may elude 
257. See supra note 236. Compare Michael D. Weiss & Karl Zinsmeister, When 
Race Trumps Truth in Court, AM. ENTERPRISE, Jan. 1996, at 54 and Randall Kennedy, 
The Angry Juror, WALL ST. J:. Sept. 30, 1994, at A12 with Paul Butler, Racially Based 
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE LJ. 677 
(1995). 
258. White juries have refused to indict or convict white defendants in certain 
cases for various reasons for over a century, a phenomenon that in part has fueled ef-
forts to integrate the jury box. See, e.g., Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 6, at 882-97. In 
the nineteenth century juries were accused of acquitting prisoners charged with crimes 
carrying a mandatory death penalty, which in turn led legislators to "forthrightly grant 
the juries the discretion which they had been exercising in fact." McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971); see also 402 U.S. at 200 n.10 (noting that the practice of 
jury sentencing in noncapital crimes arose in the colonial period because of similar con-
cerns by jurors that penalties were too harsh). For further discussion, see Albert W. Al-
schuler, A Teetering Palladium?, 79 JUDICATURE 200, 201 (1996) (book review) [here-
inafter Alschuler, Teetering Palladium] (applauding jurors' efforts to negate the 
harshness of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences). 
259. See, e.g., David N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgive-
ness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 861 (1995); Andrew 
D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253 (1996); Chaya Weinberg-
Brodt, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (1990); 
see also CALIFORNIA REPORT. supra note 90, at 92 ("The Commission is unanimously 
and emphatically opposed to jury nullification and proposals to inform the jury of this 
power."). 
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courts. Veniremembers determined to acquit for impermissible reasons 
could be excluded from juries if they were honest enough to admit it.260 
It would be no easy task, however, to evaluate whether a juror was mo-
tivated to vote for acquittal by a reasonable doubt about guilt or a for-
bidden agenda.261 . 
Related to the concern of some judges that jurors are not partici-
pating fully or are engaging in improper nullification is the relatively 
modern suspicion of juries that agree too quickly.262 Rapid deliberations 
taking only minutes, often in the jury box, were quite common, even 
welcomed, 150 years ago. As deliberation times lengthened, speedy ver-
dicts attracted challenges from convicted defendants who alleged that 
such hasty decisionmaking was misconduct, even a denial of due pro-
cess. All such challenges have been deflected by judges who reasoned 
that there is no minimum time for deliberations and who refused to pre-
sume that jurors had abandoned their duties.263 As deliberation times 
continue to lengthen, however, this tolerant stance may weaken. For ex-
ample, in ordering a new trial earlier this year, a feaeral judge in Chi-
cago concluded that a jury that had returned with a conviction for pos-
260. Just as prosecutors in capital cases are pennitted to challenge for cause jurors 
who will not sentence a defendant to die because of their opposition to the death pen-
alty, prosecutors could also be pennitted to challenge jurors who insist that they are in-
clined to acquit under specified circumstances, assuming such behavior is prohibited. 
Cf. Lynne Bolduc, Time for a Change: Problems With the American Jury System, Wo-
MEN LJ., Dec. 1995, at 13, 16 (noting that one of the goals of the Fully Infonned Jury 
Association is "to educate jurors on how to be deceptive during voir dire, to avoid be-
ing tossed off the jury."). Screening of jurors who were predisposed to nullify was actu-
ally practiced at the tum of the century in New York. Prospective jurors were asked hy-
pothetical questions about violations of "unpopular statutes which the average juror 
[would] not consent to enforce," including the question, "Would you, being a juror, and 
being charged by the court upon a point of law, and knowing this point of law to be un-
sound, decline to accept the ruling?" BENJ. R. TuCKER, A BLOW AT TRIAL BY JURY: 
AN ExAMlNATION OF THE SPECIAL JURY LAW PASSED BY THE NEW YORK LEGIS· 
LATURE IN 1896, at 8, 10 (1898); see also Leipold, supra note 259, at 258, 313-16 
(recommending instructing jurors that they are not allowed to acquit except for certain 
specified reasons). 
261. See Leipold, supra note 259, at 322-23. But see id. at 321 (suggesting that 
special verdicts for criminal juries to specify the reason for their acquittals would assist 
in controlling nullification behavior). 
262. The most recent example of this concern, of course, is that expressed by 
many after the verdict in the Simpson case. See Gail Diane Cox, Speedy OJ. Jury 
Raises Doubts, NATL. L.J .. Oct. 16, 1995, at A6; Weiss & Zinsmeister, supra note 257, 
at 55 (quoting one commentator after the verdict, "The jury did not deliberate, it 
emoted."). 
263. See generally B.K. Carpenter, Annotation, Effect on Verdict in Criminal Case 
of Haste or Shortness of Time in Which Jury Reached It, 91 A.L.R.2o 1238 (1963 & 
Supp. 1993) (reporting a fascinating collection of cases in which courts have considered 
and rejected "too hasty" claims). 
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session of stolen mail after meeting for only ten minutes had failed to 
follow his instruction to deliberate and consider all of the evidence.264 
At least one court has granted a new trial in a civil case because it 
thought the jurors should have spent more time talking together.265 Like 
judges who believe that failure to deliberate is "good cause" for re-
moving a juror, or that a veniremember's intention to nullify should be 
the basis for a challenge for cause, judges who disapprove of some 
hasty verdicts may be unable to recognize, or at least unwilling to en-
courage, the independent political role that each juror fills when she 
joins a jury in a criminal case. 
The renewed attention to such acts of juror independence could be 
explained by recognizing that judges are only beginning to be called 
upon by litigants to evaluate the propriety of this type of conduct. Until 
relatively recently, judges have not learned until after the jury an-
nounces a deadlock or an acquittal if its members refused to deliberate 
or acquitted for political reasons or bias. By then the litigants and the 
judge have no recourse. Those few jurors who can "be proven to have 
disobeyed independent criminal prohibitions against perjury or obstruc-
tion of justice or bribery could be prosecuted,266 but the bulk of this be-
havior - as well as any resulting acquittal - has remained untoucha-
ble. Today, longer deliberations, more intense observation of jurors by 
courts and attorneys, and the duty to replace or dismiss deliberating ju-
rors who misbehave are shifting debates about the propriety of this jury 
behavior from the editorial page into the courtroom. 
2. /?.esponding to Misconduct 
Assuming courts can define misconduct, they should try harder to 
prevent it before it happens and to cure its effects prior to the verdict, 
rather than to rely primarily upon restrictive and expensive postverdict 
remedies. For just as gains in compliance with jury summonses have 
been achieved by diagnosing what keeps jurors away and targeting 
those aspects of service for elimination, courts should strive to diagnose 
what conditions facilitate juror misconduct and concentrate on remedy-
ing those conditions. We know remarkably little about what conditions 
264. See United States v. Cunningham, 916 F. Supp. 817, 820 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("It 
was not possible - especially in light of the relatively complicated nature of the evi-
dence relating to constructive possession - that the jurors actually 'deliberated' the ev-
idence, as they were instructed to do."). 
265. See Kenan v. Moore, 195 So. 167, 169 (Fla. 1940) ("[T]he record as a whole 
indicates that the jury could not in sixteen minutes have duly considered the evidence 
adduced and the charges of the court . . . . "). 
266. See supra text accompanying notes 207-09. 
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foster misconduct.267 For example, jurors may be dozing during trials 
because they have nothing to do for hours on end except to sit and ab-
sorb detail. Recognizing this, some forward-looking courts are trying to 
involve the jury more, allowing them to take notes, ask questions, and 
talk among themselves. about the case as it proceeds. Jurors may con-
ceal information during voir dire to spare themselves embarrassment or 
to avoid other negative consequences. Providing anonymity or more pri-
vacy during voir dire may help them comply with their oaths. Clearer 
instructions could reduce inadvertent mistakes by jurors. To the extent 
that such measures can prevent misconduct from occurring, they en-
hance the fairness, and the image of fairness, of jury trials. 
Deterring misconduct by punishing jurors themselves seems to be 
a less desirable approach. The same considerations that discourage 
judges from gearing up contempt proceedings against recalcitrant jurors 
probably also dampen enthusiasm for contempt proceedings against ju-
rors who disobey instructions during trial. Calibrating sanctions against 
jurors for misconduct is particularly tricky - too strict a penalty may 
deter jurors or other trial observers from reporting questionable con-
duct, 268 too lenient a penalty may make misconduct an attractive, or at 
least a costless, option for escaping service.269 Leaving the regulation of 
juror behavior to prosecutors is no solution either, as it poses too great 
a risk of selective and vindictive enforcement. 
In addition, remedies for misconduct that operate before a verdict 
is reached have significant advantages over postverdict remedies. Proce-
dures that may help judges discover, assess, and cure the effects of mis-
conduct before a verdict .is reached avoid expensive postconviction pro-
ceedings. A failure to deliberate or a coercive exchange between one or 
more jurors may be impossible to prove or cure after the trial is over, 
267. Why, for example, is misconduct more frequently reported by state judges? 
What steps could be taken to remove the incentives for jurors to lie about prior 
convictions? 
268. As one commentator has noted, the sanctions for misconduct should not be so 
high that those who misbehave, their fellow jurors, and their friends and family mem-
bers would be reluctant to report this activity. See Swaine, supra note 221, at 203-04. 
269. "Punishing" misbehaving jll\ors with dismissal may result in more miscon-
duct, not less, when one considers the jury avoidance behavior documented supra Part 
I. Denying the juror her fee upon proof of misconduct is a handy compromise proposed 
by one commentator (and adopted by at least one judge responding to the survey). See 
id. at 204 (recommending that judges withhold fees from jurors involved in miscon-
duct). Unfortunately, research suggests that losing a nominal jury fee is not likely to 
make much of a difference to many jurors. See G.T. Munsterman, supra note 83, at 217 
n.5 (noting that in Dallas's fee donation program, 30% of jurors donate their fees); Wil-
liam R. Pabst, Jr. et al., The Myth of the Unwilling Juror, 60 JUDICATURE 164, 164 
(1976) (concluding that fees have no effect on juror satisfaction). 
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but it is both provable and curable before the verdict, when the rule 
against jurors impeaching their verdict and the double jeopardy bar 
against retrying an acquitted defendant do not operate. Moreover, unlike 
postverdict remedies, preverdict remedies are the courts' only present 
hope of preventing irreversible yet error-tainted acquittals. And unfortu-
nately, it is the acquittals perceived to have resulted from error, not er-
ror-tainted convictions, that seem to do the most damage to the public 
image of the criminal jury today.270 
One preverdict device for nipping misconduct in the bud that 
seems to have achieved ·some popularity in the last few decades is the 
practice of substituting alternates even after deliberations have begun. 
In 1933 California amended its already-pioneering alternate jury statute 
to authorize judges to substitute alternates for jurors who were dis-
charged during deliberations, as long as all of the jurors were instructed 
to begin deliberations anew.271 Since then, ten states have joined Cali-
fornia, several of them only recently.272 The federal courts have resisted 
such a change, preferring instead to give judges ill criminal and civil 
cases the power to end a case with fewer jurors than the number that 
began rather than allow them to replace deliberating jurors.273 
Of course, both substitution and dismissal of deliberating jurors 
carry the risk that holdouts - or jurors perceived as potential holdouts 
- will be accused of misconduct by observers or by other jurors in 
hopes that they will be dismissed. As is the case with many jury inno-
vations, there is no empirical evidence in the form of surveys or other 
studies to refute or verify whether jurors in jurisdictions that allow attri-· 
tion or substitution during deliberation are any more likely than jurors 
in other jurisdictions to be "framed" by other jurors or to invent ex-
cuses themselves to get dismissed when the going gets tough. 
270. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME 178-81 (1995); Al-
schuler, Teetering Palladium, supra note 258, at 202-03. 
271. See CAL. PEN. CODE§ 1089 (West 1985) (first enacted 1933). 
272. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-171 (1994); IDAHO CRIM. R. 24(c)(3); IND. 
CODE ANN.§ 34-1-20.5-2 (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 22-3412(c) (1995); 
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 234A, § 68 (L~w. Co-op. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 46-16-
ll8 (1995); N.H. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:l3 (1983 & Supp 1995) (first enacted 
1993); N.J. R. GEN. APPL. 1:8-2(d) (enacted 1972); NEV. R.Ev. STAT.§ 175.061 (1991) 
(first enacted 1967); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.5 (enacted 1989). 
273. See generally Joshua G. Grunat, Note, Post-Submission Substitution of Alter-
nate Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases: Effects of Violations of Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure 23(b) and 24(c), 55 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 861, 868-70 (1987); Lester B. 
Orfield, Annotation, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 F.R.D. 43, 46 (1962). 
Postsubmission substitution of jurors has been upheld as constitutional in federal and 
state courts. See Claudio v. Snyder, 68 F.3d 1573 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting cases). 
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Another promising reform is enhancement of the dialogue between 
jurors and judges during the trial. Judges can take an active role in dis-
covering and correcting misconceptions of the law, and, more impor-
tantly, the jurors can take a more active role in solving problems in 
their consideration of the case.274 This is, in some ways, a throwback to 
the control judges once exerted over juries, control which has been so 
circumscribed that any contact between judge and juror during delibera-
tion is now viewed with suspicion.275 A range of contact is available -
judges could actively poll the jurors in writing or orally, alone or in a 
group, about misconduct or misunderstandings,276 or simply emphasize 
their invitation to jurors to write notes to the judge if they have ques-
tions during deliberations. Either change would provide the judge with 
more opportunity to clear up jury problems before those problems affect 
the verdict. The survey suggests that judges already appear to be taking 
steps like these to discover and control harassment, coercion, and recal-
citrance in the jury room before deliberations, and to cure it before a 
verdict is returned.211 
The one preventive approach few have yet dared to consider is to 
examine those procedural features of the American jury trial that seem 
to foster misconduct. It may be that giving the judge much more control 
over the presentation and duration of proof,278 prohibiting publicity 
about criminal cases before and during trial, or simplifying some evi-
dence rules, for instance, might help to prevent some forms of miscon-
duct. Precedent has established so soundly the procedural facets of the 
trial process targeted by such changes, however, that each is practically 
impervious to change. Courts continue to develop more information 
about the costs to the public, jurors, and litigants of America's complex 
274. See ARIZONA REPORT, supra note 103, at 115-21; Swaine, supra note 221, 
at 202 (advocating that judges be encouraged to instruct jurors to report misconduct 
prior to verdict). 
275. Cf. Lettow, supra note 189, at 528 (noting the practice of many eighteenth-
century judges of talking to jury about their verdict before discharging them). 
276. See, e.g., Dann & Logan, supra note 253, at 283; Arthur D. Austin, Why Ju-
rors Don't Heed the Trial, NATL. L.J .. Aug. 12, 1985, at 15, 18 (arguing judges ought to 
be less reluctant to clear up juror questions about confusing instructions). 
277. A return to sequestration however, may be one front-end solution to miscon-
duct that causes more trouble than it prevents. See James P. Levine, The Impact of Se· 
questration on Juries, 79 JUDICATURE 266 (1996); Marcy Strauss, Sequestration 
(forthcoming, on file with author). After the Simpson trial, the judge in the Oklahoma 
City bombing case requested briefs detailing alternatives to sequestration. See Seques-
tration Alternatives Offered in Oklahoma Bomb Case, 10 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) No. 
l, at 13-17 (Jan. 3, 1996). 
278. Cf. General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 
1504, 1508-09 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1017 (1996) (upholding trial 
court's decision in civil case to limit each side to 23 hours a piece, and to deny defend-
ant extra time to present a rebuttal case, and only five minutes to cross-examine each 
remaining witness, and noting that due process was provided by giving defendant "time 
to conduct limited cross-examination" of the witnesses). 
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and ever-lengthening trial procedures. Perhaps lawmakers will decide 
someday that these costs warrant the reconsideration of some of these 
procedures.279 For now, however, there is little basis in the foregoing re-
search to conclude that today's judges believe that the costs of jury mis-
conduct have risen high enough to justify radical changes in procedure. 
Undoubtedly many more steps can and should be taken to ease the 
trial burdens on jurors and reduce the likelihood of verdicts based on 
misunderstanding or foul play, steps that fall short of tossing aside 
respected, constitutionally based decisions of the past century. Most 
courts have yet to take steps to improve and clarify jury instructions, re-
duce trial time, or help the jury accomplish its task in other ways. Now, 
as before, jury misconduct cannot be ignored, but must be carefully 
managed, lest "[j]ury trial . . . degenerate into a farce, become a hiss 
and a byword, and the reproach of all good citizens. " 280 
CONCLUSION 
Our commitment to compulsory jury service by average citizens is 
one of the most fascinating and defining features of the American trial 
system. It has also proved to be both a blessing and a curse for efforts 
to control the behavior of jurors. Some conditions of jury service that 
might have facilitated juror misconduct have been curtailed because of 
their deterrent effect on prospective jurors. Because jury duty is a right 
of citizenship, however, we have not attempted to create a pool of pro-
fessional juror volunteers with the training and experience to avoid mis-
conduct. Nor do courts retain or dismiss jurors from further service 
based on how many mistakes they make. Instead, our present system 
enlists reluctant amateurs to perform a demanding and unfamiliar job, 
in secret, with little accountability. In such a scheme, some degree of 
misconduct is inevitable. The challenge for courts of the next two cen-
turies is to settle upon acceptable definitions and tolerable levels of jury 
misconduct and to find ways to minimize both jury misconduct and 
avoidance that preserve the fundamental features of trial by lay jury. If 
history is any guide, an ounce of prevention may continue to be worth a 
pound of cure. 
279. See, e.g., ARIZONA REPORT. supra note 103, at 71 (recommending that 
judges be given express authority to limit the amount and type of evidence each side is 
allowed and how much time each side has to present its case, make opening statements, 
etc.). 
280. Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Bowen, 79 S.E. 1113 (Ga. 1913). 

